What are France’s motives behind pushing Iran away?

Posted by FS On Saturday, 16 November 2013 0 comments

When Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited Paris last week and held talks with his French counterpart Laurent Fabius on Iran’s disputed nuclear programme, he probably never thought the main opposition to an Iranian proposed agreement to resolve its nuclear standoff, would come from the French three days later.
The US and its allies narrowed their differences with Tehran after three days of marathon talks in Geneva, but announced they had failed to produce an interim deal due to yet unresolved differences.
“A lot of concrete progress has been achieved, but some differences remain,” European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told reporters in Geneva, Switzerland.
Still hopeful
Also addressing reporters at the end of the talks was Zarif, who said, “We are all on the same wavelength, and that gives us the impetus to go forward when we meet again.”
US Secretary of State John Kerry had a similar message, “There’s no question in my mind that we are closer now, as we leave Geneva, than we were when we came, and that with good work and good faith over the course of the next weeks, we can in fact secure our goal.”
With the next round of talks set for November 20 in Geneva, it was announced on Sunday, that the US Congress will push for a new round of sanctions on Iran, and also outline acceptable conditions for a deal with Iran now that the Geneva talks have failed.
The talks were very close to a final deal on Friday, but complications surfaced after France raised questions, saying it believed the proposal did not adequately neutralise the risk of Iran making a nuclear bomb.
Different viewpoints have been expressed on the motives behind France’s intervention to prevent a deal, ranging from commercial and geopolitical interests, to just playing a role as a scapegoat for the US.
With respect to the P5+1, the French stance challenged efforts made by the group to sit at the negotiation table. There have been comments that by doing so, France, in fact, strengthened Iran’s position because despite all problems, Iran has always been ready to attend the talks to settle the case, and hammer out a deal. However, US conservatives and Israel, in the previous rounds of talks, and now, in this round, France, have rejected diplomacy and continue to play the military confrontation, “all options are on the table”, card.
Suspect motives
By taking a tough stance against Iran, France can appease the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, which fears Iran’s increasing regional power. Its reward is more financially lucrative contracts and sales of more arms to these countries.
Francois Heisbourg, a former French official and now chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies has said that in domestic politics, “standing up to the Americans will increase popular ratings of President Francois Hollande’s government”, even though the Iranian nuclear issue isn’t especially important to the French public.
There are speculations in Tehran that Hollande hopes that what he did at this round of talks, might lead to a stronger deal to be discussed during the November 20 Geneva meeting. This will surely make the hawks in Washington happy, too.
Conservatives in Tehran believe that France was playing its role within the group. It is believed that France was given the role of  a “spoiler” in an orchestrated move. Because of the distrust between Tehran and Washington would have grown deeper, had the US played this role.
Statements made by US and British officials put weight behind such belief. In comments on “Meet the Press” on Sunday, Secretary  Kerry again downplayed the idea that France had undermined the deal, saying that the US too wanted more “clarity” about the terms of the deal and that the six powers remain united.
Presence of the Israeli lobby in French diplomacy is another reason mentioned for Fabius’ change of heart. It is also believed in Tehran, that the French intend to get more concessions. One should not forget that rivalry among big powers to take over global markets, has been the root cause of two world wars.
Economic concerns
Additionally, France’s anti-Iran move has roots in the economy. The French are worried they might lose the vast and lucrative Iranian market. France has benefitted considerably from the sanctions placed on Iran. It has sold its outdated auto technology to the country, and has been active in the oil and gas sectors. The French know the US will have an eye-catching presence in Iran’s market once the sanctions are lifted, so they intend to pave the ground, in the talks with the US, for having a share in Iran’s significant market.
Kerry, Lady Ashton and Zarif have voiced strong optimism that a deal would be reached on the nuclear standoff in the next round of talks, and that would pave the way for a thaw in relations between Iran and the West. In which case, where would France stand, considering the fact that Iran picks its economic partners on the basis of its long-term interests?

READ MORE

Dollar loses momentum

Posted by FS On Wednesday, 13 November 2013 0 comments

The dollar’s rising momentum against the yen weakened on Monday in Asia as Japanese exporters jumped into the market to sell after the greenback was pushed over the Y99 mark following stronger-than-expected U.S. jobs data Friday.
The jobs figures offered a brighter picture of the U.S. economy, bolstering the view that the Federal Reserve will soon start winding down its asset-purchase program.
The data came after a U.S. government shutdown and fiscal stalemate in early October clouded the economic outlook for the world’s biggest economy, leading market participants to believe the U.S. central bank wouldn’t be prepared to end the crisis-response measure anytime soon.
“We had pushed back the potential start of tapering, but that view is now being adjusted,” said Akira Moroga, manager at forex products group at Aozora Bank. “People in the market are now seeing a 50% chance that the Fed will begin tapering in December.”
The dollar was at Y98.99 as of 0450 GMT from Y99.08 late Friday in New York.
“Japanese exporters are selling dollars after the greenback rose above Y99, but at the same time buying is strong following the jobs data,” said Michiyoshi Kato, senior vice president of forex sales at Mizuho Bank.
The euro was at $1.3363 from $1.3370. The Wall Street Journal Dollar Index, a measure of the dollar against a basket of major currencies, was at 73.420 from 73.411.
Many Asian currencies such as the Korean won and new Taiwan dollar were lower following the solid U.S. employment figures. The dollar was at KRW1,066.6 from its Friday close of KRW1,064.9. The greenback was at NT29.455 from NT29.420.
Looking ahead, investors are focusing on U.S. economic indicators later this week and a confirmation hearing at the U.S. Senate’s banking committee on Thursday for Federal Reserve chair nominee Janet Yellen.
The U.S. market is closed Monday for Veterans Day.
Interbank Foreign Exchange Rates At 00:50 ET / 0450 GMT

                          Latest        Previous   %Chg    Daily    Daily  %Chg
Dollar Rates                             Close             High     Low    12/31

