GHQ’s Pearl Harbour

Posted by Admin On Wednesday, 14 December 2011 0 comments
By Wajahat S Khan


Exactly seventy years ago this week, on December 7, 1941, at 0748 hours local time, two waves of 366 Japanese aircraft commenced the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii. Eight battleships were put of commission and over 300 American aircraft were damaged or destroyed. The loss of life was worse; 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,282 wounded that morning. By comparison, Japanese losses were a victory: 29 aircraft lost, with 55 servicemen killed or wounded.

America was expecting a fight, but not here, and not like this. The next day, the US – hurt, angry and unprepared – officially entered World War II, ending its isolationist era and becoming the internationalist, globally committed military power that it remains till this day.

Sounds familiar? It should.

The events of November 26th at Mohmand Agency’s Salalah checkpoints of Boulder and Volcano are not as well documented as Pearl Harbour. But details so far point to haunting similarities between the two battles: The early morning attack that caught the Pakistanis off guard; the lack of preparation for an offensive of such scale by the Pakistanis; and the knowhow of Pakistani coordinates and response abilities by the attackers.

Thus, for many in and out of the Pak Army uniform, the roles of the opponents are reversed. In this narrative, Pakistan is now the US, while the US is now Japan. And instead of starting, the war – for some in the GHQ – has now ended...maybe even restarted. But the damage is done. For the army, Salalah is a Pearl Harbour moment, though in reverse. Here’s how.

Pakistan’s sovereignty, long atrophied – by hit-and-run ground incursions, drone strikes and the Abbottabad raid – has now been terribly and officially breached. Whether Salalah was deliberate or a case of ‘friendly fire’ is irrelevant. The Chaklala garrison never had the moral high ground to back out of the ‘war on terror’ after Operation Geronimo targeted Osama bin Laden last May. Ditching the US-led alliance then would have been labelled defeatist, and only added insult to the injury Pakistan sustained by letting Bin Laden live happily in a bungalow in its heartland, and then letting the US Navy SEAL Team Six happily infiltrate its territory and send him packing. Pulling out of the war effort then by citing sovereignty would have been akin to pulling out of a card game by citing the call of nature when you owe everyone. Not cool.

Now, the Pakistani military has a royal excuse to beg Nato’s pardon, proceed to the coat-check and hail a cab out of town. The party’s over. And Pakistan is done buying the drinks and pretending to play along, for only it knows that its tab ran out a while ago.

Again, if Pearl Harbour started World War II for America, then Salalah could very well end the Af-Pak War for Pakistan. Thus, their recent actions (boycotting Bonn, blocking Nato convoys, evacuating Shamsi Airbase and now installing air defences on the western border while recalling liaison officers from Nato/ISAF) indicate that the generals know something we don’t.

Thus, GHQ’s think tanks are preparing a laundry list of demands that they can finally call the US out on and actually achieve. Eager to ditch the taxing mortgage rates of the Musharraf era, expect General Kayani’s brass platoon to hammer out some redefining commandments for a new battlefield environment that could feature some critical, game-changing rules.

Firstly, drone attacks could now take on a whole new set of operating procedures. The Pakistanis will now want to coordinate, call, compute and clear all targets according to the projected cost-benefit analysis that fits the GHQ’s math. The fact that there have been no drone strikes since Salalah should say something about the achievability of this objective.

Secondly, the ISI could aggressively seek any/all unofficial/undercover CIA or other intelligence presence in the country to be evacuated by request (or perhaps forcefully evicted through the now familiar ‘blown cover’ approach). The Director General Military Operations has already hinted at this in his briefing to the cabinet last Thursday. This could be compounded by even tighter visa regulations that could well make Pakistan the North Korea of South Asia.

Thirdly, Pakistan will want the finality of the Durand Line to be re-established (especially as nationalist Afghan politicians are using the Salalah incident to grind away at its sanctity), and any operational details in a re-defined (maybe by 10 or 15 kilometres) ‘grey zone’ that straddles both sides of the border will have to be shared and cleared. This will also redefine the oversimplified and often misused ‘hammer and anvil’ approach that Rawalpindi and Kabul have ‘jointly’ implemented.

Fourthly, following up on the ‘grey zone’ regulation, a ‘no boots on the ground’ logic will render the unstated but often implemented Nato/ISAF policy of ‘hot pursuit’ across the border and into Pakistan useless. Thus, a tighter ‘grey zone’ will now lead to a clear and present ‘red line’ at the border itself.

Fifthly, expect Nato supply route traffic to be regulated and convoys to be increasingly taxed/levied. As the Russians don’t seem to be interested in playing ball with Nato without extracting their pound of flesh through the disablement of the European missile defence system for a relaxation of the Northern Distribution Network, Pakistan will continue to milk advantage from its exclusive land routes.

Sixthly, over-flight permissions could become stricter. The more than 100 daily Nato flights over Pakistani airspace will thus be cleared more tightly than Chicago’s O’Hare ATC on a stormy Sunday.

Seventhly, Pakistan could implement a reversal of the border to corps to headquarters chain of command to be reversed in order. The next time anyone wants to shoot some bad guys, the request will have to come from ISAF HQ in Kabul to the Pakistani Directorate of Military Operations at the GHQ (and not tactically from some Forward Operating Base or Company Outpost on the border to its Pakistani counterpart or liaison on the ground). This will stem Pakistan’s realistic fears that CIA/Afghan/Special Operations forces from the other side act independently and without ISAF HQ’s knowhow.

As Nato/ISAF seems to have overplayed its hand, the khakis now have the chance they’ve been waiting for. The raging debate among them is how to effectively stay on course without being cornered domestically into a coup or an all out border war. As there is sympathy, if not support, from Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and even Istanbul, expect Rawalpindi – and not Islamabad – to once again do what it is does best: end the war, if not win it.

The writer is a Harvard Shorenstein Fellow, an Asia Society Young Global Leader and investigates for print/broadcast/social media. Tweet him @wajskhan, Email: wajahat_khan@hks.


Courtesy: The News


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