SPY EYES

National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz, who met US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel on Tuesday, has said that only a regional approach of total non-interference can bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

At his meeting with Secretary Hagel and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, Mr Aziz also “underscored Pakistan’s commitment to… facilitating US drawdown from Afghanistan”, said an official statement.

Earlier, Mr Aziz conceded that the US plan to withdraw most of its troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year would create a vacuum in Afghanistan, but warned that this “vacuum should only be filled by Afghans, not outsiders”.

At the Pentagon meeting, Mr Aziz said that “a forward looking, broad-based and enduring defence partnership between Pakistan and the US is critical for security and stability in the region”.

The adviser, who is visiting Washington for the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, also said that Pakistan would not “pressurise Afghanistan” to sign a security agreement with the United States.

Mr Aziz said that while experts felt the proposed security agreement would help stabilise Afghanistan, Pakistan believed that “it’s for the Afghans to decide whether they want to do this deal”.

He said that Pakistan and the US were also working on a framework for defence reimbursement after 2014 when the United States plans to pull most of its combat troops from Afghanistan.

US officials will present their reimbursement proposals at a joint meeting in February, Mr Aziz said.

He visited the Pentagon with Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Ambassador Jalil Abbas Jilani, Secretary Defence Asif Yasin Malik and Chief of the General Staff Lt-Gen Ishfaq Nadeem Ahmad.

The meeting focused on security cooperation and identified key priorities for the strengthening the defence partnership in the future.

Mr Aziz noted that positive momentum in defence exchanges over the last one year had helped both sides make significant progress in a number of areas such as supply routes, counter-IEDs cooperation and counter-terrorism.

Talking to journalists, Mr Aziz said there could be no peace in Afghanistan unless all countries of the region followed the same policy of non-interference and “have no favourites in that country”.

Dawn News

The permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) and Iran hammered out an interim nuclear deal (the so-called Joint Plan of Action) which entered into force on January 20. The Joint Plan of Action will involve Iran eliminating stockpiles of its more highly enriched uranium, dismantling some its enrichment related infrastructure, agreeing to more inspections and not to activate any more centrifuges. In return, Iran gets some sanctions relief. However, given the poor history and number of irritants in each bilateral relationship between Iran and the West, it is likely that a broader politico-security deal with Iran, if there is to be one, will still be in the process of being negotiated a couple of years from now.

In my forthcoming book on Iranian foreign policy, Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (I B Tauris, 2014), I make the argument that active containment of Iran has failed and that active engagement (consistent diplomacy and the utilization of a range of soft power tools, mainly economic, to support and achieve clear diplomatic objectives) will help rebuild relations between Iran and the West. The U.S. and its Western allies could include positive measures such as sanctions relief and eventually sanctions removal, foreign direct investment to develop Iran’s oil and gas industry, and technology transfer from countries such as Japan to achieve this objective. But such engagement requires time. I also argue that a deal with Iran not only hinges on the success of the preliminary nuclear deal, but also on the success of any renewed cooperation in other areas. For example, should there be clear headway made from bringing Iran into informal or formal talks on the future of Syria (e.g. Geneva II) or Afghanistan, then this could contribute to confidence and sustain future diplomatic engagement.

Syria

It is difficult to identify where Syria might be by the end of the decade given the current stalemate in the conflict. The situation remains fundamentally tied to establishing facts on the ground by the Syrian military and opposition forces. No matter how surprising the election of a moderate, Hassan Rouhani, was in the recent Iranian presidential elections, Iran’s solid political, financial and military alliance with Syria will endure because the mutual fear of insecurity and rationale for resistance to U.S. or Israeli regional hegemony remains.

It is therefore highly likely that after this initial nuclear negotiation, the U.S. and Iran will encounter some serious ideological and geo-strategic obstacles that will be far more difficult to resolve than a compromise on technical details for a nuclear program that Rouhani has already explicitly stated has ”no place in Iran’s security doctrine.” Given the current dynamic, Iran’s relationship with the West is unlikely to change dramatically in the coming years. At best, there could be more economic cooperation, particularly in signing new oil and gas contracts and in settling past debts. The relationship remains fundamentally constrained by the Israeli government and the U.S. Congress which take a skeptical view of any Iranian foreign policy reform and a punitive approach to sanctions enforcement and tightening. It also remains constrained by the ultra-nationalist hardliners in Iran (including the IRGC) whose interests are best served by maintaining an anti-Western policy and those in the political establishment who are unwilling to cede further concessions to the West on sensitive security matters without reciprocal concessions.

Managing the Diplomatic Track

It is therefore possible amid tight institutional constraints that the Obama administration has done all it can do on Iran and will leave a legacy of improved relations without any overall political reconciliation. The lack of normalized relations will continue to perpetuate the negative aspect of relations between Iran and the Gulf States because the U.S. will be unable to leverage substantial ties with Iran into a win-win regional security strategy. Although the strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for dominance in the Islamic world and accusations about alleged Iranian interference in the domestic affairs of the Gulf States are likely to continue, there are signs the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may be moderating its stance on Iran. Besides speculation that secret talks between the UAE and Iran over an unresolved islands dispute in the Persian Gulf are close to a successful conclusion, the ruler of Dubai and prime minister of the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, has publicly stated his support for sanctions against Iran to be lifted. Whilst such negotiations and gestures may lead to improved bilateral relations between the UAE and Iran, it is doubtful they will facilitate meaningful changes in the region.

The U.S. Congress has already expressed resistance to rolling back sanctions against Iran. Although the Democrats have a slim majority in the Senate (52 Democrats versus 46 Republicans as of December 2013), about half of all senators back a bill for onerous new sanctions against Iran called the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act  proposed by Senator Robert Mendez (D-NJ). It is unclear if the bill will achieve the two-thirds majority needed to pass, but President Obama has already threatened to veto it since it would compromise the current diplomatic agreement. However, the bill probably would gain the necessary congressional support if Iran was perceived to have broken the agreement. Such a unilateral move without close coordination with western allies could be enough to undermine the entire sanctions regime.

