SPY EYES

As a result of the September 11 attacks, now known as 9/11, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded all commercial flights on the continental United States, and issued orders for flights in the air to land immediately. International civilian flights were issued orders to either turn back or to land in Canada (which hosted 226 diverted flights) or Mexico, and U.S. airspace was closed to international flights for three days as the “Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids” (abbreviated as SCATANA, first developed in 1971 and later amended in 1976) was invoked by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the FAA, and the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for the first time in history. The FAA was notified as early as 8:32am of the hijackings, and F-_ fighter jets were scrambled from  Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts and Langley Air Force Base in Virginia by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). At 10:20 a.m., U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney issued orders to shoot down any commercial aircraft that could be positively identified as being hijacked – an order that could not be relayed to the fighter elements in time, as they took to the air without live ammunition and were aware that they would have to use their own jets as weapons, crashing their fighters into hijacked planes and ejected at the last minute in order to deter any more hijacked planes from reaching and destroying their intended targets. That, however, did not turn out to be necessary, and all remaining civilian airliners were either successfully grounded, or deterred from entering U.S. airspace from abroad.

But the most devastating attack on U.S. soil since the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941 had taken place, resulting in 2,996 deaths: 2,977 victims and the 19 hijackers. 2,606 died in the World Trade Center attacks, and 125 were killed in the attack on the Pentagon; all passengers and crew of the four flights, a total of 246 people, also perished – some had also been attacked (stabbed, according to reports and investigations) on the planes as the hijackers took control of the airliners and diverted them to their targets. In the weeks after the attacks, the death toll was assumed to be close to 6,000: more than twice the number that were actually killed. As of July 2011, a team of scientists at the New York Office of Chief Medical Examiner was still trying to identify victims of the 9/11 attacks through the remains, and on  September 16, 2013, the 1,638th victim was identified: 1,115 victims are yet to be identified.

In response, the NATO Council termed the 9/11 attacks as an attack on all NATO member nations, requiring a response under Article 5 of the NATO Charter (originally intended for use against an attack by the former U.S.S.R.). Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty was also put into effect, as the then-Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, was in Washington D.C. The then-Director General of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, was also in Washington at the time of the attacks, discussing Osama bin Laden with Republican Congressman Porter Goss and Democratic Senator Bob Graham, and consulting senior officials in the U.S. administration in the weeks before and after 9/11. After the attacks, he was called into meetings with U.S. officials where demands of Pakistani cooperation were made, and the DG ISI was told to convey these demands to the Pakistani government. While he conveyed these demands of cooperation – later elucidated by U.S. President Bush as “you are either with us or against us” – Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed was reported to have opposed the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. He retired from the command of the ISI on October 08, 2001, just prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and was replaced by Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul Haq as DG ISI.

On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF Pub. L. 107-40, passed as House Joint Resolution bill 64 and thereafter as Senate Joint Resolution 23), granting then-U.S. President George W. Bush the authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those whom he determined “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the September 11th attacks, or who harbored said persons or groups. The U.S. President approved the Authorization and signed it into law four days later, on September 18, 2001. In a speech to the joint session of the U.S. Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush vowed to defend America’s freedom and protect America against the fear of terrorism.

The U.S. government charged Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, as the planners and perpetrators of the attack, and demanded that the Taliban – the governing force in Afghanistan that was hosting/harboring the Al Qaeda leader, his senior commanders and his fighting cadres – hand over bin Laden to the U.S. In a statement released by Al Jazeera on September 16, 2001, Osama bin Laden denied any involvement with the 9/11 attacks, saying that it was carried out “by individuals with their own motivation”, despite having been the architect of a 1998 “fatwa” or religious edict which called for the destruction of America and killing of American citizens. Before September 2001, Osama bin Laden was wanted by the U.S. FBI only for the coordinated bombings of U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. However, evidence uncovered later by the U.S. implicated Osama bin Laden as responsible and culpable for the 9/11 attacks – the main architect of the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda commander Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, was an adviser and financier of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, as well as the uncle of Ramzi Yousef, the lead bomber in that attack. During the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui – suspected to be the 20th hijacker – five people were identified as having been completely aware of the operational details of the attack plans: Osama bin Laden, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Turab al-Urduni and Mohammed Atef (bin Laden’s deputy, who provided operational support for the plot, including target selections, and helped arrange travel for the hijackers).

