There is one big problem that is mostly ignored in any analysis on Pakistan — its population. Pakistan’s population is analogous to a ticking time bomb. If containing Pakistan means alienating an already disgruntled 180 million-strong nation, it is inevitably going to prove to be a disastrous policy
As I have developed an odd proclivity for drawing parallels between apparently disparate objects of interest, David Rothkopf’s blog post for Foreign Policy magazine, titled ‘Innovations in diplomacy: introducing the anti-ally alliance’, caught my eye at once. Rothkopf is a lifelong Washington insider so one should not dismiss him lightly. Hillary Clinton’s recent statement in India, as Rothkopf suggests, is a proclamation of an alliance to contain Pakistan — an idea that he fervently supports.
It is now obvious that the Pak-US ‘partnership’ is becoming frustrating for both sides and the frustration is being vent on petty tit-for-tat manoeuvres. But, let me concur that the idea of a US-led containment of Pakistan is an interesting prospect; it is, at first sight, quite a fantastical idea. However, it is far from an innovation in American foreign policy.
There is a striking parallel between the relationship the US shared with the Soviet Union during World War II and the one it has with Pakistan during the ongoing war on terrorism. The Soviet Union was a wartime ally and a post-war threat at the very same time. So, it seems, is Pakistan. Pakistan’s military has been dependent on American aid throughout the duration of the post-9/11 conflict in Afghanistan and within Pakistan; so was the Soviet army. The USSR was relying, although to a lesser extent than Pakistan, on an American lend-lease programme during the World War. Moreover, the alliance with the Soviet Union, much like the one with Pakistan, was a transactional alliance. The post-war agendas of both sides differed greatly.
It was the anticipation of the post-war scenario that led to the standoff with the Soviet Union, and a very similar scenario is leading to an intensifying confrontation with Pakistan.
In February 1946, after the Truman administration had reached a virtual impasse on its policy towards the USSR, a relatively junior diplomat based in Moscow, George F Kennan, broke the ice with his 8,000 word ‘long telegram’ — paving the way for the long haul of containing the massive communist mammoth. And, as we see things now, there is once more a breakdown of relations with a wartime ally and Washington is again looking to re-invent its relationship with a wartime ally in a post-war scenario.
The US’s relationship with Islamabad has always been viewed with scepticism on both sides — there never was any trust between the two allies — much like the relationship with the Soviet Union. Even while the war was going on, as John Lewis Gaddis argues in his Strategies of Containment, US President Roosevelt was conscious of the risks of Soviet influence in post-war Europe. And, as it happens, Pakistan’s duplicity in the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda is a similar predicament forerunning the endgame in Afghanistan.
This whole story makes up for a nice prologue to a Cold War against Pakistan. But analysts sitting in crisis-embroiled Washington should not run towards a conclusion just yet. Pakistan is no communist Soviet Union, nor is it run by Taliban-style ideologues. And, moreover, Afghanistan is no Germany to be stabilised, tamed and reined in like post-war Europe.
With some (ground) reality checks and some historical sense, the fantastical idea of containing Pakistan starts seeming vague and impractical.
What would be the objectives of such ‘containment’? They can be vague at best. Pakistan is run by nationalist forces and has a deeply divided populace of diverse ethnicities. There is no common national ideology, unlike communism in the case of the Soviet Union. Pakistan is a broken country, while the Soviet Union was a superpower. Let us assume, for once, that a containment policy would seek to weaken Pakistan to the point where it disintegrates or Balkanises (an idea being backed by many anti-Pakistan lobbies). This would mean a catastrophe for the whole of Asia. In whose hands would Pakistan’s strategic assets, which are spread across the country, fall? And, more importantly, who would volunteer to pacify a (massively armed) civilian population that is already brimming with anti-Americanism and is fiercely anti-India?
There is one big problem that is mostly ignored in any analysis on Pakistan — its population. Pakistan’s population is analogous to a ticking time bomb. According to safe projections, it is soon to become the world’s largest Muslim country in terms of population. If containing Pakistan means alienating an already disgruntled 180 million-strong nation, it is inevitably going to prove to be a disastrous policy.
Drawing parallels does seem, on the face of it, quite a neat exercise. But history, as it happens, is not neat at all — it is full of contradictions and paradoxes that cannot be lumped together. There are fundamental differences between both the plot and the principal actors in the present dilemma facing the US and the one that it faced in 1946.
At present, a quid pro quo policy towards Pakistan seems to be dysfunctional at best. A campaign to build public pressure on Pakistan through controlled leaks to the international press has not yielded much fruit, nor has the Pakistani military yielded to the suspension of the $ 800 million military aid; the army, in a recent corps commanders conference, shrugged off the punishment imposed by the US by largely ignoring it. While the carrot and the stick both seem to be ineffective, revisiting the experience with the Soviet Union might seem like an easy policy solution for the US. But it is not. Dialogue is still a better option.
The reality is that Pakistan is an immediate neighbour of Afghanistan, sharing with it a 1,610 miles long porous border — and a foreseeable long future too. Moreover, Pakistan has a larger Pashtun population than Afghanistan itself. While the US is looking for cooperation from Pakistan in view of its short-term objectives — those of troop withdrawal and Obama’s re-election — Pakistan on the other hand has to deal with Afghanistan for the long haul. It is the failure to recognise the fact that Pakistan has a genuine interest in the endgame in Afghanistan that has led to the present stalemate. A solution to this stalemate is the reconciliation of American short-term objectives with Pakistan’s long-term relationship with the Afghans. And such a solution can only be arrived at with negotiated give-and-take from both sides. But, at the same time, Pakistan must also shun the manner in which it deals with the US — a now obsolete routine that has an aura of duplicity. The Pakistani leadership should come clean with the US, telling it clearly what they can and cannot do.
Containment, however, should be left to the books of American history students.
The writer is a consultant with the Centre for International Media Ethics and a freelance writer. He can be reached at talhajalal@hotmail.com
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