Robert Gates recently asserted that: ”There is no international problem that can be addressed or solved without the engagement and leadership of the United States…,” and yet the U.S. government has been unable to solve the Iranian conundrum for the past 30 years, even when it was in its interests to do so immediately post 9/11. What U.S. foreign policy has lacked in the Middle East is diplomatic ambition. Whereas hundreds of billions of dollars have been pumped into the War on Terror over the past decade, little headway has been made in policy areas that could have contributed more to bridging the old ideological and sectarian divides that have manifested themselves in new Middle East conflicts. Lack of tangible progress on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) has not only created a jaundiced view of the issue by those most familiar with it, but some Israeli politicians are now openly skeptical of U.S. arbitration. Nevertheless, the successful conclusion of a two-state solution would make it infinitely easier to be optimistic that progress could be made on other regional issues. Importantly, the conclusion of the MEPP would help define borders, ensure the recognition of Israel by all the states in the Arab world, and contribute to an overall reduction in regional tensions.

Finally, whilst the Obama administration has managed to avoid becoming embroiled in the Arab Spring, it has not managed to resolve the crises in Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. The U.S.-Iran deal and the MEPP could therefore be the beginning of the U.S. government regaining traction on vital Middle East issues. At the same time, the Obama administration must remain cognizant that it is the only actor capable of managing a resurgent Iran and providing security guarantees to the Gulf states and Israel to allay their fears and limit any hard power responses.

Post Obama U.S.-Iran Relations

Under the next U.S. president, the pendulum should swing back from the extremes of the George W. Bush administration’s military adventurism and the Obama administration’s largely hands-off policy during the Arab Spring to a point where the U.S. government becomes a strategic enabler in the Middle East. In this sense the U.S. government could use its vast resources to set the preconditions (including helping to activate the political will of the region’s political leaders) necessary to concluding revised security and economic treaties. The cases of chemical weapons use against Iranian and Syrian civilian populations as well as widespread concern about the Iranian nuclear program all point to the urgency of implementing a new regional security agenda which is acceptable to all stakeholders.

The U.S. government should be championing this with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories in the Gulf States and across the region (including NPT non-signatories such as Israel, India and Pakistan) where the U.S. could leverage its strong bilateral relationships into forming an agreement on applying revised Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols. This would be a logical extension of the Iranian nuclear deal which has raised the bar of transparency and verification, and it could become a possible interim step to establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZME). The incentive for Israel to finally declare its nuclear arsenal and submit to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) controls would be the immediate implementation of substantial additional measures designed to enhance its national security. For Iran, such an agreement would further undermine its resistance ideology.

Whilst Obama’s main foreign policy legacy so far appears to be in establishing the Action Plan with Tehran, only with the U.S. government engaging more ambitiously and actively on the MEPP and on other security and economic issues can a broader legacy with Iran and the Arab world be realized.

The Diplomat

In the half-year since the Egyptian military ousted President Mohamed Morsi, U.S. officials from President Obama on down have repeatedly said that the United States seeks to advance “Egypt’s transition to democracy .” Unfortunately, given Egypt’s downward political spiral, what is probably intended to be a principled policy formulation sounds either dangerously naive or deeply cynical — and is pointing U.S. policy down the wrong path.

Supporting Egyptian democracy is certainly the right thing to do. Unlike in some countries where U.S. interests pull in conflicting directions, the achievement of democracy in Egypt would advance the critical U.S. security interest in longer-term stability as well as peace with Israel and would help to contain violent extremism. Only an inclusive, pluralistic political order that respects Egyptians’ aspirations for a voice, accountability and justice would put an end to the repeated paroxysms of mass public protest and signs of incipient extremism. Supporting Egyptian democracy is not a pleasing idealistic extra; it is essential to an effective, hard-nosed policy for security and regional peace.

But there is a serious problem with the constant U.S. references to supporting Egypt’s democratic transition: There is no democratic transition in Egypt. That formulation was appropriate after President Hosni Mubarak’s fall in February 2011, when open political contestation took place despite undemocratic steps by various actors. It may have been plausible, briefly, after the military’s ouster of Morsi last July. But in recent months the true colors of the military’s political project have become clear. Through a bruising cascade of actions, laws and decrees that violate basic rights and freedoms, constrain political space and sharpen polarization, Egypt’s security apparatus has defined the boundaries of a new semi-authoritarian system. Last week’sreferendum on a new constitution, marred by the exclusion of dissenting views, cemented in place a foundation stone for that project: The constitution gives extensive autonomy and immunity to the army, as well as the right to try civilians in military courts.

In this context, continued U.S. references to the “democratic transition” in Egypt are problematic, especially when accompanied, as they often are, by references to “progress on Egypt’s road map” and the “shared goals” of the U.S. and Egyptian governments. At a minimum, the administration sounds seriously out of touch. (Imagine if throughout the political gridlock and polarization in Washington last year, President Obama had repeatedly stated his support for Congress’s “constructive bipartisanship.”) Worse, these references, however well-intentioned, give the impression that Washington is doing the opposite of supporting democracy — that it is backing the Egyptian military’s project and playing along by depicting it as a democratic path.

Getting the words right on Egypt has become all the more important in the past month — recent U.S. legislation says that nearly $1 billion in U.S. military and economic assistancecan be released only if the secretary of state certifies that the Egyptian government “is taking steps to support a democratic transition.” The remaining allocated aid is half a billion dollars and can be spent only if the secretary makes a similar certification about a new Egyptian government after presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled to take place over the next few months. Unlike with previous legislation, the administration may not waive those conditions on national security grounds. A hedge is still possible: the administration could choose to highlight a few strands of political progress while playing down major backward steps, such as the massive ongoing crackdown against Islamists and secular critics of the military in which hundreds have been killed and thousands imprisoned. But would that be wise, and would the relevant congressional committees accept such a certification?

