A web of complexity surrounds the TTP insurgency, the core of the ‘internal elements’ that now present the gravest threat to national security – a fact acknowledged by COAS Gen Kayani himself. Military successes, coupled with drone strikes, have significantly disrupted insurgent activities in the tribal areas. But militants have responded by relocating to strategic arcs around main cities, and conducting hit-and-run attacks with high impact value.
As things stand, the insurgency is at a crucial stage. Attacks in big cities are signs of desperation, say military experts, as the noose tightens around the TTP in the tribal area, and its hierarchy seems using them to push the government towards a negotiated settlement as both sides become battle weary, a Pakistan Today investigation has revealed.
But ensuring lasting peace, as opposed to deals that did not work in the past, requires understanding the complicated makeup of the TTP, how it uprooted the centuries old jirga system headed by tribal maliks, and the inevitable spillover of developments in Afghanistan (especially the ’14 American drawdown).
Maliks irrelevant
The influence of the maliks has been on the decline since long before al Qaeda financed the multi-party conglomerate known as the TTP, when foreign influence in the region was limited to ‘investing’ in the maliks to dispute the Durand Line.
As far back as the early days of the Soviet jihad, when US, Pakistani and Saudi intelligence agencies midwifed the soldier-cleric mujahideen of the Afghan resistance, maliks have been unable or unwilling to keep abreast of monumental changes sweeping the region.
They agreed to help raise tribal lashkars for the resistance, but never honoured their promises. And it was this stalling that led agencies to approach religious seminaries, which were ready and willing to partake in the jihad.
“It was because of the maliks that all the attention came to rest on religious circles,” said sources from the tribal area. “These developments elevated the clergy to unprecedented political heights, something neither it nor the region was accustomed to”.
Years later, the maliks were again split when asked not to accommodate al Qaeda fighters fleeing the ’01 war in Afghanistan. It was only when the TTP had entrenched itself in the region, and a military sweep was imminent, that they bowed to government pressure and finally formed aman lashkars to confront the Taliban.
Since the Taliban rebellion the malik-political agent nexus that has long defined the tribal political structure no longer holds. The existing setup is incapable of providing the kind of administrative engagement that is necessary after army action. And the lack of institutions compounds the military’s problems, which must oversee administrative complications in addition to its prime responsibility.
Right time to talk
Whatever arrangement is reached once the military leaves the tribal area will have to factor in these changes, and make administrative provisions that are necessary in a post military action environment. For far too long FATA has remained undeveloped and neglected, and the absence of a strong political machinery leaves power vacuums that enable insurgents to circle around army positions and reoccupy strategic enclaves that have already been militarily cleansed.
Analysts observing the insurgency closely say a time of reorientation has come ahead of the American departure from Afghanistan next year.
In case of a complete withdrawal, which is being debated but highly unlikely, Afghan Taliban are likely to have a strong influence in whichever government comes to power in Kabul. That bodes ill for the TTP, which has alienated itself from the Afghan parent body (despite public allegiance) by embracing al Qaeda’s directive of engaging with the Pakistani military.
Hakeemullah’s recent overtures of peace, though with outrageous conditions, are increasingly being seen as the TTP’s posturing for a post ’14 Afghanistan, where Afghan Taliban’s influence will rise just as al Qaeda’s is diminishing. The sudden option of negotiations, and talk of halting operations in North Waziristan, is an indication of softening up to the Afghan brothers, while strange demands, and continued attacks, signify the threat in case this opportunity is also lost.
And COIN officials are confident this is the right time to talk.
“Their core demands are releasing many hundreds in detention for more than half a decade and removing the precondition of disarming for talks,” they told Pakistan Today. Military flexibility like releasing those held without charge under the FCR as long as they report to authorities regularly and allowing bearing arms within agency limits, they said, could go a long way towards ending violence within a very short period of time.
Yet despite the scent of opportunity in intelligence circles, the optimism fails to extend to the outside world.
“The Taliban’s offer of talks does not seem to be a serious move aimed at reaching a mutual understanding for a ceasefire,” said Dr Ashraf Ali, head of the FATA research centre, in a recent news analysis.
There is also little evidence of a political structure capable of dealing with the most important part of COIN doctrine – the administrative effort that follows it. The maliks, struggling for relevance, will resist accommodating Taliban they are presently engaging on the field. And perhaps the most important factor, the fate of Afghanistan as well as resistance fighters from all over the world, remains far from certain. There is little disagreement, though, that dealing with the TTP immediately, whether politically or militarily, is essential or the war will come more frequently to main cities. And the armed option has a far higher chance of proving self-defeating.
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