USD/JPY Japan         98.97-99.00       99.20-22  -0.23    99.23    98.96 +14.11
EUR/USD Euro            1.3362-64      1.3357-59  +0.04   1.3366   1.3346  +1.27
GBP/USD U.K.            1.6012-16      1.6000-07  +0.07   1.6021   1.6002  -1.43
USD/CHF Switzerland     0.9220-26      0.9225-30  -0.05   0.9232   0.9216  +0.77
USD/CAD Canada          1.0475-78      1.0479-86  -0.06   1.0486   1.0472  +5.53
AUD/USD Australia       0.9381-84      0.9384-89  -0.04   0.9390   0.9368  -9.72
NZD/USD New Zealand     0.8278-82      0.8258-68  +0.20   0.8287   0.8244  +0.02

Euro Rate
EUR/JPY Japan           132.27-30      132.52-58  -0.20   132.52   132.22 +15.58

Source: ICAP PLC
Write to Kosaku Narioka at kosaku.narioka@wsj.com
  (END) Dow Jones Newswires
  11-11-130114ET
  Copyright (c) 2013 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
READ MORE

The Maulvi Menace

Posted by FS On 0 comments

The Jamaat e Islami (JI) Chief has flabbergasted and outraged the people and probably his own party by a statement that makes no sense unless his aim was to create the kind of controversy that is now raging. He has said that the terrorist leader killed in a Drone strike recently is a Shaheed (martyr) and that those killed while defending the country against the scourge of terrorism are not. Coming from a religious leader such a statement is a direct assault on the integrity of the country’s armed and law enforcement forces. It is also a statement that undermines the honor of the thousands who have been killed and crippled while executing the government’s policy to defend the country and the cause of Islam. Can one even begin to understand how such a statement can undermine morale and motivation — the bedrock of the spirit that leads men to sacrifice their lives? Can anyone imagine the anguish of the wives, daughters, sons, fathers and mothers of those who did not reason why and chose to die? There is rage and anger across the land and it is justified. Lost in the confusion is another statement by another Chief of a religious party that — ‘even a dog killed by the Americans is a Shaheed’ — talk about bad taste and distorted thinking.
After waiting for a government reaction to these most damaging statements and not getting any, the Armed Forces through the Inter Services Public Relations Directorate has issued a strong statement that is a condemnation, rebuttal and a demand for an apology. So far there is silence from the government while the JI is doing damage control of sorts by saying that their shura will decide on a response and this was the personal opinion of their Chief. None of this makes sense. What has been said cannot be unsaid. As we have seen from recent events in the senate, apologizing is not what we are good at — even when the image of our country and its integrity is at stake. Is this the much talked about beauty of democracy?
The reality is that rash, spur of the moment statements create problems. The tone for the entire debate should have been carefully set and modulated right after the Drone strike that killed the TTP leader. There should not have been two views about it and this should not have been used to get on the bandwagon against the US. Talks had not started. The dialogue option had not been turned into a proposal. TTP attacks had escalated. TTP demands could not be met. Yet we are talking about the murder of peace by a drone strike that took out the TTP leader? The dialogue option and possible peace has been murdered not by the Drone strike but by the elevation of a murderer to the leadership of the TTP. He has promptly ruled out the dialogue option and vowed revenge against Pakistan. Some are now hoping for a divide within TTP ranks and infighting among the many groups. The country’s leadership needs to step back, review the situation, acknowledge mistakes and then act to influence opinion that will lead to a rational acceptable narrative.
In an enfeebled, fractured society already divided by sectarian and ethnic issues and being exploited from across our borders there is absolutely no scope for the kind of religious, political and civil-military divides that are now being created by people who need to keep themselves zipped up. The no action, no reaction, thick hide policy that seems to be prevalent will not work — not any more. We have very little time to get it right otherwise the disillusionment with democracy will trigger events that will take their own course. As the Americans tell us — ‘all options are on the table’. Act to rule out the negative ones — and act quickly.
By Adam Raj