Rather than continuing to describe Egypt’s political conditions with words that have less and less to do with reality, the Obama administration and Congress ought to be forthright and accurate about what is happening. While continuing to look for concrete, meaningful ways to weigh in in favor of pluralism, openness and justice in Egypt, the administration should stop using aspirational language that can be misconstrued as supporting current Egyptian political realities. Clarifying our words would also help clarify our policy.

The administration is likely to feel compelled to maintain certain kinds of security cooperation with Egypt and to support the Egyptian people directly via educational or other assistance. But it should make clear that it does so despite strong disapproval of the political path the military is following and serious concern about that path’s implications for the Egyptian people and for U.S. interests, which might well be threatened by reinvigorated Islamic extremism. Washington must not pretend that some empty imitations of democratic processes, such as the recent referendum and what are likely to be equally flawed parliamentary and presidential elections, constitute a meaningful return to the path toward “bread, freedom and social justice” that Egyptians rightfully demanded in 2011.

Washington Post

Monsignor Dieudonné Nzapalainga leans forward, frowning. His bulky frame fills the hotel armchair as the latest news agency copy is read to him. “That’s bad. Very bad,” he says quietly. The Reuters reports describes a convoy of more than two dozen vehicles carrying heavily armed Seleka rebels leaving Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR), and heading north.

The news fills the city’s archbishop with gloom. “They needed to be held accountable for what they had done. We cannot have impunity,” he says wearily. His friend and companion on this London visit, the imam Oumar Kobine Layama, representing the country’s Muslim minority, nods in agreement.

The Central African Republic descended into chaos in March last year, when the mainly Muslim Seleka rebels ousted President François Bozizé. Archbishop Nzapalainga appealed for help from the international community on the Global development site in November, warning that the country was teetering on the edge of catastrophe. Then 65,000 had fled from their homes. Today the total is nearer 1 million, almost a quarter of the population.

The archbishop and the imam have been touring European capitals, seeking support for their benighted country. In France they met President François Hollande; in London they are being received by Lady Warsi and a handful of officials.

The religious leaders are appealing to the British government for political support to try to halt the killings. “In particular,” their letter to the prime minister, David Cameron, reads, “we call on the United Kingdom to support EU efforts in a full deployment of Eufor” – the European rapid reaction force.

The UN has warned repeatedly of the danger of a full-scale genocide in CAR. Nzapalainga says this is a real threat, with Christian and Muslim youths roaming the streets, seeking revenge for previous atrocities. “The two groups are at war,” warns Kobine. “And they are led by bandits.”

Has the presence of 1,600 French and 4,000 African forces done anything to improve the situation? Yes, both men agree. “If it was not for them the whole country would have been in flames,” the archbishop says.

But the situation is complex. Chadian forces are among the African troops who comprise the bulk of the peacekeepers in and around Bangui. They have been closely allied with the Seleka and have been accused of joining them in attacks on Christian communities.

The archbishop and the imam fear the rebels will re-form in the remote north-east and reopen their campaign. They say 10 generals who led the rebellion came from Chad, although they describe them as mercenaries rather than Chadian army officers. But both agree that Chad and Sudanhave repeatedly intervened in CAR’s affairs. “We have a soft belly,” says Nzapalainga. “Everyone takes advantage of us.”

The real problem is that, seen from Paris, CAR is of only secondary importance compared with Chad. France has had a particular penchant for the Chadians since the former colony came out in support of General de Gaulle during the second world war. A French military base is situated in eastern Chad, with troops ready to serve across Africa.

But the religious leaders remain hopeful that the situation can be salvaged. A week ago, Catherine Samba-Panza, a respected businesswoman with a reputation for independence, was elected to serve as head of state by the transitional parliament. She is the country’s first woman president and the archbishop warns she will not succeed without international support. “Civil servants have not been paid for the last five months,” he says. “The army needs to be rebuilt so that we can protect ourselves.”

Clearly there is much to be done, but the omens are not all bad. The US is threatening sanctions against those involved in religious-based violence. Germany, for the first time in years, is contemplating sending troops into an African conflict. The defence minister, Ursula von der Leyen, said on Sunday her country could not “look the other way when murder and rape are a daily occurrence, if only for humanitarian reasons”. Even Britain, which has ruled out providing ground troops, is willing to provide financial and political support to these endeavours.

Ending the violence will require international as well as African resolve, particularly if Chadian and Sudanese interference in the Central African Republic is to be ended. But it will also need goodwill among the Christian and Muslim communities. “We are doing what we can,” Kobine says. “We have trained 30 religious leaders on dialogue and conflict resolution. Now we must train many more.”

It is a small beginning in a vast and troubled land, but the first seeds of peace must be planted somewhere and the archbishop and the imam are doing what they can.

guardian

The firebrand interior minister of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) party, ChaudhryNisar Ali Khan, made a typically nonintellectual gaffe in the National Assembly last week; but he will not be properly reprimanded for it. Khan stated in the course of his familiarly unbuttoned harangue condemning Bangladesh for having hanged a rapist leader of Jamaat-e-Islami: “I am a Muslim first and a patriotic Pakistani later.”

No one in brainwashed Pakistan will realize how Khan has delegitimized the state of Pakistan he serves as its interior minister. By proclaiming his supra-state identity, he was in fact trying to place himself in a “moral position” to violate the sovereignty of Bangladesh which he could not do as a “patriotic Pakistani.” The pan-Islamic Muslim label is routinely claimed by religious parties who want the Constitution of Pakistan changed to reflect faithfully the edicts of the true Shariah. Terrorists also claim the right to “correct” the “errant Pakistani state” on the basis of their superior Muslim identity.