As the U.S. stated, on September 20, 2001, that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, they issued a five-point ultimatum to the Taliban:

The Taliban, however, refused the ultimatum on the very next day: they were not keen on handing over Osama bin Laden – who was their guest, and enjoyed their protection as per Pushtun custom – to the U.S. without sufficient proof. On September 22, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia withdrew diplomatic recognition of the Taliban, leaving Pakistan – Afghanistan’s neighbour to the east – as the only country that had diplomatic relations with the Taliban government. It is believed that on October 04, 2001, the Taliban made a covert demand that bin Laden be tried in an international tribunal in Pakistan, in accordance with Islamic Sharia law. These demands were not accepted by the U.S., and on October 07, 2001 – the same day that the Taliban made an overt proposition to try Osama bin Laden in an Islamic court in Afghanistan -  Operation Enduring Freedom commenced as U.S. and British forces commenced aerial bombing campaigns targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda camps, then later invaded Afghanistan with ground troops of the Special Forces supporting Northern Alliance forces. The Northern Alliance, a political and military group with Afghanistan’s Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen and other minorities in its ranks, had been fighting a drawn out civil war against the Taliban since the ouster of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the fall of Afghanistan’s communist regime, and the chaos that had ensued as different warlords made power grabs in a security vacuum that engulfed Afghanistan until 1994, when the Taliban became organized as a military force under their leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, and took control of almost 90% of Afghanistan by 1996. Operation Enduring Freedom was the first military operation initiated under the auspices of the Global War on Terror that the U.S. launched in response to the 9/11 attacks. It was initially codenamed “Operation Infinite Justice” and misquoted as “Operation Ultimate Justice”, until the codename “Operation Enduring Freedom” became the hallmark of U.S. military actions in response to terror activities mainly in Afghanistan (OEF-A), but also in the Phillipines (OEF-P), the Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), the Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), and the Caribbean and Central America (OEF-CCA). On October 14, 2001, the Taliban again proposed the handover of Osama bin Laden to a third country for trial, provided that the Taliban were given proof of bin Laden’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks, but to no avail: the U.S. rejected this proposal and continued with Operation Enduring Freedom.

Supported by a joint Special Operations team consisting of Green Berets from the 5th Special Forces Group, aircrew members from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and Air Force Combat Controllers, the Northern Alliance fought back against the Taliban, capturing (or, as the international media put it, “liberating”) Mazar-i-Sharif on November 09, 2001, and took control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, on November 13, 2001. Kunduz, the last stronghold of the Taliban in the north, fell on November 26, 2001. The battle then shifted to the south of Afghanistan, where the Taliban traditionally held sway: Kandahar was wrested from Taliban control in December, while the U.S. established their first military base, FOB Rhino, in November. Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A) is a joint U.S., U.K. and Afghan operation, and is separate from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is an operation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations (also including the U.S. and U.K). The two operations run in parallel, and although a merger of the two military operations was intended, this has not yet happened, and the ISAF mandate – as per UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1917 (adopted in 2010) – was extended till March 23, 2011: the governments of different countries have given varying mandates and timeframes to their armed forces as per their involvement in the ISAF, with one such example being clear above, in the difference(s) between NATO-ISAF and OEF-A.

NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission was established under an Article VII mandate of UNSC Resolution 1386 (adopted in December 2001), which was a follow-up and reaffirmation of the Bonn Agreement (which created the Afghan Interim Authority that would serve as the “repository of Afghan sovereignty” and outlined the so-called Petersberg Process, a political process towards a new constitution and choosing a new Afghan government). Initially created for a period of six months, NATO-ISAF was charged with securing Kabul and the adjoining areas, and with assisting the Afghan Interim Authority with maintaining security in these areas so as to allow for the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Administration headed by Hamid Karzai. UNSC Resolution 1386 also reaffirmed previous UNSC Resolutions on Afghanistan, particularly UNSC Resolutions 1378 and 1383 (both adopted in 2001), and supported international efforts to eradicate terrorism in accordance with the UN Charter. UNSC Resolution 1386 “welcomed developments in Afghanistan that would give the Afghan people freedom from oppression and terror”, and also “recognised the responsibility of Afghans to provide security and law and order themselves”. Until ISAF expanded beyond Kabul, the force consisted of a division-level headquarters and one brigade covering the capital: the Kabul Multinational Brigade. The brigade was composed of three battle groups, and was in charge of the tactical command of deployed troops, with the ISAF headquarters serves as the operational control center of the mission.

