Recommended Policy Thrusts and Contours of Counter/ De-Radicalization Strategy

Posted by Admin On Saturday 9 July 2011 0 comments

Presentation by Mushahid Hussain Sayed at National Seminar
on“Recommended Policy Thrusts and Contours of Counter/
De-Radicalization Strategy” organized by Pakistan Army
Mingora, July 6, 2011
I.​Reasons for Radicalization among Muslims:

In the last 3 decades, there are 3 fundamental reasons why
radicalization has taken place among Muslims in various parts of the
world. This radicalization sometimes takes the form of an extremist
mindset that has, on occasion, degenerated into acts of violence and
terrorism.

First, the impact of the Afghan Jihad which was the last biggest
battle of the 20thCentury that resulted in a US supported
international campaign against Soviet Communism. After defeating the
Soviet Red Army in 1989, the West left Afghanistan and Pakistan high
and dry, cutting off all aid, slapping sanctions on Pakistan and
forgetting about the region as a whole. They had no programme for
de-radicalization, de-weaponization and tens of thousands of Jihadis
were left “jobless”. These Jihadists then turned on their own mentors
and handlers and started destabilization in different conflict areas.

Second, there is a growing sense of Muslim victim-hood in which
Muslims see themselves as being at the receiving end of double
standards from the West. While the people of Palestine and Kashmir
are denied their inalienable Right of Self-Determination despite
United Nations resolutions, within the last 15 years, East Timor and
South Sudan, both with Christian majorities, have been granted this
right under United Nations sponsored referenda. Muslims generally
tend to blame the West for this unequal treatment.

Third, increasingly after 9/11, most Muslims perceived the “War on
Terror” as a “War on Islam and Muslims” and in this regard, statements
and leaks from Western leaders have not helped. The turning point in
this regard was the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq and it was
perceived as a war to protect Israel and capture the Iraqi oil
reserves, the second largest in the world. More so because Iraq had
nothing to do with 9/11 or Al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. The
revelation by British Lawyer, Philippe Sands, in his book “Lawless
World” that President Bush, in a private telephone talk with Prime
Minister Tony Blair on January 30, 2003, several weeks before the Iraq
war, had in his mind to ' go beyond Iraq' with a list of countries
that included Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, apart from Iran and North
Korea, confirmed in the minds of Muslims a broaderconspiracy theory of
a Western design to contain the Muslim world.

II.​Why Radicalization in Pakistan:

​There are at least 5 reasons that can be understood which have helped
spawn radical/extremist ideology that sometimes has resulted in
violence and terrorism in Pakistan. This issue predates 9/11 but all
governments have been in denial since it is more convenient to look
the other way rather than face the challenge.

​First, the direct impact of the Afghan Jihad which Pakistan fought
through its own territory, primarily through the Pakhtoon areas of
Balochistan and FATA/NWFP region from 1979-89. That was the biggest
covert operation in American history, the CIA pumped in $ 2.1 billion
during those 10 years, backed by a matching financial grant of $ 2.1
billion from Saudi Arabia and $ 1 billion during same period from
China. In fact, $ 5.2 billion were secretly spent in financing,
training, arming and ideologically motivating some 200,000 Afghan
mujahideen and 20,000 Arab volunteers to fight the Afghan Jihad.
Pakistan felt the fallout the most because all this was done through
Pakistan territory.

​Second, the lack of vision and will of the Pakistani elites, both
civil and military, and their failure to develop an adequate state
school public educational system that could cater to the needs of the
poor.

​Third, there is also the issue of injustice in Pakistani society
where the rich and the powerful have been above the law, while the law
is applied only for the poor and the oppressed who have no money or no
access to influence.

​Fourth, economic disparities have also created a yawning chasm
between the haves and have-nots, with the rich becoming richer, mostly
through corruption, while the poor are becoming poorer. It is thus no
accident that radical/extremist ideology would flourish in such an
environment.

​Finally, Pakistan, together with Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and
Palestine has become one of the principal battle grounds of a proxy
war between two Muslim ideological rivals, Iran and Saudi Arabia,
which has resulted in competition, conflict and cleavage of Muslim
societies along ethnic, linguistic and sectarian lines, sometimes
degenerated into a violent proxy conflict.

III.​Nature of Pakistani failure to evolve a
Counter-Terrorism/Extremism/
De-radicalization Strategy:

In the last 30 years, no government has paid serious attention to the
formulation of an effective Counter-Terror strategy. While the
rhetoric has been plentiful but the reality is otherwise. Often, the
national leadership has been in denial taking the convenient route of
blaming it on “an international conspiracy” or announcement of
half-hearted policies like Police Reforms or Madrassah Reforms or the
much touted declarations of a National Counter-Terrorism Authority
(NACTA), have never been implemented. Often, there is bureaucratic
infighting and a vision and will to implement it has been lacking.

There is also an additional factor, namely, monumental incompetence as
well. Take the case of the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in
Lahore in March 2009 or the audacious assault on the GHQ Rawalpindi in
October 2009. Both were predicted by the Special Branch of
Intelligence, their news was published in the national press but
neither was prevented, and these attacks took place precisely in the
manner that the published intelligence report had predicted.

Today, terrorism needs to be treated as a national security problem,
not just as a police problem of law and order. It is the single
biggest source of domestic destabilization of the state and society.
In tackling terrorism, 3 kinds of failures are evident:

a)Intelligence gathering, particularly the ability to anticipate or
forewarn about possible incidents of terrorism.

b)Investigation, trial and conviction of acts of terrorism, since
investigation is generally carried out in a haphazard,
non-professional and casual manner without the assistance of such
modern complements as forensic labs or DNA testing facilities.

c)The third failure apart from intelligence gathering and
investigation pertains to the visible absence of coordination between
different agencies of the government pursuing such cases of terrorism,
including coordination between provinces and the Federal Government,
between khaki and mufti, and amongst the Intelligence Agencies.