Unfortunately, those, like Najam Sethi writing in The Friday Times, who have dared to criticize Khan for making himself supra-state, will be excoriated and subjected to the ignominy of being called American agents, thus laying them open to terrorist attacks—which may actually be carried out by another “Muslim-first”-believing policeman!

The Muslim-first slogan, of course, comes from the community of clerics who began in the early 20th century to reject the nation-state and nationalism. In fact, their jurisprudence rejects international frontiers and makes states who offend Islam fair game for their cross-border warriors. But the nation-state in which they live ensures equal rights to all Pakistanis, not to all Muslims. That’s why if you ask a Pakistani Christian or Hindu about his identity he will forcefully assert his Pakistani identity. His embedded message is: “Please treat me at par with Muslims.”

Last year, Zakir Naik, a “renowned” Islamic orator of India, was on a TV channel talking to British Pakistanis about their identity. (His entry into the U.K. was thereafter banned.) He said why get embarrassed when the Brits ask you: “Are you a Muslim first or British first?” His solution to the dilemma concealed in this question was: ask a counter question, “Are you a human being first or a Briton first?” No one saw through the falsehood of this formulation: being human precedes even the Muslim identity and, therefore, bars Muslim Brits from claiming to be Muslims first.

Naik said: “Turn the tables, let the Brit be embarrassed. When asked this question, he will have to say he is a human being first. The situation created by this confusion will spare the Pakistani Brit the dilemma of a clash between his religious identity and his national one.” But what Naik said pertained to an issue that raises its head in Pakistan too. And none other than Pakistan’s interior minister has highlighted it.

I once conducted a TV debate in 2006 with an audience. Those who said they were Muslim first won by a 90 percent count. Pakistan is an Islamic state and all of us are Muslims; therefore, it is easy to say that we are Muslims first and then Pakistani. The Pakistan Movement should also support this thesis because we claim that Muslims had become a nation before they demanded a state.

But the nation-state poses a problem. Why do the non-Muslims insist on being Pakistanis first? The answer is that they want to be treated equally with other Pakistanis. If they emphasize their Christian or Hindu identity and put it before their Pakistani one, they might be treated unequally. The nation-state in Europe favors multiple identities and demands that all identities be treated equally. And for that, all those who live in the U.K. must call themselves British first.

The question arises: Why do only the Muslims as a minority insist that they are Muslims first? It is clear that unlike the Christian minority in Pakistan, they, as a minority group in non-Muslim countries, want to stand apart. What is hidden behind this gesture is a refusal to integrate and a nation-state is bound to clash if its various communities don’t integrate. And the trick is that expat Pakistanis in the U.K. know that the U.K. will treat them equally under law even if they don’t integrate.

Not so in Pakistan. The nation-state has wanted to gloss over secondary or tertiary identities to create unity. In Pakistan, the first problem that arose was linked to regional identities: Sindhi, Punjabi, Bengali, Baloch, Pakhtun, etc. The state wanted them to be only Pakistanis and said so. When it did not work, it abolished the provinces. Now as far as religious identities are concerned, Pakistan is overwhelmingly Muslim, and most of us don’t care if non-Muslims are treated unequally. If we were like the Brits, we would have said we are Pakistanis first.

But when in Pakistan you say “Muslim-first,” you in a way destroy the nation-state of Pakistan and place yourself in a position to violate the sovereignty of other Muslim states. That is what interior minister Khan did this past week. The nation-state is no utopia, but it is better than any other kind of state.

In Pakistan, the non-Muslim instinctively wants to integrate as a Pakistani; in the U.K. the Muslim minority wants to stand apart. There, the majority wants to be British first on the principle of equality; here the minority non-Muslim is appealing for equality as a Pakistani. The conclusion is simple: the majority community in Pakistan doesn’t much care if the non-Muslims are treated unequally.

Pakistan follows the rest of the Muslim world in thinking about the modern state. There was a time when it was normal for a Pakistani to say that he was a Pakistani first; now he says he is a Muslim first, little realizing that he is negating the modern state. Most of the states in the Muslim world began as modern states, but are now on the brink of choosing a pre-modern order that is a stranger to democracy.

BY KHALED AHMED
NEWSWEEK PAKISTAN

There is a widely held belief among the general public in Pakistan that the army is the ultimate arbiter of what happens in Pakistani politics.

It is thought, for example, that most election results are predetermined by the “agencies” – an oblique reference to the secret service apparatus of the Pakistani defense establishment. The agencies decide who will win and who will lose. And important government decisions especially those related to foreign policy and internal security cannot be made without the army’s tacit consent or approval.

Does the army indeed exercise this level of control over Pakistani politics? It is difficult to affirm or refute this with any reasonable level of confidence. But the more interesting question, and one that perhaps can be answered, is: Why would the army want to interfere?

To understand this one has to understand two sets of people: Those who run the army – the generals. And those who run the civilian administration – the politicians. Politicians first: This is a motley set. They include feudal landlords, hereditary “pirs“- the descendants of long deceased holy men, urban mafiosi, and a spattering of mullahs. This whole set is not usually associated, in the public eye, with integrity, honesty, decency, competence or for that matter patriotism.

The army on the other hand recruits its soldiers from across the social spectrum

The selection process – especially for the officer corps – is competitive and demanding. Only the best survive. In some sense the army is a complete meritocracy – it is “up or out.” If you meet the cut you are promoted to the next rank. If you do not you retire. Hence those who run the army – the top generals – get to where they are on the basis of their merit and competence. Remember also that the army inculcates patriotism in all its soldiers – enlisted men and officers. The message that their raison détre is to defend Pakistan to the last breath is hammered into their minds again and again. In the end, whatever else you say about these men, you cannot say that they are not patriotic.

So on the civilian side, running the country, you have a set of politicians of dubious competence and integrity who get to where they are because of inherited privilege or deception, or coercion, or other even less savory methods. Ask the general public what they think of their politicians patriotism and the response, stripped of expletives, would be that they will happily sell a close family member for a foreign passport.