Despite the initial mandate of six months, NATO-ISAF operated in Kabul and the adjoining areas for almost two years – however, they did not go beyond this jurisdiction for that time. U.S., U.K. and allied forces operation under OEF-A conducted military operations in other areas of Afghanistan under a separate mandate from the UN-authorized NATO-ISAF. On October 13, 2003, the UNSC voted unanimously in favor of Resolution 1510 to expand the ISAF mission beyond Kabul: shortly after that, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien said that Canadian soldiers (nearly half of the entire force at that time) would not deploy outside Kabul, despite the enhanced mandate and UN approval. Eighteen countries were contributing to the force as of February 2002, and NATO-ISAF was expected to grow to 5,000 soldiers. By March 2003, ISAF was composed of 4,700 troops from 28 countries.

ISAF’s operational command originally rotated among different nations on a six‑month basis, but due to the difficulty in securing new lead nations, the command of ISAF was turned over indefinitely to NATO on August 11, 2003. This marked NATO’s first deployment outside Europe or North America, and by this time, the force numbered 5,000 troops from 30 countries. 90% of the ISAF force were already contributed by NATO nations: 1,950 were Canadian, by far the largest single contingent, and about 2,000 German troops were also deployed in the ISAF force. As UNSC Resolution 1510 expanded ISAF’s mission beyond Kabul, its first objective was to take command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz – the other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan as of 2003 remained under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom, the continuing U.S.‑led military operation in Afghanistan running parallel to the ISAF mission. On June 28, 2004, at the Summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would establish four other PRTs in the north of the country in the first stage of the expansion of NATO-ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan: in Mazar-i-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan. After the completion of Stage 1, the ISAF’s area of operations then covered approximately 3,600 square kilometres in the north of Afghanistan, and was able to “influence security” in nine provinces in the north of the country.

On February 10, 2005, NATO-ISAF announced the commencement of Stage Two of the mission’s expansion – this time towards the west of Afghanistan. This process began on May 31, 2006, when ISAF took on command of two additional PRTs in the provinces of Herat and Farah, and of a Forward Support Base in Herat. The extended ISAF mission led a total of nine PRTs in the north and the west, providing security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan’s settled territory. The second stage of ISAF’s mission expansion doubled the size of the territory that the force was responsible for: the new area was the former US Regional Command (West), consisting of Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. ISAF Stage 2 was completed under the Regional Command of Italy in September 2005, and the 2,000 additional troops were also temporarily deployed to Afghanistan to support the provincial and parliamentary elections held on September 18, 2005. On January 27, 2006, it was announced in the British Parliament that NATO-ISAF would replace U.S.-led OEF troops in Helmand Province, and the British 16th Air Assault Brigade became the core of the force in Helmand Province.

Stage 3 of NATO-ISAF’s expansion – towards the south of Afghanistan – was deliberated by NATO Foreign Ministers in a meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels on December 08, 2005: the first element of this plan was the expansion of ISAF to the south in 2006, and at the completion of this stage, the NATO-ISAF mission assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from U.S.‑led Coalition/OEF forces, expanding its area of operations to cover an additional six provinces – Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul – and taking on command of four additional PRTs. The expanded (post-Stage 3) NATO-ISAF force contingent led a total of 13 PRTs in the north, west and south, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan’s territory. As Stage 3 of the expansion was completed on July 31, 2006, the troops under NATO-ISAF command numbered approximately 20,000 (more than double the previous number of soldiers under Stage 2), and NATO-ISAF assumed command in the six southern provinces of Afghanistan mentioned above. NATO-ISAF’s  Regional Command South was established at Kandahar, and was led by Canada, which had deployed 8,000 soldiers there by the time.

