SPY EYES

It’s become a small industry. In foreign policy research institutes around Europe and the US the last six months have been spent producing papers, attending seminars, giving lectures and contributing to workshops all focused on answering the question: ‘what will happen in Afghanistan after 2014?’ I have been to a fair few myself.

It’s a question that has everything a think tank needs. It’s complicated, forward looking and has implications for policy. Influencing policymakers, after all, is a think tank’s holy grail.

And the reason everyone is asking the question is clear enough. The next 12 months will see two major developments in Afghanistan: the end of Hamid Karzai’s presidency and the withdrawal or reduction of US forces.

And one thing is clear. If Karzai’s now somewhat desperate attempts to establish himself as something other than a US puppet go on long enough, and he manages to scupper the Bilateral Security Agreement, then Congress in Washington will be only too happy to save some cash and leave Afghanistan to its own devices.

The general consensus in the research institutes is that, one way or another, Afghanistan is going to suffer from a long running civil conflict in which no one group will be able to secure a clear victory.

Pakistan, meanwhile, will need to spend 2014 developing a new Afghan strategy. The previous one, after all, has sunk without trace. The idea was that as the world tried to put together a post-2014 political settlement in Afghanistan, various big powers would come knocking on Pakistan’s door seeing it as the only country capable of delivering the Afghan Taliban.

It sounded like a good plan but was based on a flawed premise. The Afghan Taliban, it turns out, have ideas of their own and Pakistan could not deliver them. The consequence has been the increasing irrelevance of Pakistan on the international arena. Closer to home, meanwhile, Pakistan faces an unstable Afghanistan which no doubt will serve as a sanctuary to the TTP.

But not all of Pakistan’s 2014 developments will be made in Afghanistan. Domestic trends will also be at work.

As Nawaz Sharif looks ahead to the new year he should have some confidence that he will complete his third term as prime minister. The PPP is still reeling from its disastrous election and the PTI’s electoral challenge may well be past its peak. As for the army, it would have little popular backing for a coup.

Of course Pakistan’s habitually crisis-ridden political system can take unexpected, rapid turns but, by historical standards, Nawaz Sharif is in a remarkably secure position.

At the same time, there is plenty for him to worry about over the next 12 months. Two issues above all the others will be urgent: the militancy and the dire economic situation. Going by past precedent he is unlikely to do much about either. And, to be fair, in both cases he may have good reason for that.

Shortly after the election Sharif secured an IMF extended facility worth $6.6bn – only slightly below the $7.2bn he asked for. The IMF attached various conditions to be implemented over a 10-year period but, given past history, it presumably has little expectation of them being respected.

Sharif is well aware that international concern about Pakistan’s nuclear assets means the IMF is likely to give the country support even when its conditions are ignored. And since Sharif knows the money will keep flowing, he has little reason to court unpopularity by taking tough economic decisions.

Policy towards the militants, meanwhile, will remain in the hands of the military. Nawaz Sharif could do more to lead the campaign against the militants but he will be unwilling to stick his neck out when he does not control the levers of power.

In 2009 the TTP had a high degree of control of 18 administrative units such as tribal areas within Fata, districts including Upper Dir and Swat and frontier regions such as Bannu. They now have one genuine stronghold: North Waziristan.

Although the number of militant attacks in Pakistan remains very high, it is worth remembering that the situation has improved since 2009. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies 5,047 people were killed in 2012 in politically inspired violence compared to 12,632 in 2009.

The question is whether the army will try to push the TTP out of North Waziristan. And for three reasons the army might wait until after 2014 before making up its mind.

First, it will be easier to sell the policy of clearing North Waziristan to the Pakistan electorate as being in Pakistan’s rather than the US’s interest after the US drawdown in Afghanistan is done. Second, even though the army is convinced that talks will fail, it will have to let negotiations between the government and the TTP run their course. Third, it’s always easier to put things off.

For decades now dire prognostications have been made about Pakistan. Many have been proven to be true. The army’s support for Kashmir militant groups did lead to a more general jihadi culture. The failure to give the Baloch people what they needed did lead to a violent insurgency. The politicians’ flagrant corruption did undermine support for the democratic process.

At the same time many pessimistic predictions have turned out to be wrong. The nuclear weapons have not fallen into the hands of jihadis; the economy has not collapsed and the country’s territorial integrity has not been compromised.

With the benefit of hindsight it would seem the best prediction might have been that Pakistan will, somehow, muddle along.

And as we all look ahead to 2014 that’s probably about as good a prediction as you’ll get.

The writer is a freelance British journalist, one of the hosts of BBC’s Newshour and the author of the new political thriller, Target Britain.

By Owen Bennett-Jones
The News International