On the other side are a group of generals who have come up through the ranks based on their competence and professionalism. And etched in their conscience, by virtue of their training, is the paramount importance of protecting Pakistan from any perceived threats.

Now back to the question of why the army would want to interfere in politics: The generals, professional and competent patriots, do not trust the politicians, people of questionable competence, integrity and sincerity, to be faithful to the country. They believe, perhaps not without reason, that if these politicians are left to their own devices they would pose a real and present threat to the integrity and security of Pakistan. And since direct interference for the army is not an option they resort to other means – the agencies – to keep the politicians from doing too much damage.

This is clearly a dysfunctional way to run a democratic country

The politicians should be running the country with the generals focusing exclusively on the army. Running a six hundred thousand man army is difficult enough without the added involvement of keeping a set of dubious politicians in check. The generals would be happy to focus on their own domain and leave the running of the country to elected representatives of the people. But they will not do this until they have confidence that the people’s representatives have the integrity, competence, experience and sincerity to do so.

So we as a country need to try harder to bring into politics people who do have the qualities needed for national leadership. And once we succeed in doing this the army, reassured that the country is in safe hands, will no longer need to be involved in minding the minders.

By Nadeem Qureshi, Chairman at Mustaqbil Pakistan
SHARNOFF’S GLOBAL VIEWS

Nadeem Qureshi is Chairman at Mustaqbil Pakistan. Nadeem is a graduate of MIT and Harvard Business School, and is fluent in Arabic. Mustaqbil Pakistan is a Pakistani political party which believes that the country’s many problems stem from a single cause: Our politicians in general do not have the sincerity, competence, education and experience to run the country. Mustaqbil Pakistan’s raison d’etre is to provide a platform for the country’s best people to enter and compete in the political arena. Read other articles by Nadeem.

Pakistani officials used a secret counter-terrorism fund to buy wedding gifts, luxury carpets and gold jewellery for relatives of ministers and visiting dignitaries, according to documents seen by AFP.

The revelations cast a spotlight on high-level corruption in Pakistan as the impoverished but nuclear-armed country battles a surge in Taliban violence.

They concern the National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC) of Pakistan's interior ministry, formed in 2000 to coordinate between the country's intelligence agencies and federal and provincial governments on national security matters.

The US and other Western countries have poured billions of dollars into Pakistan since the 9/11 attacks of 2001 to help in its fight against Taliban and al Qaeda linked militants.

The NCMC received some 425 million rupees ($4.3 million) from Pakistani government coffers from 2009-2013, according to files obtained by Umar Cheema, an investigative journalist for Pakistani daily The News, and seen by AFP.

During that time the interior ministry was headed by Rehman Malik, a flamboyant loyalist of former president Asif Ali Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

Watches, carpets, gold, goats

Many of the documents deal with payments to intelligence sources, routine maintenance of vehicles and overtime for employees.

But the files also include receipts for gifts for US and British embassy officials, as well as flowers and sweets for journalists.

One receipt for 70,000 rupees ($700) is itemised as a “Pair of wrist watches for marriage of nephew of minister for interior”.

The documents show that on a trip to Rome for an Interpol conference in November 2012, Malik took a necklace, wooden tables and a TouchMate tablet computer as gifts.

The counter-terror fund was also used to buy three rugs as wedding gifts for the son of former prime minister Raja Pervez Ashraf early last year.

A set of 21-carat gold jewellery worth $3,000 was bought for one unnamed individual, while another was the recipient of a $1,500 set.

A handicrafts store in Islamabad was paid some $23,000 in December 2012 for carpets and crafts given to local officials and delegations from the EU, Iran and India.

Among the more bizarre items paid for from the fund was the $800 cost of four sacrificial goats, plus butchery costs, listed as “stabbing charges”, for the festival of Eid-ul-Azha.

Alms to the poor and donations of sweets, flowers, and cash to a local Sufi saint were also made from the fund in 2012, the documents show.

'You know how Pakistan works'

Pakistan's present government, led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, has ordered an audit of the interior ministry accounts from 2010-2013.

Ministry spokesman Danyal Gilani confirmed the audit was ongoing but declined to indicate a timeframe for its completion.

The director general of the NCMC, Tariq Lodhi, did not respond to repeated attempts to seek comment. Upon coming to power in June last year, Sharif's government abolished secret funds in 16 ministries in an effort to curb corruption and rein in spending.

Malik, who as minister was famed for his expensive ties and purple hair-dye, mounted a firm defence of his conduct on Twitter, denying he had used the fund and saying it was “never under the control of the minister”.

Asked why some receipts contained hand-written instructions saying they were the minister's directives, Malik told AFP: “You know how Pakistan works.

Just because it mentions me does not mean I personally authorised the payments.”In a tweet, he said using funds to entertain dignitaries and offer gifts was “routine for 15 yrs”.

But Moinuddin Haider, who served as interior minister from 1999 to 2002, said the NCMC fund was not set up to pay for “gifts abroad”.

“The purpose of these funds was to establish offices in the provinces, primarily to be spent on communications equipment and data analysis,” he told AFP.

Cheema, who won the Daniel Pearl journalism fellowship in 2008, said the affair was indicative of how officials had turned the national terror crisis, which has killed thousands of people across the country since 2007, to their own benefit.

“This abuse clearly explains how our leaders convert a tragedy into an opportunity for personal gains,” he said.

“If history is any guide it's not going to be resolved nor will the abolition of secret funds lead to any corrective measures.” Ayesha Siddiqa, a security analyst, termed the use of the funds “sad”, but said a lack of clear counter-terrorism policy direction by successive governments was also to blame, as well as the way Pakistan's bureaucracy works.

“There is also this problem with the government where if a department gets funds you're in a hurry to spend them, because if the funds lapse they will be deducted the next year and the department will be reprimanded,” she said.