IV.​What is to be done: Purpose & Contours of a Comprehensive Strategy
for combating terrorism/extremism & for deradicalisation

The Government must formulate & implement a National Strategy that is
doable with practical measures evolved from Pakistan's domestic
context and ground realities.

There should be a three-fold purpose of such a national strategy:

A) Provide clarity of a vision regarding the future direction of the
country. Basically, what kind of Pakistan do we want for the present
and future generation of Pakistanis? And the answer to this is quite
clear in the minds of the overwhelming majority of our people, namely,
an Islamic, democratic, tolerant, inclusive and pluralist Pakistan as
envisioned by our Founding Fathers led by the Quaid-e-Azam. Certainly
not an intolerant or insecure Pakistan where Muslims even fear to pray
in mosques or go to shrines of respected and popular saints, just
because of the threat of being blown up.

B) Demonstrate, at the highest political level, the will to execute
and implement this vision, particularly the capacity and competence to
do so.

C) Raise national morale so that people are convinced that the
challenge of extremism/terrorism can be overcome by Pakistanis with a
made-in-Pakistan course correction, while at the same time, restoring
their pride and confidence in the security forces, Intelligence and
Armed Forces, and reviving their faith in the future of Pakistan.


Contours of a 6-point Comprehensive, National Strategy

1. POLITICAL:

Consensus on such a strategy through Parliament, similar to the
consensus amongst the political forces prior to the military operation
in Swat-Malakand in April 2009, which was an essential prerequisite
for it's success. Public opinion support provides a sort of 'air
cover' for a military operation.
Parliamentarians and political leaders should stand
shoulder-to-shoulder with their valiant Armed Forces, who are a
sheet-anchor for the Pakistani Nation. They should be seen in the
front-lines with the soldiers and officers, plus providing
succor/sympathy/support to families of martyrs, soldiers and civilians
alike.

2. MEDIA:

Establish Media Coordination Committee to promote this Strategy in the
print and electronic media, including representatives from the
government and non-governmental experts and professionals.
Television is key in this regard - talk shows, plays and public
service ads explaining the essence of Islam and how our religion
rejects extremism, to educate, motivate and mobilize public opinion.
Inspire people by highlighting heroes and success stories in this campaign.

3. EDUCATION/RELIGIOUS:

Have a sustained deradicalisation programme with reformed radicals,
respected & credible clerics, prominent public figures and experts in
human psychology.
Deradicalisation programmes should highlight destructive consequences
of extremism/terrorism for society (lost lives of youth, shattered
families, loss of limb and life of innocent women, children and men,
culture of fear, damage to image of Islam, destruction of traditional
social values of tolerance, with such an environment conducive to
external enemies machinations).

4. LAW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM:

To nullify the popular view, which is based on an unfortunate reality,
that terrorists are neither caught nor convicted because of flaws in
our system, it is important to focus on a triangle of police, prison
and the judiciary. This process should begin by instilling
professionalism in the Police, which is the first line of defense in
this battle.
The Intelligence Bureau, which more or less duplicates the functions
of the ISI should be dedicated to counter terrorism/extremism,
coordinating with the Special Branch in the provinces whose mission
statement needs to be redefined to focus fully on this challenge.
Hate speech & hate literature should be treated as an issue of
criminal law enforcement, not merely as a deviation from norms of our
religion. And those involved in heinous crimes should be lodged in a
special maximum security prison, something similar to Attock Fort.
Judges fearful for their and their families lives in case they try
terrorists should follow the Italian Model where judges trying the
Mafia had their identities hidden behind hooded faces in special
closed trials behind prison walls.

5. ECONOMIC:

A fundamental lesson of the Afghan Jihad in 1989 was that jobless
jihadis invariably turn to extremism/ terrorism. In Pakistan, despite
tall talk, there have been no economic incentives provided like a plan
for employment opportunities or other developmental initiatives.
The Government should seriously consider establishing a
Pakistan-US-Gulf Consortium to provide Fast Track work visas for
25,000 FATA youth, starting with educated boys and girls, to work in
Gulf countries. This FATA-specific initiative, if pushed by the US and
supported by the Gulf states who are friends of both Pakistan and the
US, could be a productive alternative to the non-starter that the
much-talked about Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) that both
President Bush & President Obama proclaimed as policy, but failed to
deliver.

6. FOREIGN POLICY:

Pakistan has been in the eye of the storm for the last 30 years, since
the Iranian Revolution and the Afghan Jihad, feeling the fallout of
instability, turmoil and violence in the region. All of Pakistan's
neighbors, friends and foes alike, have had complaints at one time or
the other regarding our territory being used against them. And
Pakistan too has had similar complaints against at least two of it's
neighbors, on the east and west. Under the mechanism of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose primary purpose is to combat
terrorism & extremism, Pakistan and it's neighbors should agree to a
Common Convention to prevent mutual destabilization.
Additionally, amongst all Muslim countries, Pakistan has been the
worst victim of an ethnic-sectarian proxy conflict, with strings being
pulled from abroad on Pakistani territory. This conflict has been
playing out for 25 years, while it was caused by geopolitical events,
Pakistan has felt it's consequences the most. Such strife is like a
dagger cutting through the heart of the Muslim Ummah, causing
conflict, cleavage and confrontation. Ending it should be one of
Pakistan's principal national security priorities.

Conclusion: ​Combating terrorism and containing
radicalization/extremism is no rocket science and is certainly doable,
provided the Government can muster up the necessary vision and will to
do it.

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