On September 28, 2006, the North Atlantic Council gave final authorization for NATO-ISAF to expand its area of operations to 14 additional provinces in the east of Afghanistan, boosting NATO’s presence and role in the country. This marked the fourth and final stage of NATO-ISAF’s expansion in Afghanistan, and with this further expansion, NATO-ISAF would also assist the Government of Afghanistan in providing security throughout the whole of the country. The final expansion saw the NATO-ISAF force contingent controlling 32,000 troops from 37 countries. On October 05, 2006, NATO-ISAF completed the final stage of its expansion by taking on command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.‑led OEF troops. An additional 10,000 troops were put under NATO command, bringing the total number of NATO-ISAF troops in Afghanistan to 31,000. 8,000 U.S. troops continued training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and conducted counterterrorism operations separately from the NATO-ISAF mission, which was also mandated to train Afghan security forces (the Afghan National Army – ANA – and the Afghan National Police – ANP – collectively known as the ANSF). By January 2009, NATO-ISAF commanded approximately 55,100 troops in Afghanistan, with 26 NATO member countries, 10 NATO partner countries and 2 non-NATO/non-partner countries providing troops for the ISAF mission. As of early 2010, there were at least 700 military bases inside Afghanistan. About 400 of these were used by American‑led NATO forces and 300 by ANSF. And as of October 2010, there were 6 Regional Commands of the NATO-ISAF force contingent in Afghanistan, each with subordinate Task Forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Security experts and military strategists hoped that in order to restore peace and stability in Afghanistan, and to avoid mistakes made by previous invading superpowers (such as the British Empire in the 18th century and the former U.S.S.R. in the late 1970s and 1980s), the U.S. and NATO-ISAF would not only be restricted to security responsibilities in the main cities and central transportation and communication lines of the landlocked country, and would expand their presence and operations into the vast countryside and rural areas of Afghanistan, particularly the villages and tribal areas where the role and authority of the Taliban and other conservative forces has been traditionally entrenched. However, despite the stage-wise expansion of NATO-ISAF and the formidable presence of U.S. troops under the parallel OEF-A, the opportunity that the Taliban acquired in 2005-06 – and capitalized on ever since, gaining an unassailable momentum that has bogged down international troops and poses an existential threat to the current Afghan governing dispensation and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) under their command – is a stark reminder that despite the availability of cutting-edge modern military technology at their disposal, the U.S. and NATO-ISAF could not rout the guerilla warfare tactics of the Taliban (who made and still make use of outdated military technology, including standard “infantry”/militia weapons like the AK-47) in the latter’s home ground: international troops could not defeat a local nationalist insurgency against an “invading” force (as the Taliban narrative goes) despite the stark divergence in military technology, tactics and strategy, and overall legitimacy in Afghanistan as well as in the world and in multilateral/inter-governmental bodies such as the UN whose Security Council issued resolutions that bound nation-states to support the U.S. mission (that they endorsed) and the subsequent NATO-ISAF mission (that they themselves initiated). When the Soviet Union’s 40th Army invaded Afghanistan in 1979, their mission was mapped as follows:

From 2006 to 2009, NATO-ISAF also launched various operations to counter the growing Taliban insurgency that started in the south of the country, and soon spread to all parts of Afghanistan. NATO-ISAF’s earliest known offensive – Operation Medusa in Kandahar – took place in September 2006. In December 2006, NATO-ISAF launched Operation Baaz Tsuka (Falcon’s Summit) against Taliban forces in the Panjaway Valley of Kandahar province. The quantum and tempo of NATO-ISAF operations increased as time went by, with Operation Achilles launched in Helmand province in March 2007. In February 2009, NATO-ISAF’s Operation Diesel again targeted Taliban forces in Helmand province, followed by Operation Zafar-1, Operation Zafar-2, Operation Panther’s Claw, and Operation Mar Lewe (Snake Wolf). In June 2009, NATO-ISAF launched Operation Panther’s Claw to secure control of various canal and river crossings in Helmand Province so as to establish a lasting ISAF presence in an area. In July 2009, NATO-ISAF launched Operation Khanjar (Strike of the Sword) in Helmand – the largest U.S. Marine offensive since Operation Phantom Fury (the codename for the 2004 Battle of Fallujah in Iraq). These NATO-ISAF operations and missions are separate from U.S. offensives launched in Afghanistan since 2001, such as Operation Anaconda (2002) and other major battles against Taliban forces and Al Qaeda cadres.