DAWN News

Just before Leon Panetta left the Pentagon, the former Defense Secretary threw a political grenade into the building's E-Ring when he created a new award -- a "distinguished warfare medal" -- in recognition of the work drone operators do. But so far, no medals have been issued. Chuck Hagel, Panetta's successor, still hasn't announced a decision on he'd like to handle an issue that may seem silly to the civilian world -- but is beyond-radioactive within the military. 

As a former director of CIA and then Pentagon chief, Panetta felt it was time to show drone pilots and others in the community that the Defense Department values their work. In a military where medals and public recognition are the coin of the realm when it comes to promotions, many felt drone crews were unsung heroes.

"Our military reserves its highest decorations obviously for those who display gallantry and valor in actions where their lives are on the line, and we will continue to do so," Panetta said at what would be his last press briefing at the Pentagon in February 2013. "But we should also have the ability to honor the extraordinary actions that make a true difference in combat operations."

But the new medal caused an uproar. Ground troops felt disrespected because in the hierarchal world of military order, it sat two awards up from the Bronze Star medal in precedence -- and three above the Purple Heart. That was seen as a bit of a slight at infantrymen in the war zones, because the personal risks and valor they exhibited on the ground now appeared to be seen as less valuable than "joystick operators" working out of  places like Creech Air Force Base, down the highway from Las Vegas, Nev.

"The DWM must be demoted to its proper place in the order of military decorations, a move that is necessary to uphold the integrity of the awards process and ensure valor awards for courage and sacrifice in combat are not diminished in any way," wrote Rep. Duncan Hunter, Jr., a California Republican and former Marine officer who introduced legislation to prevent the medal as envisioned from going forward.

Enter Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, a former Army sergeant who fought on the ground in Vietnam and immediately saw the need to take a deep breath on this issue. A month or so after entering office, upon the advice of Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Pentagon's other service chiefs, Hagel killed the medal altogether. Instead, he said he would create a "distinguishing device" -- later known as the "Remote Impacts Device" -- that would be affixed on existing medals, in effect downgrading recognition for drone operators. But that's all that was said. Nearly 10 months later, key specifics about the recognition -- who should be eligible, what awards it can be affixed to, and how operators would rate it -- have yet to be announced. 

That's because Hagel is preparing to launch a broad review of how all troops are honored for their service as the long war in Afghanistan winds down and U.S. forces potentially find themselves in other hotspots. 

Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary, told Foreign Policy that the review will "include service members entrusted with the responsibility to operate remote technology to directly impact combat as well as more traditional forms of arms." He said it would be finished later this year or in the early part of 2015.

Hagel, Kirby added, had a unique perspective on the issue of recognizing heroism.

"Having seen combat himself, Secretary Hagel fully understands and respects the traditions that come with awards and decorations," Kirby said. "This is a process that will take time and care, but he believes it's important it's done right."

Some believe Hagel, who has been consumed with far more important matters -- from the drawdown in Afghanistan to Egypt to the Pentagon budget to North Korea -- has back-burnered the issue in the hope that it will just sort of disappear on its own.

Others think Hagel could have used the opportunity to send an important signal to ground forces at a time when the wars are coming to a close, the benefits of service members are under scrutiny after more than a decade of war, and the services, particularly the Army, are beginning to shrink by tens of thousands of troops.

"There was a tremendous rift in the force when the Distinguished Warfare Medal was introduced," said Joe Davis, a spokesman for the Veterans of Foreign Wars. "We're pleased that Secretary Hagel chose to eliminate the medal and to use the existing medal structure to appropriately award those who have a tremendous impact on the battlefield from afar."

Doug Birkey, director of government relations for the Air Force Association in Washington, said it's tough to try to balance the value of "strategic effect" with "personal sacrifice."

"An RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] operator could net an incredibly important strategic goal, but not be in direct personal danger due to the attributes afforded by remote operations," Birkey said. "This is a new paradigm that diverges from the traditional model of attaining objectives via putting one's self in harm's way."

But he paraphrased Gen. George Patton's famous quote that "it's not your job to die for your country, it's your job to make the enemy die for his." Then he added: "Given the rapid emergence of cyber and RPA ops -- both of which change what it means to project combat power -- I personally think it is important to consider rewarding skill and innovative thinking that nets strategic goals for the nation."

It's unclear if, or how, Hagel will decide to honor drone operators and crews for their wartime service. But after more than a decade of two bloody and expensive ground wars, the future of warfare will have more drone operators in it than boots on the ground, and that's a reality that he may find it hard to ignore.

Even with all the optimism about the global economy here last week at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, there was a remarkable economic and political risk that appeared to have been largely overlooked: The long-simmering battle between China and Japan may be close to boiling over. One top executive went so far as to describe the nations’ relationship as a “stealth war.”

The implications for the global economy — and some of the largest multinational companies — are profound. China and Japan represent the second- and third-largest economies in the world, after the United States, and they are among each other’s largest trade partners. General Motors,Microsoft, Boeing, Nike, Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble, among others, have huge businesses in both countries.

“I probably spoke to no less than 40 U.S. C.E.O.’s here and I would say this issue came up in more than half of those conversations,” said Ian Bremmer, the political scientist who founded the Eurasia Group, the political risk consulting firm. “This week at Davos, for me, the big takeaway was that China-Japan was much more problematic than we thought. The possibility that you get anti-Japanese sentiment in a big way and it causes real disruption on trades and hurting both economies is real.”

If you need evidence of the significance of this geopolitical clash, look no further than the surprising comment made here by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, who said his country’s relationship with China was in a “similar situation” to the one between Germany and Britain before World War I.

Mr. Abe was trumped by Wu Xinbo, a Chinese university dean who is considered close to China’s leadership, when he described Mr. Abe as a “troublemaker” and, at one point, compared him, somewhat obliquely, toKim Jong-un, the North Korean dictator.