READ MORE

Waziristan’s Game of Thrones

Posted by FS On 0 comments

By Fahd Humayun
Maulana Fazlullah was always the wild card. As Hakimullah Mehsud’s last rites were being read, and emergency conclaves were being summoned across six other tribal agencies to deliberate upon the militant organization’s future leadership and policy direction, it was expected that operational control of the TTP would remain with the organization’s natural custodians – the Mehsuds.
But the Mehsuds have increasingly become a house divided. Internal cohesion in the militant outfit was frayed first by the death of Wali-ur-Rehman in May, and then the sacking of longstanding party spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan in June after he suggested that the TTP and Afghan Taliban were separate entities. The capture of Hakimullah’s close aide Latifullah Mehsud in Afghanistan’s Logar province this October was another unexpected blow to the TTP’s central command. That Latifullah was picked up, and not eliminated like so many others by surgical drone strikes, has augmented the possibility that the once trusted deputy may have played a part in providing actionable intelligence to the US about the TTP chief’s movements. If correct, this is undisputedly symptomatic of deeper fissures colouring the group’s social fabric.
As news of Hakimullah’s death broke on TV channels across the country, Maulana Fazlullah and Umar Khalid convened rival shuras in Swat and Mohmand Agency respectively to discuss the game plan for their own individual chapters. In South Waziristan, meanwhile, local commander Khan Said was considered by many to be the natural heir in the Mehsuds’ jealously guarded line of succession.
As contenders for the TTP title, Maulana Fazlullah was, by all accounts, the weakest link. It was argued that his dwindling shelf-life notwithstanding, the former Radio Mullah’s capacity to lead a splinter faction was constrained by his relegation to eastern Afghanistan. As potential power brokers, Umar Khalid and Khan Said were thought to present significantly greater challenges.
However, legitimacy is disputed currency in the tribal areas. Reports that 17 out of 60 members of the majlis-e-shura voted against South Waziristan commander Khan Said’s nomination for TTP chief suggest that internal voices of opposition had shrunk the Mehsuds’ own political space within the organization. And bipartisanship is an indulgence that non-state actors at war can rarely afford.
In an organization where blood is spilt to establish hierarchy, Hakimullah’s failure to leave behind a will or a clear choice of successor is likely to carry a heavy price tag for the Mehsuds. For militants who claim they are prepared to die fighting, the level of unpreparedness exhibited at the funerals of Baitullah Mehsud and now his protégé Hakimullah has been striking. Hakimullah took charge of the TTP following a long summer of protracted political infighting after Baitullah’s death in 2009; that he would spend his own days fighting on the frontline without giving a thought to his future successor seems to have been a managerial oversight on his part.
2013 has been a year of existential crisis for the TTP, and Maulana Fazlullah’s quiet rise to the forefront may be indicative of the underlying mood within the organization. Notorious for his iron-fisted control of Swat between 2007 and 2009, Fazlullah is remembered as the man who transformed Mingora’s Green Square into a public execution ground, and ordered the attack on Malala in 2012. Rumours that he may recently have been shifted to Pakistan from Afghanistan in an attempt to facilitate negotiations with the PML-N government, while speculative, suggest that power dynamics within the TTP have been in a state of flux for a while.
With Hakimullah’s death, it seemed as if uncertainty about TTP’s future had set in. And while uncertainty in times of war can be debilitating, Fazlullah’s selection as the new face of the TTP raises the possibility that the appointment will be internally contested. As the first non-Mehsud to lead the organization since its ethnogenesis in December 2007, the core message here is that the TTP has less to lose; in this context, desperation and conviction of cause are likely to translate into infrequent but higher-intensity attacks against the state.
Against this backdrop is a ferocious debate on the CIA’s controversial drone campaign, and while the Hellfire missiles targeting Hakimullah and his men have certainly left cracks in the walls of House TTP, they have also divisively split public opinion in Pakistan. As the US counterterrorism strategy of choice, drones continue to do more harm than good, fuelling radicalization and undercutting national and regional stability.
Given these arguments, the altered demographic reality of the TTP has heightened the need for a revised CT strategy. The targeting of the militancy’s topmost leadership tier has significantly narrowed the pyramid that forms the TTP’s organizational structure. A once prolific cadre of battle-hardened lieutenants has been washed thin, leaving behind an unwieldy base of foot soldiers with basic education and training, and greater prospects for de-radicalization and social mainstreaming.
In this context, a systematic strategy of fight-talk-fight (continue to target the hardliner leadership tier, but offer individual groups amnesty if willing to renounce violence) may help arrest the TTP’s strategic momentum. With the conflict in Afghanistan entering its twilight, the likelihood of a tribal buy-in to such a strategy is closely linked to the desperate desire for peace in a war-ravaged frontier.
Given that the PML-N government has already bitten the APC bullet, negotiations with the TTP need to be approached strategically rather than apologetically – a willingness by the government to talk does not necessarily imply a Faustian bargain. However, Fazlullah’s hardliner posturing also suggests that the TTP may now be less willing to talk.
Ultimately there was never a shortage of able-bodied protagonists to carry the fallen TTP banner, but there was a clear shortage of self-assurance. If exploited correctly, this vacuum could still give way to a deeper identity crisis within the movement’s ranks. For violent non-state actors, success is path-dependent on internal cohesion, and the last standing groups are those that amount to more than the sum of their individual parts.
For Fazlullah, finding that crucial balance will depend on coming to terms with the political compulsions of his own game of thrones; this will entail either a ruthless consolidation of power, or a judicious accommodation of centripetal tendencies within the movement. The latter will provide the state with a comparative advantage. The former will be a game-point for the TTP.
The writer is a project manager for Jinnah Institute’s Strategic Security Initiative, and tweets @fahdhumayun.
READ MORE

Pakistan Army’s statement not political

Posted by FS On 0 comments

Federal Information Minister Pervaiz Rasheed,  stated that the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) statement directed at the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief  Munawar Hassan was not an interference in politics, Express News reported on Tuesday.
“ISPR’s statement is the voice of every Pakistani,” said the information minister, endorsing ISPR’s condemnation of the JI chief Munawar Hassan calling the the slain Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Hakimullah a ‘martyr.’
The Jamaat-e-Islami had held a meeting on Monday to specifically discuss the Pakistan Army’s press statement.
“The Pakistan army does not have the right to make political or democratic statements,” JI General Secretary Liaquat Baloch had stated.
Baloch also said that a letter regarding the involvement of ISPR in politics would be sent to the Prime Minister.
“Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has not received any letter from Liaquat Baloch,” revealed Rasheed, who is a known figure in the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).
Background
In addition to calling Mehsud a martyr, JI chief had reportedly said on television that if an American who died on the battlefield was not a martyr, then his backers were also not martyrs because they were chasing the same goal. This was implicitly directed towards the Pakistan Army.
The ISPR had then demanded an apology from the JI chief and stated that Hassan should take his words back.
Within 24 hours of Pakistan Army’s angry rejoinder to a controversial statement by the JI ameer Syed Munawar Hassan, the party’s Shura (consultative body) had pored over the issue during a meeting on November 11.
Though no formal clarification was issued as was demanded in the ISPR statement, JI leaders had said their party considered everyone who dies fighting for the country a martyr (Shaheed).
The Shura meeting – which was chaired by JI chief Syed Munawar Hassan – had agreed that the armed forces have no right to interfere in politics or democratic issues. Briefing the media after the meeting, JI Secretary Baloch had said the Shura decided to draw the government’s attention to the matter because the military’s interference in politics was unacceptable.
JI chief Hassan had stated that his statement regarding the Pakistan Army was correctaccording to Sharia Law during a party session held in Lahore on November 11.
JI Secretary Baloch and senior JI leader Fareed Piracha were also present at the session, which was held to specifically discuss the Pakistan army’s response to Hassan calling the slain TTP chief Mehsud a ‘martyr.’
READ MORE

Study On Terrorism: Al-Qaida Kills Eight Times More Muslims Than Non-Muslims

Posted by FS On Monday, 11 November 2013 0 comments

A leading al-Qaida ideologue for the terror network, Abu Yahya al-Libi, has developed his own theologically-based theory of collateral damage that allows militants to kill Muslims.