In spite of all of these efforts, the NATO-ISAF mission seems to have failed in securing Afghanistan when considered in terms of their overall efforts for over a decade. In 2007, the Brussels-based Senlis Council, a think tank located in the very same city where the NATO headquarters is, reported that the Taliban controlled 54% of Afghanistan – a few years later, a UN report (published in 2009, but quickly retracted) cited that Taliban control in the rural areas and the Afghan countryside has been augmented, with the Taliban holding sway in a majority (over 90%) of rural and tribal areas in the country (except for areas in the north of the country, which are traditionally non-Pashtun and therefore averse to the Taliban). In recent news reports, it has been claimed that international troops from the U.K., Italy and even France have bribed the Taliban for a variety of reasons: to gain access to certain areas, to travel through certain areas during the day and certain other areas during the night without being attacked, and even paid the Taliban to vacate certain areas where operations were to be conducted so that international forces do not face the entire brunt of the Taliban assault.

Even according to Wikipedia, Afghanistan’s security situation deteriorated after NATO-ISAF took over security responsibilities in 2006, and not when the U.S. invaded the country in 2001. The approach adopted by international forces drew a condemnation by the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, who was installed by Western backing and whose entire governance system is propped up by the very forces he condemned by saying: “For two years I have systematically, consistently and on a daily basis warned the international community of what was developing in Afghanistan [and how] this war against terror is conducted”.

Despite the expiration of ISAF’s UN mandate in 2011, only three NATO states have announced withdrawal plans: Canada (which has withdrawn its forces in 2011), Poland (which has withdrawn its forces in 2012), and the United Kingdom (which has 8,065 troops deployed in Afghanistan and will withdraw all combat elements in 2015). Most importantly, the United States has said it would end combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014: this would not involve a total withdrawal, as “sizable” advisory forces may remain to train and mentor Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). These forces would, however, not take part in or lead combat missions, as NATO-ISAF has completed the handover of security responsibilities to the ANSF throughout Afghanistan. As of date, the ANSF – the army and the police – number more than 300,000 troops, and have been trained by NATO forces for almost a decade, in addition to being armed with state-of-the-art weaponry used by NATO forces. The U.S. has approximately 68,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan, making up over two-thirds of the NATO-ISAF force: most of these troops were transferred from the U.S.-led OEF mission to the NATO-led ISAF mission sanctioned by the UNSC. As of June 24, 2013, 47 nations contributed 97,920 troops to the NATO-ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Once the combat troops of the NATO-ISAF force contingent leave Afghanistan, the ANSF – particularly the Afghan military – will have over 700 NATO-style bases from which they can plan and execute military operations and command troops and other fighting elements deployed in the country.