“I have to say that the political trust between the two countries now is very low,” Mr. Wu said, suggesting that he expects “political relations between our two countries will stay very cool, even frozen, for the remaining years of the Abe administration in Japan.”

Problems between China and Japan have long been festering, especially as Mr. Abe has sought to rewrite the country’s Constitution and build the country’s military, which has long been considered only defensive.

Tensions rose when China angered Japan last November when it claimed an air defense identification zone over a chain of islands in the East China Sea that the countries have disputed claims over. The conflict increased after Mr. Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war dead are commemorated, including several war criminals who were executed after Japan’s defeat in World War II. The trip offended many Chinese, and the Obama administration had warned Mr. Abe not to visit the shrine.

China-Japan political relations have been strained since the end of World War II. Previous visits by Japanese politicians have angered China and South Korea, which both suffered greatly under Japan’s empire-building efforts then. And the Japanese citizenry has often sought to distance itself from its imperialist past, preferring instead to highlight the nation’s economic progress and prowess.

Yet now, the intensity of the feelings of mutual distrust is striking. According to Pew Research, just 1 in 20 Japanese “have a favorable attitude toward China” and “anti-Japan sentiment is quite strong in China, where 90 percent of the public has an unfavorable opinion of Japan.”

The latest tensions are having a direct economic impact; the Japanese, for example, are investing less in China.

Mr. Bremmer, of the Eurasia Group, put it bluntly: “The Chinese have written off Shinzo Abe as someone they can potentially work with. They mistrust him completely. They believe he is belligerent toward them and believe an escalatory policy is the appropriate one to pursue.”

After Mr. Abe made his comment comparing his country’s relationship as being similar to Britain and Germany in 1914, when the two countries were major trading partners, China’s leaders made their own attacks. “Rather than using pre-World War I Anglo-German relations, why don’t you deeply examine your mistakes during the First Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula and the fascist war that Japan launched on victim countries in World War II?” Qin Gang, a spokesman for China’s foreign ministry, asked of Mr. Abe.

Mr. Abe, in fairness, did try to play down any hints that the simmering tensions would lead to a prolonged military conflict.

“Japan has sworn an oath to never again wage a war,” Mr. Abe said in his speech. “We have never stopped, and will continue to be wishing for the world to be at peace.”

But that’s not what many of the executives and regulators I spoke to after his presentation took away from his comments. “I’m going to be asking our teams in China and Japan to do a full analysis of the risks to our business when I get home,” one Fortune 500 C.E.O. told me, seeming anxious. “Maybe this should have been on my radar before, but it is now.”

So what’s the biggest risk?

“The possibility of a mistake where someone gets killed is going up,” Mr. Bremmer said. “They are scrambling their fighters in the East China Sea every day.”

And the misunderstandings could deepen. “More problematically, the aftermath of a mistake will have both countries actively mistrusting the intentions of each other without a mechanism to really talk to each other and without the Americans acting as an interlocutor,” Mr. Bremmer said.

Mr. Wu said that the possibility of war was overstating the case: “China doesn’t want to fight a war.”

One of the greatest challenges multinational companies doing business in the region may face is that the United States government may not be positioned to step into the middle of the debate. Many of the American officials who were closest to Japan have left the Obama administration. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Kurt Campbell and Tom Donilon — all known for being the architects of President Obama’s “pivot” toward Asia — are no longer there, nor is Timothy F. Geithner, who worked in Japan in the 1990s and had close relationships with many senior leaders.

“Kerry doesn’t really do Asia,” Mr. Bremmer said about Secretary of StateJohn Kerry, who would most likely take umbrage at that assertion. “Susan Rice? No,” he said of the United States ambassador to the United Nations.

“Who is paying attention to foreign policy in Obama-land or in Congress? Nobody.” Whether that is true or not, it is clear that China, long seen as a fast-growing economy, and Japan, which has experienced a rebound in the last year, now should be added to the list of political and economic risks that businesses should consider in 2014.

New York Times

Elections in India are known as a one-of-a-kind festival of democracy, replete with colorful pageantry, flamboyant personalities, and very large numbers. The size of the country’s electorate when India heads to the polls for parliamentary elections later this spring is expected to reach nearly 800 million. According to census data, an estimated 150 million people are eligible to vote for the first time—a figure larger than the total number of voters that took part in the 2012 U.S. presidential elections.

Elections certainly bring out the best in India’s raucous democracy, but they also expose some of its blemishes. Consider this extraordinary figure: 30 percent of members of parliament have criminal cases pending against them. And that is an increase from the previous election in 2004, when “only” 24 percent of MPs were similarly situated.

In the fight to curb these figures, there have been some positive developments and valiant efforts to raise awareness. The Supreme Court of India recently decided that sitting politicians who are convicted of criminal acts should be removed from office upon conviction—a new practice in India. And for the first time, an anticorruption party vaulted to victory in Delhi’s state assembly. These are certainly bright spots, but, if recent state elections are any indication, efforts thus far have barely scratched the surface.

Real change will take significantly more sweeping measures to get to heart of the crime-politics nexus. In India’s electoral marketplace, as in any market, there are underlying supply and demand factors that facilitate exchange. And in this case, politicians with criminal records are supplying what voters and parties demand: candidates who are effective and well-funded.

A wellspring of information about India’s political class was tapped in 2003, introducing a new level of transparency about India’s electoral aspirants and elected officials. In response to landmark public interest litigation filed by civil society watchdogs, the Supreme Court of India ruled that any person standing for elected office at the state or national level must submit, at the time of nomination, a judicial affidavit detailing his or her financial assets and liabilities, education qualifications, and pending criminal cases.

The disclosures are not without their shortcomings. Crucially, the information is self-reported, which means that in the case of financial details in particular, the accuracy of the affidavits can be questioned. In addition, the data on criminality refers to ongoing cases rather than convictions; due to the vagaries of India’s justice system, it can take decades for an indictment to produce a conviction, if at all.