Even the Iraqi affiliates of Osama bin Laden's terror group, who are known to be particularly bloodthirsty, claim that they too consider this question. For instance, in a message claiming responsibility for an August attack in Baghdad, the group wished those Sunnis injured in the "operation" a speedy recovery and expressed their hope that those killed would be accepted by God as "martyrs."

But even as such apologetic communiqués from al-Qaida show the terror network stylizing itself as a defender of the true faith wrestling with religious concepts, they also make it look as though any dead Muslims are regretful but isolated cases. The facts, though, tell a different story.

Between 2004 and 2008, for example, al-Qaida claimed responsibility for 313 attacks, resulting in the deaths of 3,010 people. And even though these attacks include terrorist incidents in the West -- in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 -- only 12 percent of those killed (371 deaths) were Westerners.

New Report Shows Many More Muslims Killed Than Non-Muslims
It is, of course, no surprise that al-Qaida kills more Muslims than non-Muslims -- particularly for people in the Islamic world. But a new reportby the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the United States' Military Academy at West Point in New York -- which has gathered together these and other relevant figures in one report ("Deadly Vanguards: A Study Of al-Qaida's Violence Against Muslims "), spells out the discrepancy in black and white.

The authors of the study admit that their report likely omits a number of Muslim victims. But that was the price of their rigorous methodology, used in an effort to avoid accusations of partisanship.


The researchers only counted the attacks for which al-Qaida claimed responsibility, thus preventing accusations that they were seeking to make al-Qaida look even worse than it is. Still, it is well known that al-Qaida does not claim responsibility for every attack perpetrated, meaning that many victims are likely left out of the report. Furthermore, the researchers only included attacks reported on by the Arab media and relied on the numbers they reported -- out of a conviction that the Arab media is more highly regarded in the Muslim world than the Western media. That, though, is not always the case.

Blurred Figures And Inexact Categories Are Problematic
The greatest potential for inaccuracy in the report, however, is the placing of victims into only one of two categories: Western or non-Western. The assumption being that Western would also mean non-Muslim and vice versa. The problems with such a system of categorization are myriad. Not all those living in the Muslim world are Muslim: In Iraq, al-Qaida has launched attacks against Kurds, Yazidi and Christians. 

Indeed, the report's authors confront the shortcomings of their methodology head on. In one passage, they remove attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan from their calculations altogether, resulting in the share of Westerners killed in al-Qaida attacks rising to a much more significant 39 percent. If one removes the Madrid and London attacks from the statistics, though, the share of murdered Westerners drops back down to 13 percent.
Perhaps more significantly, if one only examines attacks in 2007 and disregards those having been perpetrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, the share of non-Westerners killed by al-Qaida rises to 99 percent. In 2008, it was 96 percent.

Non-Westerners 38 Times More Likely To Be Killed
Put another way, between 2006 and 2008, non-Westerners were 38 times more likely to be killed by an al-Qaida attack than Westerners.
"Since al-Qaida has limited capability to strike against its Western enemies, the group maintains its relevance by attacking countries with Muslim majorities," the study concludes.
The conclusions reached by Helfstein and his co-authors are hardly world changing. They are valuable nonetheless, in that they provide a numerical foundation to the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim al-Qaida victims.

Still, critics will no doubt point out that the study comes from the CTC, an organization that is part of an American military school. In recent years, the CTC has released a number of excellent studies on terrorism. But because it is actually supplying arguments, backed by scientific research, for the fight against terrorism to decision makers, politicians and military personnel in the US, it cannot be considered strictly neutral. That also applies to this case, especially since a number of American officials have recently begun stressing the point that al-Qaida is particularly violent toward Muslims and can now rely on solid data to back up their argument.

This perceived lack of neutrality doesn't change the fact that the fundamental findings of the report are correct and meaningful. The authors conclude that if they compare statistics for the years from 1995 to 2003 (excluding the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in the US as a solitary event), they find that al-Qaida is becoming more violent and "increasingly indiscriminate" in its attacks.

Just how big a problem this discrepancy between Muslim and non-Muslim victims will become for al-Qaida remains to be seen. Even prior to the report's release, however, it had become a subject of intense debate within the Jihadist seen -- with more and more ideologues coming to the conclusion that al-Qaida's fight on behalf of the downtrodden Muslims isn't worth it.
READ MORE

Growing fear of radicalization pushes Syrian consensus forward

Posted by Admin On Saturday, 9 November 2013 0 comments
Syria risks becoming “Afghanistan on the shores of the Mediterranean“, warned Turkish President Abdullah Gül candidly. The president’s remarks echo a growing Turkish realisation that militant Islamist groups, far from being […]

