SPY EYES

Peshawar is in grief after the brutal assassination of Awami National Party leader Bashir Bilour and other party workers and policemen last week, the same way it was in grief after Benazir Bhutto’s murder five years ago.

Like 2007, the year 2012 will also end on a sad note because the Taliban killed a political leader who questioned their use of violence in the name of Islam. He was on the special hit list of terrorists that is known by security officials as the love list. Someone on a hit list may get off the hook or fall off the radar at some stage, but there is no compromise on those who are on the love list. They remain a permanent target for “the crimes they committed against the Taliban”. The list includes top politicians and senior security officials who the militants see as the biggest obstructions to their terror campaign.

The year 2012 saw a staggering 25 percent increase in attacks on the police, and targeted strikes on politicians and other influential people rose by 17 percent. The province has seen the largest number of suicide attacks since 2006 – at least 187, compared with 54 in FATA. There have been 98 suicide attacks in all the rest of Pakistan since 2006.

Terrorist groups have changed their tactics in the last year. Firstly, they have started sending suicide attackers or snipers after high-value targets. Secondly, they chose to go after the security apparatus and strategic installations in a more organized way. These include strikes on police stations, checkposts, mobile police and paramilitary units, and strategic installations such as the Kamra airbase in August or the Peshawar airbase on December 15. Thirdly, the Taliban terrorists seem to be running out of cash, supported by an extortion drive in the greater Peshawar region.

In Shabqadar and parts of Orakzai and Mohmand agencies, for instance, dozens of people have received intimidating calls by unidentified men claiming to be Taliban, with demands for money. Locals say this is a new trend, suggesting the collusion of crime and militancy.

A travel agent in Shabqadar area of Malakand Division was recently gunned down when he refused to pay extortion money to unidentified men. In another incident of a similar nature, an affluent family was compelled to leave the area.

A fourth very alarming new tactic is the increased deployment of heavily drugged children under 15 to carry out suicide attacks. On at least three occasions in November and December, security forces were able to intercept and neutralize boys planning to make such attacks. They were all heavily intoxicated.

On November 20, police arrested two would-be suicide attackers Bilal (14) and Jahangir near Peeshtakhara police station, Peshawar. They were riding a motorbike. The police succeeded in engaging them in a discussion and eventually overpowered them. They, too, were found to have been drugged. But the most alarming aspect of this incident was the revelation that both the terrorists possessed airport entry passes. Bilal later confessed during a court appearance that their target was the Peshawar airport.

On December 15, another group of terrorists stormed the Peshawar military air base with rockets and foot soldiers, exposing weaknesses within the security apparatus and terrorizing the entire city.

And this brings us to the fifth frightening element – the shortcomings of, and the enemies within the security apparatus. A visit to the airbase vicinity adjacent to the Old Abdarra Road reveals that terrorists chose a site that was the most strategic in terms of location and assets.

A reconstruction of the events by residents suggests that the attackers first created a distraction by torching a small van in one of the small alleys, then drove the other explosive-laden vehicle next to the periphery wall of the air base and blew it up within a few minutes. Hundreds of kilograms of explosives rocked the entire settlement, caused a massive crater and the impact brought down a significant portion of the periphery wall.

The four terrorists, according to locals, then sneaked into one of the smaller alleys in the darkness (the power to the settlement had been turned off by then), and sat down in front of a house, probably for the dust to clear. One of the residents asked the suspects as to what they were up to, but he was forced to go back.

Already struck with the impact of the huge explosion, most residents retreated to their homes, and took positions on rooftops or terraces just in case these people tried to barge into their homes. The gang of four – of which one spoke Pashto and was probably their local facilitator – stayed there until 11, and eventually headed out to another street junction where a police checkpost serves as a first tier of protection for the airport periphery. They shot dead the only guard present there and disappeared in the dark, presumably in the direction of Pawakai.

Some locals say they informed the police several times about the presence of the suspicious men in their street but the police did not arrive until 2am. The air force police came to pick up a couple of bags the terror suspects had dumped behind on two locations. These bags contained mineral water, rocket propelled grenades, and hand grenades.

This raises questions about the preparedness of our security agencies. Why didn’t the police take these calls by residents seriously? Why did the intelligence agencies not respond to what the would-be suicide bomber Bilal told interrogators on November 20? How did the planners know about the extremely sensitive but vulnerable location of the military airbase? Also, did the security apparatus ever think that terrorists could use the entire residential area along the periphery wall of the airport to sneak in men and ammunition and to blow holes into the thinly guarded airbase?

Attacks on strategic installations had looked imminent after the raid and partial siege of the General Headquarters on October 10, 2009, the attack on PNS Mehran on May 22, 2011, and the Kamra airbase attack on August 16. Police and the military managed to defend the airbase and the airport, killing presumably all the attackers, but questions hang over their preemptive capabilities, such as information-gathering, planning and response. All that various segments of the security apparatus can do on a particular day is to defend their positions and put down the attackers. A stretched-out police (one fourth of which is deployed for VIP and protocol duties), exhausted and poorly-trained paramilitary (often guarding critical entry points from the tribal regions) as well as an intelligence network infested with double agents (informers for militant and criminal gangs ) are some of the factors that need urgent consideration. Without insider information, terrorists wouldn’t have been able to blow up the periphery wall at an extremely critical location.