In the last two stages of its expansion in Afghanistan, and before the handover of security responsibilities to the ANSF, NATO-ISAF had been increasingly involved in more intensive combat operations in southern and eastern Afghanistan – such as Helmand and Kandahar provinces, the traditional stronghold and birthplace, respectively, of the Taliban – from 2006 to 2011. This represented what the U.S. noted as an enhanced “momentum” of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan from 2005 onwards, despite an increase in international coalition forces (both under U.S.-led OEF and NATO-led ISAF) and the establishment, training and augmentation of indigenous Afghan security forces. In 2009 and 2010, the U.S. sought to try and implement its “troop surge” strategy in Afghanistan, after witnessing considerable (yet temporary and short-lived) security enhancements by employing this battlespace strategy in Iraq. The architect of this strategy, Gen. David Petraeus, assumed command of NATO-ISAF on July 04, 2010 after the previous NATO-ISAF commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was removed by U.S. President Barack Obama for “conduct that undermined civilian control of the military”. Before assuming command of NATO-ISAF, Gen. Petraeus also commanded U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq, and was commanding the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) when nominated to lead NATO-ISAF. After relinquishing command of NATO-ISAF to Gen. John Allen of the U.S. Marine Corps on July 18, 2011, Gen. Petraeus later served as the Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Much attention has been given to the year 2014 in terms of Afghan security and stability, and the U.S. role in Afghanistan, since U.S. combat troops in the country depart during that year; moreover, Afghanistan will also be holding Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 – a democratic exercise that could be severely hampered, and even destabilized, by the withdrawal of international forces and the intrinsic weaknesses of the ANSF if the electoral process does not reach its logical conclusion. The Afghan peace process also exhibits a duality akin to the U.S.-led OEF and the NATO-lef ISAF mission: while the Afghan government has established a High Peace Council to negotiate peace terms with the Afghan Taliban, the latter have made it clear that they will discuss peace directly with the U.S., and not with the “puppet government” of Hamid Karzai that the U.S. has established in Afghanistan. For the purposes of direct U.S.-Taliban negotiations, a Taliban office has been opened in Doha, Qatar, which is (coincidentally, or otherwise) also the base for the U.S. CENTCOM. However, trivial issues such as the flag used by the Taliban office, or the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” plaque installed outside the Taliban office, have been given significant (and unnecessary) weight so as to become serious hurdles in talks between the U.S. and the Taliban: and thus, hamper the process of bringing the Afghan Taliban insurgents to the negotiating table, and to make them partners in a durable and lasting peace in Afghanistan as well as in the region at large.

The U.S. approach to talks with the Afghan Taliban, and the misgivings of the ruling Afghan dispensation – which is predisposed to counter the Taliban in a military as well as political sense – give many analysts reasons to consider the possibility that Afghanistan may once again become subject to instability and insecurity after international troops withdraw from the landlocked country that has seen nothing but war for the past three decades. While the Afghan Taliban see the current Afghan government and constitution – and particularly the ruling dispensation – as illegitimate, the bilateral relations between Pakistan and post-2001 Afghanistan have suffered immensely with both sides trading barbs over harboring different elements of the Taliban. As Hamid Karzai blames Pakistan and its security establishment – particularly the ISI, which has for long been labeled as the creator of the Taliban – for continuing to harbor the Afghan Taliban, especially the “Haqqani network” which is considered the most dangerous component of the ongoing Afghan Taliban insurgency, Pakistan blames Afghanistan and its government for not being able to assert its writ and control over various parts of the country where terrorists attacking Pakistan find sanctuary and safe haven with ease; the case of Swat Taliban commander Mullah Fazlullah hiding in Kunar and Nuristan provinces is frequently cited as one of the most glaring examples of the Afghan government and military’s inability to secure its own country and territory.

While the U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan have been – or have always claimed to be – allies in the War against Terrorism, it has always appeared to be the case that the Taliban – whether it is the Afghan Taliban (operating in Afghanistan and allegedly hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas) or the Pakistani Taliban (the TTP, terrorizing urban and rural areas of Pakistan and crossing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in order to find not only sanctuary, but various kinds of support from Pakistan’s landlocked neighbor) – have been a more cohesive strategic force than the three states that are trying to create a distance or drive a wedge between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, a transnational terrorist organization that breeds a fundamentally extremist brand of Islamic ideology and considers the West and the U.S. to be its primary enemies and targets.