Syria risks becoming “Afghanistan on the shores of the Mediterranean“, warned Turkish President Abdullah Gül candidly. The president’s remarks echo a growing Turkish realisation that militant Islamist groups, far from being the unpalatable but necessary bulwark against the al-Assad regime, risks transforming Turkey into a Mediterranean Pakistan. With such realisation comes the prospect of a new international consensus on Syria.
At the onset of the Syrian conflict, Turkey, Europe and the United States were all on the same side. They first attempted to nudge Bashar al-Assad to reform. But by the summer of 2011, the three parties concluded that this was a lost cause. The more the spiral of violence spun out of control, the more they, and the Arab Gulf countries, converged on their support for the Syrian opposition.
The parting of ways
But as the war deepened, the allies parted ways in two fundamental respects. First, Turkey increasingly converged with the Arab Gulf countries – and in particular Qatar – in backing the Brotherhood component of the Syrian opposition. Over time, Turkish intelligence also started turning a blind eye - and at times actively backing – the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra front and other militant Islamist groups.
The militant Islamist opposition was not Turkey’s partner of choice. But blinded by the perceived imperative of ousting the Syrian regime, Turkey allowed the safe passage of such groups into Syria, and facilitated their organisation and helped to arm them.
Alarm bells in the US and the European Union began ringing. Few were persuaded about the Saudi Arabia-promoted distinction between “good” and “bad” militant Islamist groups Islamist groups. Echoes of Afghanistan rang loud in their ears.
Second, Turkey became increasingly adamant about a more muscular international action in Syria. Turkey had long called for more direct military involvement in support of the Syrian opposition. It appealed for a humanitarian corridor, it supported the arming of the rebels, and it repeatedly called for a no-fly zone. When on August 21, a chemical bombardment killed hundreds in Eastern Ghouta, Turkey was quick to jump on the interventionist bandwagon.
The EU took a different line. With the sole exception of France, no member state openly backed the idea of an attack without a UN Security Council resolution. Even the UK moved to the sidelines after David Cameron’s government was embarrassingly defeated in the Commons. President Barack Obama took one step forward by calling for an attack, and two steps backward by abdicating his leadership to Congress. As it became increasingly clear that an endorsement of Congress was not forthcoming, both Europeans and Americans sighed in relief when Russia pulled a rabbit out of the hat – which President Assad readily caught – proposing a plan to place Syria’s chemical weapons under international supervision. The plan, and its implementation to date, have shelved the prospects of an intervention. Turkey was left seething.
Turkey left hanging
For Turkey, an attack, albeit limited in nature, could have triggered deeper international involvement in the Syrian crisis, altering the balance of forces on the ground. It could have jolted the world into doing more than “simply watching”, as lamented by the Turkish president.
Without a reversal of the war on the ground, Turkey feared that a political solution would see the Syrian regime remain in power, allowing it to eradicate jihadist groups, and turning a blind eye to the fact that, barring a few cosmetic changes, the regime would wipe out – à la Egypt? – the Brotherhood and the democratic opposition over time. Turkey had hoped that following an attack, the Syrian National Coalition and the Free Syria Army would gain the upper hand, both in the confrontation with the regime, and within the Syrian opposition, and that only, at that point, would a political solution be pursued.
Turkey’s concerns were not far-fetched. As all efforts are now turned towards Geneva II, it is increasingly clear that two developments have happened: Assad’s regime has been strengthened – through the battlefield, and diplomatically through its compliance so far with the chemical weapons plan; and, the democratic Syrian opposition is withering away, dwarfed by succeeding militant Islamist groups.
There is indeed a tangible risk that if, and when, a diplomatic solution is reached, it would end up in the de facto acceptance of the status quo, with a regime that is meaner and leaner, coupled with the continuation of low level violence for years to come. That said, it is also clear that Turkey seriously underplayed the costs of a military strike that could have provoked a broad military conflagration in which the entire region would not have been spared.
A new consensus?
Thus, the key question is; what to do in order to set in motion a political track that offers some hope for a solution that moves beyond an endorsement of the status quo, and whether the US, the EU and Turkey can work together to that effect.
The US, the EU and Turkey ought to exert their efforts in cobbling together a unified and credible Syrian opposition delegation for Geneva II. To do so, they must engage Saudi Arabia, the greatest loser from, and thus the greatest potential spoiler of, the current diplomatic track.
On the other side, Iran must be openly engaged on Syria – and beyond – in order for it to exert the necessary pressure on the Assad regime. In doing so, Iranian vital interests must be accounted for. Like all authoritarian regimes, Iran’s basic interest is survival. And in view of its isolation, maintaining Syria as an ally and a lifeline to Hizbollah is vital. The bottom line is whether Europe and the US are willing to provide Iran with the inclusion it seeks. An agreement on the nuclear file is necessary and progress on this front is encouraging. But alone, it is insufficient. Only if the EU and the US are willing to fully accept Iran’s position in the regional order can a genuine solution in Syria become a possibility.
But where does Turkey stand on all this? Only a few years ago, Ankara had stuck its neck out for Tehran, despite Iran being a traditional Turkish rival. The 2010 nuclear fuel swap deal, mediated together with Brazil, had put Ankara at loggerheads with its traditional allies in the West. Yet, Turkey steadfastly attempted mediation.
Since then, much has changed. The growing sectarianism of Iraq, and above all the Syrian civil war, have starkly brought to the fore Turkish-Iranian divisions. That said, as much as Europe and the US should do their share of soul-searching on the Iran question, Turkey should do likewise, and revive the promise it held out for the Middle East only a few years ago: That of a soft power that defied, rather than fed on the conflictual dichotomies of the region.
To do so, there is no better place to start than Tehran. In this respect, the timid signs of an opening are encouraging. In a recent meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Javad Zarif, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu spoke of the joint interests of the two countries in curbing the spiraling of a sectarian conflict in Syria and beyond, and working together to this effect.
As Turkey comes around to appreciating the grave risks of Syria’s radicalisation, not only is it edging towards a new consensus with the EU and the US, but its prospects for reasserting itself as a credible interlocutor with Tehran may brighten.
READ MORE

Who is Fazlullah?