Nevertheless, the data—taken as a whole—gives a reasonable snapshot of the biographical profiles of India’s most influential lawmakers. And the picture isn’t pretty.

The 15th Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), whose term expires at the end of May 2014, is home to 162 MPs with pending criminal cases. These cases involve a diverse array of charges, both large and small, ranging from mischief to murder and nearly everything in between. If one were to focus only on serious charges—those unrelated to electioneering or a politician’s daily vocation such as those involving murder, kidnapping, and physical assault—approximately 14 percent or 76 MPs face pending cases.

The situation at the state and local levels, though lacking comparable scrutiny, is similar. Roughly one in three members of state assemblies (31 percent) is involved in at least one criminal case. Again about half, roughly 15 percent, face serious charges.

There has been no systematic analysis of panchayats (village governments) and urban local bodies, but there is evidence that local tiers of governance are hardly free of criminality. Based on data collected by the Association for Democratic Reforms, 17 percent and 21 percent of municipal corporators in Mumbai and Delhi, respectively, declared involvement in criminal cases.

In one sense, the answer to why political parties in India nominate candidates with criminal backgrounds is painfully obvious: because they win (see figure 1). In the 2004 or the 2009 parliamentary elections, a candidate with no criminal cases pending had—on average—a 7 percent chance of winning. Compare this with a candidate facing a criminal charge: he or she had a 22 percent chance of winning. Granted, this simple comparison does not take into account numerous other factors such as education, party, or type of electoral constituency. Nevertheless, the contrast is marked.

Of course, the real question is what makes these candidates winnable. At least part of the answer comes down to cold, hard cash—an area in which those who break the law often have a leg up. Election costs in India have grown considerably over the years thanks to a host of factors, including a growing population, a marked increase in the competiveness of elections, and elevated voter expectations of pre-election handouts.

Money does not buy elections in India; what a well-financed campaign buys is viability. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between a parliamentary candidate’s personal assets—a good proxy for financial capacity—and the likelihood of election (see figure 2). Drawing on data from 2004 and 2009, the poorest 20 percent of candidates, in terms of personal financial assets, had a 1 percent chance of winning parliamentary elections. The richest quintile, in contrast, had a greater than 25 percent shot.

Beyond the draw of a higher likelihood of success, parties value “muscle” (criminality, in Indian parlance) because it often brings with it the added benefit of money.

As election costs have soared, parties have struggled to find legitimate sources of funding, which is a partial reflection of the general decline in their organizational strength. As a result, they place a premium on candidates who can bring resources into the party and will not drain limited party coffers. The quest for private funds is further propelled by an ineffectual election finance regime, which is marked by numerous loopholes and a lack of transparency.

When it comes to campaign cash, candidates accused of breaking the law have a distinct advantage: they both have access to liquid forms of finance and are willing to deploy it in the service of politics. In the last two parliamentary elections, roughly 6 percent of candidates in the lowest quintile of candidate wealth (or poorest one-fifth) faced criminal cases compared to nearly 20 percent of candidates in the top quintile (see figure 3).

Money is an important part of the story but, on its own, is an insufficient explanation—if only because parties have access to wealthy candidates who are not linked to criminal activity, from cricket heroes to film stars and industrialists. It is also not immediately clear why voters would prefer a wealthy, “tainted” candidate to an equally wealthy, “clean” alternative.

As the deputy president of the state unit of one major party confided to me back in 2010, candidates with criminal records thrive because they have “currency.” It turns out that this “currency” is also figurative.

While many have suggested that voters in India unwittingly support tainted politicians because they are ignorant about the biographies of their political representatives, there is an affirmative explanation that is consistent with rational, well-informed voters. In contexts where the rule of law is weak and social divisions are highly salient, politicians often use their criminal reputation as a badge of honor—a signal of their credibility to protect the interests of their parochial community and its allies, from physical safety to access to government benefits and social insurance. The “protection” on offer is often grounded in the language of caste or religious empowerment and can be readily justified in defensive terms. One member of Maharashtra’s Shiv Sena party with a reputation as a strongman explained his “hands-on” approach to the scholar Thomas Blom Hansen: “If someone enters my house and runs away with my roti [bread] then what should I do? I have to slap him and take the roti away because it is my roti and not his.”

The appeal of candidates who are willing to do what it takes—by hook or crook—to protect the interests of their community provides some intuition for why the odds of a parliamentary candidate winning an election actually increase with the severity of the charges, with slightly diminishing returns in the most severe instances (see figure 4).

Elections in India have acquired a sort of customary rhythm over the years. Part and parcel of this rhythm is the spate of news headlines before elections about the sordid biographical details of aspirants to higher office. Once voting is completed and the results are announced, a second wave of stories about the criminal antecedents of those who are actually elected pours forth. Recent judicial action is a positive step, but interrupting this rhythm requires deeper institutional change.

The unexpected victory in Delhi of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which campaigned on an avowedly anticorruption platform, is also a positive sign of popular frustration with malfeasance, but it is unlikely to be a game changer. The AAP proved a party could win without heavily resorting to candidates with lengthy rap sheets, but that did not seem deter the party’s rivals. According to the Association for Democratic Reforms, 21 percent of the ruling Congress Party’s candidates and 46 percent of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party’s candidates were involved in criminal cases, compared to 7 percent for the AAP.

If the high levels of criminality in politics could be attributed to a lack of information about candidates’ biographies, a public awareness campaign might make a significant dent in criminality rates. Alas, the situation is far more nuanced.

India needs a credible election finance regime with real teeth to rein in under-the-table funding. And the state’s ability to impartially deliver benefits, physical safety, and timely justice has to improve. Unless an investment in institutional change is made, parties—as well as many voters—will continue to view a candidate’s criminal reputation as a potential asset rather than a liability.

By Milan VaishnavCARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Danielle Smogard provided excellent research assistance for this article.