If NATO-ISAF forces – and particularly, U.S. forces, which constitute more than two-thirds of the NATO-ISAF contingent – withdraw from Afghanistan without a meaningful peace process in place (with credible guarantees from the Afghan Taliban for the U.S. if not for the current Afghan dispensation), the ensuing chaos will be more deadly than the contained civil war that Afghanistan witnessed between the Soviet withdrawal from the country till the U.S. invasion of that country in 2001. The incumbent Afghan political and constitutional setup derives its support from a variety of international actors – most importantly the U.S., but also from Russia, India, and Central Asian states – and if the Afghan Taliban continue to consider this state and its organs as illegitimate, then the Afghan civil war will continue with a heightened tempo and will lead to insecurity and destabilization in Afghanistan’s neighboring countries as well. The first victim of continued – or exacerbated – insecurity in Afghanistan during or after 2014 will be Pakistan, whose own peace process with the Pakistani Taliban was torpedoed when Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the TTP, was killed in a drone strike the very day that a formal delegation of ulema (religious leaders) were to take a message from the Pakistani government to him for the initiation of peace talks. Pakistan has for long been blamed of supporting the Afghan Taliban so as to acquire a degree of “strategic depth” on its western border, but the alleged policy of state support for extremist elements and armed militias has served as a tool of “strategic death” for the Pakistani as well as Afghan state. If Pakistan indeed does provide sanctuary and safe haven to the Afghan Taliban – as many allege and argue – then the provision of the same to the Pakistani Taliban by Afghanistan (by elements in that country or by the incumbent government of that country: by commission – active support of terror elements in Pakistan – or by omission – the simple inability to secure its own territory and ensure that it will not be used by terrorists for planning and executing attacks in other countries in the region and around the word) will prove to be a death knell for the nation of Pakistan, which has suffered the largest number of both civilian and military casualties since the War on Terror began (numbering almost 40,000 dead – with between 5,000 to 10,000 military deaths – and thousands more injured) and has suffered an economic cost of over U.S.$ 100 billion in more than a decade. These losses have been significantly damaging to the state and people of Pakistan over the last 12 years, and have relegated Pakistan from a developing country to the status of a frontier economy, as the War on Terror has seriously stunted the socioeconomic development and economic growth rates of the country.

Despite all the strategizing and planning done by the U.S. military and by NATO in terms of their UN-mandated mission in Afghanistan, the landlocked country is still wartorn and independent analysts observe that the Taliban insurgency – which started in 2005-06 – has been picking up pace and, in the terms of U.S. President Barack Obama, has a “momentum” which may well increase near the end of 2013 and in 2014, when the bulk of international forces (read: U.S. troops) leave the country. As the stability of Afghanistan – and of its new, democratic political process – will be tested in 2014, especially with an election scheduled that year, other countries in the region will also shore up their internal security and stakes in external and regional security so as to protect themselves from any fallout in Afghanistan. Despite all-out backing and support from the U.S. to India in terms of increasing the latter’s stake in Afghanistan’s security and economy – and thereby obtain an economic (and energy) route to Central Asia – Stephen Blank has noted that India has faced what he calls a “strategic failure” in Central Asia because it was unable to capitalize on the gains and routes provided by the U.S. invasion, and because Pakistan (and especially China) have been successfully blocking any economic inroads that India could have made or would have wanted to make in Central Asia. With their continuing rivalry in all international spheres, the notion that Pakistan and India – particularly their militaries – will collectively develop a mechanism to stabilize Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond seems more myth than reality, despite the hopes of peaceniks who claim that where Kashmir is a source of suspicion and mistrust for the South Asian neighbours, Afghanistan can be a unique opportunity for collaboration and cooperation in order to make the region more secure.

It remains to be seen whether the indigenous Afghan security forces, the police and the army collectively known as the ANSF, will be able to live up to their duties and mandate – even though they seem to be failing since the complete security handover from NATO to local Afghan forces was completed. Moreover, the Taliban has now become a transnational movement: with or without Al Qaeda, the Taliban movement now also exists in Pakistan, where the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) vows to destroy the Pakistani state and Constitution so as to replace it with the same kind of shari’a law that the Afghan Taliban introduced in their country from 1994 to 2001. As Pakistan fights the War on Terror, the war against the Taliban and against multidimensional terrorist elements, including extremist militant groups, supporters and financiers, has become a veritable battle for Pakistan’s survival. Pakistan’s army is also destined to see a new chief take the reins in November 2013, when the incumbent Chief of Army Staff General Kayani completes his tenure: only after a new chief is appointed will analysts be able to determine whether Pakistan is willing to take the fight to the Taliban militants and other extremist groups using its territory, or whether the army will back the civilian administration in their efforts towards a negotiated peace with the Taliban – a process that suffered a death blow when a CIA-operated drone killed TTP leader Hakeemullah Mehsud the very day a delegation of ulema (religious scholars) was being sent to him with the formal offer of peace talks from the government of Pakistan.

In the coming years, all sides in the War on Terror will have a clearer idea of who their enemies and allies really are: because, as the past decade has shown, actions speak louder than words – and most times, actions destroy the intent of words and their meaning, regardless of whom they are spoken by.