Posted by Admin On 0 comments

Maulana Fazlullah, the new Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader, is a ruthless fighter who is vehemently anti-state and unamenable to peace talks.
Fazlullah was elected as TTP commander by a consultative council of the group on November 7, almost a week after Hakimullah Mehsud, the group’s former leader, was killed by a US drone in the tribal area of North Waziristan.
He is the first commander of the group not to come from the Mehsud tribe in Pakistan’s tribal areas, hailing instead from the northwestern valley of Swat, where he waged a bloody war against the Pakistani state from 2007 to 2009.
As chief of the local chapter of the TTP in Swat, Fazlullah drove civil and military authorities out of the area in 2007, before finally signing a peace agreement with the government in 2009.
The agreement, dubbed the “Nizam-e-Adl” (system of justice), granted the TTP virtual control over Swat and implemented their interpretation of Sharia law, in exchange for the cessation of hostilities.
It soon disintegrated, however, when Fazlullah’s men attempted to expand their sphere of control to neighbouring Buner district.
As a result, Pakistani forces moved into Swat for the second time in two years, resulting in hundreds of deaths and millions of civilians displaced. Fazlullah was finally driven out of the valley by September 2009, with several of his top commanders captured.
But while the government and civilians rebuilt lives in the valley, Fazlullah continued to conduct operations in Swat remotely, from neighbouring Dir district and, as many locals tell Al Jazeera, the Afghan border provinces of Kunar and Nuristan.
From his base, Fazlullah ordered the targeted killings of elders who led peace committees against the Taliban, as well as rights activists. Among the dozens of people the Taliban killed or attempted to kill during this time was Malala Yousafzai, the schoolgirl activist who rose to global prominence following the attempt on her life.
Early history
Born in 1974 in the village of Kuza Bandai, Fazlullah spent his teenage years selling wooden shuttering and doing odd jobs selling items off pushcarts.
He then enrolled in an Islamic school, or madrassa, run by Sufi Mohammed, a prominent anti-government cleric and leader of the Tehreek-e-Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM). The TNSM had for years been agitating against the government to have Sharia law imposed in the Swat valley.
Fazlullah went on to join TNSM chief Mohammed when he led a group of fighters from Swat into Afghanistan to fight US forces following the invasion of that country in 2001. He also married Mohammed’s daughter.
By 2004, having returned from the Afghan war, Fazlullah started a local radio station in the valley, hosting a one-hour programme that, to begin with, focused on women’s role in Islam and society.
The show spread his ideas regarding a strict intepretation of Sharia law in all spheres of life. He also took a stance against polio vaccinations for children, dubbing them a “Jewish” or “Western” conspiracy to sterilise Muslims.
‘Sharia or martyrdom’
His status as Mohammed’s son-in-law, a veteran of the Afghan war and his radio show all gained him increased prominence, and the man known locally as “Mullah Radio” was soon rivalling his father-in-law in leading the call for Sharia law in the valley.
His rise culiminated in him leading Eid prayers in the valley’s Kabal ground in 2007, an occasion that saw thousands fall in line behind him as he raised the cry of “Sharia or martyrdom!”
With such support, Fazlullah opened a madrassa of his own at Imam Dehri, imparting both religious knowledge and paramilitary training to those who enrolled, with a view to carrying out “jihad” against both the US and Pakistan.
By late 2007, Fazlullah’s chapter of the Tehreek-e-Taliban had established control over large parts of the valley, weathering a military operation that resulted in the Nizam-e-Adl peace deal.
His group had already established a parallel court system, and he outlawed the operation of businesses such as CD shops, which his group believed to be against Islam. They also carried out attacks against dozens of girls schools, based on the assertion that women should only receive an Islamic education.
During his time in control, Fazlullah ruled over Swat with an iron fist, publically executing both those who would stood against him and those who his group deemed to have violated Sharia law.
Blow to peace talks
Having been targeted in two military operations and engaged in a failed peace deal with Pakistan’s government in the past, it is unclear if Fazlullah will accept an offer of a return to peace talks in his new capacity as overall TTP chief.
Following his election, Shahidullah Shahid, a spokesperson for the TTP, told Al Jazeera that Fazlullah was picked because he was a hardliner who had refused to surrender to Pakistani forces.
The Reuters news agency quoted Shahid as saying: “There will be no more talks as Mullah Fazlullah is already against negotiations with the Pakistan government.
“All governments play double games with us. In the name of peace talks, they deceived us and killed our people. We are 100 percent sure that Pakistan fully supports the United States in its drone strikes.”
READ MORE

Two-Faced Allies: Pakistan and the U.S.

Posted by Admin On Wednesday, 6 November 2013 0 comments


Less than a week after Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, returned home from a trip to Washington, an American drone killed Hakimullah Mehsud, a man who had terrorized all Pakistan as the leader of the country’s most dangerous militant group, the Pakistani Taliban.

With any other two countries, such a sequence of events might have been followed by an official nod to the cooperation involved — or at the very least, meaningful silence. But with the United States and Pakistan it’s always more complicated. Hours after the drone strike, Pakistan’s interior minister accused the United States of the “murder of peace efforts.” He later berated “enemies dressed as friends.”
It’s an old script. Regardless of whatever cooperation is involved, both countries always find it more useful to paint the other as the villain. The Pakistani government, which in reality is playing a central role in the war on terror, gets to paint itself as the victim of a bullying superpower.
Meanwhile, American officials keep pointing to Pakistan’s “double game” for most of their failures in Afghanistan, while downplaying the fact that, without Pakistan, this war would have been impossible to wage in the first place.
The real root of the dysfunction is not so much deceit between allies as the lies both governments have told their own people. Pakistani and American leaders have systematically and purposefully misled their own publics about the nature and details of their partnership. Each country has used the other as a strategic and convenient punching bag.
As an American born to Pakistani parents, fluent in the languages of both countries, I have spent the past 12 years regularly shuttling between the two countries and I’ve seen and heard the duplicitous official narratives steadily take root on each side.
Just days after 9/11, Pervez Musharraf, the former military ruler of Pakistan, addressed his country in Urdu, telling them that America had asked Pakistan for cooperation in intelligence sharing, the use of Pakistani airspace and logistical support. Mr. Musharraf made it clear that he’d decided to cooperate.
But that’s where the openness ended. In 2005, for example, when the Pakistani government announced that a senior Al Qaeda operative had died in an accidental bomb-making explosion in Pakistan’s tribal areas, Hayatullah Khan, a Pakistani investigative journalist travelled to the scene of the blast and found fragments of an American Hellfire missile. Mr. Khan was kidnapped and soon turned up dead. Presenting evidence that America could operate in Pakistani airspace turned out to be deadly.
Seven years later, the American public still doesn’t know much about what their country does in Pakistan. For years, Washington didn’t even recognize the use of drones there. Only recently, after leaks from inside the Obama administration forced officials to begin speaking about the details of the program, have Americans been able to piece together a basic outline.
The same is true of supply lines into landlocked Afghanistan. Within months of the 2001 invasion, Mr. Musharraf signed a deal allowing the transport of American and NATO military equipment through Pakistan. But the agreement was kept secret from the Pakistani people until 2010. The American government was no more candid with its own people. Americans never truly appreciated, for example, that since President George W. Bush was denied permission to dock U.S. Navy vessels in Pakistani ports, America was forced to outsource nearly the entire American military supply chain into the hands of private contractors close to the Pakistani military.
The decision to hide and obscure such details was born of a desire to control the precarious narrative of the war at home. Insecure Pakistani leaders always feared that details of the cooperation would destabilize their already shaky regimes. Likewise, Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama likely thought that publicly acknowledging the compromises they’d made to win Pakistan’s support, might make them appear weak. Keeping their citizens in the dark, leaders in both nations seemed to think, would keep the cooperation simple.
The result has been quite the opposite. The stark disconnect between reality and rhetoric now makes both governments’ pronouncements sound absurd. There have been more than 300 American drone strikes in a remote corner of Pakistan. And while Islamabad continues to denounce these strikes, Pakistani citizens see thousands of trucks carrying huge shipping containers on the highways every day, bringing supplies to the American military in Afghanistan. Likewise, Americans have learned that billions of dollars in aid is still flowing to Pakistan, despite the fact that Osama bin Laden was living a mile away from Pakistan’s main military academy for years.
The resulting confusion is making Americans and Pakistanis hate each other. A Pew Research Center poll in July found that America is more disliked in Pakistan than anywhere else. A Gallup poll a few months earlier found that the countries most disliked by Americans are Pakistan, Iran and North Korea.
The lies that were meant to hold Pakistan and America together in a time of war, are now imperiling the alliance they were meant to protect.
The two countries have been geopolitical allies since Pakistan appeared on the map in 1947. In the interest of preserving this long-term relationship, which will remain vital to both countries long after the American troops withdraw from Afghanistan, the details of the agreements between Pakistan and America must be made public. In the end, Americans and Pakistanis want the same thing — the truth, for once, from their leaders.
Shahan Mufti is the author of “The Faithful Scribe: A Story of Islam, Pakistan, Family, and War.”
INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES
READ MORE

Central Asian dreams materializing

Posted by Admin On 0 comments
The Pentagon quietly announced last month that the U.S. military is leaving the air base it has operated in Kyrgyzstan as a staging area for American troops and matériel since 2001. While the move will complicate American efforts to wind down the war in Afghanistan, the decision has much broader ramifications: It marks the end of a brief experiment to extend American power and influence into the distant strategic arena of Central Asia.
The base, formally known as the Transit Center at Manas, is a key installation for the U.S. military, with about 1,500 American airmen processing all the troops going in and out of the Afghanistan theater and operating refueling aircraft. More than that, it is the largest manifestation of American power in Central Asia, the remote region that not long ago held an almost mystical attraction for policy makers.
In the 1990s, just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Zbigniew Brzezinski described Central Asia as “the grand chessboard” on which the United States had to play if it were to maintain global supremacy. Henry Kissinger called for the creation of a pro-Western “buffer zone” in the region separating Russia and China.
The farthest Washington advanced on this chessboard was when, in the late 1990s, it pushed for the construction of pipelines leading from the Caspian Sea through Georgia and Turkey, for the first time breaking Russia’s monopoly on the region’s rich oil and natural gas reserves. But after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, long-term strategic goals for Central Asia were abandoned in favor of short-term military expediency. The United States set up air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and ground logistics routes through the entire region.
Although this worked out as well as it could have for the effort in Afghanistan, it meant that nearly all the diplomatic energy Washington put into the region went toward ensuring military access. This priority meant that Central Asian leaders always had the upper hand in negotiations about anything else Washington might want to do there. Central Asian autocrats could end American military access on a whim — which Uzbekistan did in 2005 when it ordered the Americans to leave the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in retaliation after Washington called for an investigation of human rights violations.
Meanwhile, over the past decade, Russia and China became much more active in Central Asia. The Kremlin is strenuously opposed to the American military’s presence in what it sees as its sphere of influence and has signed long-term agreements to maintain military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
While none of the Central Asian countries want to be dominated by Russia, none believe that the United States can be a true counterweight to Kremlin pressure. Instead, China appears to be taking that role, dramatically increasing its economic activity across the region over the past few years, arranging several massive oil and gas deals.
The most common reaction in Washington to the loss of Manas will be to blame Moscow for bullying Kyrgyz leaders. And, indeed, Russia had long pressured Kyrgyzstan to kick the Americans out. After Russia promised more than $1 billion in military aid, along with financing for much-needed hydropower plants and debt relief, President Almazbek Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan moved to end America’s use of the base when the current lease expires in July 2014. The United States made some behind-the-scenes efforts to stay at Manas, but soon admitted defeat.
Placing the blame on Russia isn’t wholly accurate, however. Russia has tried to force the United States out of Manas before, most notably in 2009, when a similar scenario unfolded: Russia offered a large aid package, and Kyrgyzstan’s then-President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that the Americans would have to leave. But that time, Washington negotiated a new deal and Mr. Bakiyev reversed his decision.
What changed? Ironically, it’s that the country has become more democratic. Under Mr. Bakiyev and his predecessor, Askar Akayev, Washington gave huge contracts to supply Manas with fuel that often wound up in the hands of shadowy companies with ties to presidential family members. Roza Otunbayeva, who led an interim government after Bakiyev was forced out and served as president until December 2011, undertook an anti-corruption campaign that increased transparency in business dealing related to the Manas base, making it more difficult for shady contracts to be signed — and indirectly reducing the incentive of future leaders to keep the base.
President Atambayev ran for office in 2011 promising to evict the Americans. While that wasn’t the top issue for most voters, campaigning against the United States is smart politics. According to a poll by the International Republican Institute, shortly after Mr. Atambayev was elected, when people in Kyrgyzstan were asked which countries they saw as partners and which as threats, 96 percent identified Russia as a partner and fewer than 1 percent as a threat. The United States, meanwhile, was seen as a partner by only 8 percent of respondents, and as a threat by 42 percent.
Kyrgyzstan, alone in the region, has a Parliament that is not a rubber stamp. When the proposal to evict the Americans came up for a vote, it appeared that there may have been enough votes to stop Atambayev’s plan. But then a court in New York dropped an extradition case against Maxim Bakiyev, the son of former President Bakiyev. That outraged many Kyrgyz, who believe that the Bakiyev family stole hundreds of millions of dollars from the country. The ruling appeared to turn members of Parliament against keeping the base, and the law to oust the Americans passed 91-5 in June. Washington delayed formally announcing its departure, apparently until it found another facility, which officials say will be in Romania.
The move to Romania is suggestive, too, of a strategic retreat Westward. The edge of the Black Sea is the farthest east that NATO has been able to advance. Romania and Bulgaria are both members of the European Union and the Atlantic alliance. The future of the countries farther east on the Black Sea, notably Ukraine and Georgia, may still be up for grabs. But Central Asia now appears to have been a bridge too far.
Joshua Kucera is a freelance reporter based in Istanbul.
READ MORE

Murderers or martyrs?

Posted by Admin On 0 comments

THE death of a man who waged war against the Pakistani state and was responsible for the slaughtering of thousands of innocent men, women and children should have come as a great relief to this strife-torn nation.
Instead, our political leaders are mourning the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud in a US drone strike describing the incident as an “attack on peace”.
From being public enemy No.1, the chief of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has virtually been turned into a hero after his inglorious death. A mass murderer who ordered the beheading of our soldiers and claimed responsibility for killing a Pakistani general just a few months ago, is now being elevated to the status of a martyr.
Instead of seizing this moment of opportunity to dismantle a fragmented terrorist network, a frightened political leadership has shamelessly prostrated itself before the militants. As a result, the extremists and their allies are now dominating the public narrative despite their crimes against the people of Pakistan. It is an extremely dangerous situation for a country facing the existential threat of spiralling violent extremism. A narrow self-serving leadership is taking the entire country towards a suicidal path.
With few exceptions, all political parties have joined the chorus that the fatal drone strike on Hakeemullah was a conspiracy to scuttle an illusory peace process. While the interior minister has called for reviewing relations with the US, an agitated Imran Khan has threatened to block the Nato supply line in protest. The bravado may just be public posturing, but the irresponsible rhetoric could lead to some unintentional consequences, plunging the country into more dire straits.
It is a pity that even the killing of young women and children in a suicide bombing in a crowded Peshawar bazaar or the massacre of Christian worshippers in the church bombing has not shaken the great Khan as much as the death of the leader of the militant outfit that perpetrated those heinous attacks. He even refuses to accept that the Taliban were behind those bombings despite their endorsement of the attack.
Seemingly, all the tumult is about the timing of the US action and the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty once again. According to the interior minister, the attack was carried out hours before a three-member delegation was to meet the TTP leadership and extend to them a formal invitation from the government for talks.
Notwithstanding the questionable legality of America’s drone strikes on Pakistani soil, it is hard to believe that the targeting of the TTP chief was part of a plan to sabotage the talks as alleged by our political leaders.
One should not forget that the TTP leader was on the US’s most wanted list with a bounty of up to $5m on his head. He came on the US radar after a video showed him talking to Hummam Khalil Abu-Mulal al Balawi, a Jordanian doctor with Al Qaeda connections who blew himself up inside a CIA operating base in Afghanistan’s Khost province, killing seven intelligence operatives in 2009. The incident also confirmed his close ties with Al Qaeda.
Soon after, Hakeemullah claimed to have trained Faisal Shehzad, an American of Pakistani origin who was involved in a failed attempt to detonate a car bomb in New York’s Times Square.
Hakeemullah had narrowly escaped several drone strikes in the past three years. He was also reportedly injured in one of them that kept him out of action for several months. Significantly, the fatal attack on Friday came a couple of weeks after the US forces had snatched from the Afghan intelligence agencies Latif Mehsud, a close confidant of the TTP leader.
It is quite plausible that the information gleaned from Latif might have led the CIA to Hakeemullah’s hideout. Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan has confirmed that American officials had informed him that the TTP leader would not be spared if tracked down.
For sure, the drone campaign has remained a major irritant in the troubled relations between Islamabad and Washington. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also raised the issue during his meeting with President Barack Obama in Washington last month. Indeed, Pakistan’s objection to the violation of the country’s sovereignty is fully justified on legal and ethical grounds. There are no two views about the negative political impact of the collateral damage caused by the drone attacks.
But it is also a fact, that the drones have eliminated many high-value Pakistani militants running their terrorist operations from North Waziristan. Prominent among those killed in the last two years are Waliur Rehman, who was deputy chief of the TTP, Ilyas Kashmiri, Qari Hussain, Qari Zafar and Badar Mansoor. They were all masterminds of attacks on Pakistani security installations.
Pakistan has also decided to contact the five permanent members of the UN Security Council on the killing of Hakeemullah in the latest drone strike. The move will certainly make Pakistan a laughing stock and only weaken the country’s case on the drone issue.
Leave aside other countries, Islamabad cannot even convince its closest ally China on the matter. The militant sanctuaries in North Waziristan are a cause for concern to the entire international community. It is certain that the way Pakistan is dealing with the issue of terrorism will find no takers.
It was questionable from the outset whether the government’s peace efforts could succeed given the uncompromising attitude of the TTP. In his last interview to the BBC, Hakeemullah had rejected any dialogue under the Pakistani Constitution, saying that it envisioned a secular democratic system.
Now with his death that may lead to further fragmentation of the TTP, the possibility of any purposeful negotiations has become even more remote. But the danger is that the current state of policy disarray may provide a conducive environment in which the militants can revitalise their activities. It is perhaps, the most critical point in the country’s struggle against the rising militant threat.
READ MORE