There was a group of people who were called Dogs of Hell by Muhammad s.a.w.w and they were not non muslims but they were the muslims. They were called khawarij because of their abandoning islam and innovating new things in islam. They believed on their opinion to be true and right. These people were nice reciters, (also called reciters, because of their excellent and beautiful recitation of Quran) but yet they used to twist and misinterpret the meaning of Quran.
These are the people who revolted against the caliphate of Hazrat Uthman r.a. and they never accepted Him as their Amir. They accepted Ali r.a. as their amir and they fought alongside him in wars but when hazrat Ali r.a. made peace contract regarding the imam-ship of hazrat Amir MU’aviya, they revolted against Ali r.a and called him a disbeliever like they used to call hazrat Uthman r.a. actually these people were so staunch in believing their own point of view to be correct that they never listened to what others have to say, a kind of pride and self-centered nature these people had.
There are several ahadith of Muhammad s.a.w.w about khawarij. Few of them are given below.
Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.w. called them dogs of hell: from al-hakim, Ahmed, ibn hanbal
“The Khawārij are the dogs of Hell.”
Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.w. called them dogs of hell: from al-hakim, Ahmed, ibn hanbal
“The Khawārij are the dogs of Hell.”
Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.w said that there will be a group of people who will be worst of all, and HE s.a.w.w called them worst of all creatures. Recorded by Muslim (no. 1067) and it is in “Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi’” by al-Albānī (no. 2035).
“There will definitely be a people after me from my nation who recite the Quran yet it will not even reach beyond their throats. They will pass through the religion as an arrow passes through a target, then they will not return back to it. They are the worst of people, the worst of all creatures.”
The worst does not stop here, Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.w said that anti-christ or dajjal will emerge from these people.
Ibn Mājah no. 174 and it is in “Ṣaḥīḥ al-Jāmi’” by al-Albānī (no. 8027).
Ibn ‘Umarr.a that the messenger of Allah s.a.w.w said:
“There will arise a group of people who will recite the Quran but it will not reach beyond their throats. Every time a new generation of them rises, they will then disappear.”
Ibn ‘Umar said, “I heard Allah’s messenger s.a.w.w. say, ‘Every time a new generation of them rises, they will then disappear,’ more than twenty times and then said: “Until the Anti-Christ finally appears among them.”
Another hadith, describes that these people when are killed are among the worst people and the people who they kill and the best i.e. these worst creatures kill only the best people.
“(They are) the worst people killed under the sky, and the best people killed are those whom they kill. They are the dogs of Hell. These people used to be Muslims but they became disbelievers.”
I (Abū Ghālib, one of the narrators) asked, “Abū Umāmah, is this something only you yourself are saying?” He replied, “No, rather I heard it from the messenger of Allah s.a.w.w .
From the above hadith, it is quite clear that the khawarij were muslims, and still their generations belonged to muslims. But out of pride and self centered nature, these people not only introduced new things in islam but Also reject the truth and kill those who are truthful and pious.
>> [al-Bukhārī (no. 3610) and Muslim (no. 1063)] Who was the pioneer of this race, a tradition has been recorded by bukhair and muslim from Abū Sa’īd al-Khudrī r.a. who said:
>> [al-Bukhārī (no. 3610) and Muslim (no. 1063)] Who was the pioneer of this race, a tradition has been recorded by bukhair and muslim from Abū Sa’īd al-Khudrī r.a. who said:
“We were with Allah’s messenger s.a.w.w while he was distributing some wealth. Dhu al-Khuwaṣirah, a man from the Tamīm tribe, came to him and said, Messenger of Allah, be fair!’ The prophet replied: “Beware. And who would be fair if I was not? You would be ruined if I were not just.”

‘Umar said, “Messenger of Allah, allow me to strike his neck.” He replied: “Leave him. He will certainly have companions (from his progeny) whom one of you would belittle his own prayer when compared to their prayer and his fasting compared to their fasting. They will recite the Quran but it will not go beyond their throats. They will pass through the religion as an arrow passes through a game animal. One could then look at the arrowhead and not see a thing remaining on it. He could look at the binding which attaches the arrowhead to the rod and not see a thing. He could look at the rod and not see a thing. He could look at the feathers and not see a thing. It would go straight through the bowels and blood.
Their sign is that of a black man. One of his limbs will appear like a woman’s breast or a disfigured lump of flesh. They will emerge when the people are disunited.”
Abū Sa’īd said, “I testify that I indeed heard this Ḥadīth from Allah’s messenger s.a.w.w, and I testify that ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib fought them while I was with him. He instructed that we search for that man. He was found and ‘Alee was brought to him. I saw that man exactly as the prophet s.a.w.w described him.”
And there are many other ahadith about this fasiq and fajir group who are the dogs of hell. Because their pioneer tried to be over smart by “advising” Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.w to be fair and they show themselves as good and pious people but innovate in islam what they like by distorting the meaning of the verses. Prophet s.a.w.w said that they will appear when ummah will be disunited. Today, muslim ummah is most disunited than ever before. There is no tolerance left for other sects, instead of inviting muslims to a common platform, there are scholars of different sects who openly abuse other sects and claim that they are the only ahle-sunnah wal-jammah, i.e. the jamat of muslims on the right path and to be entered in jannah when the Day of Judgment come.
- TTP (Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan) Terrorist Children Death Squad just before slaughtering a Pakistani Security Official. the picture is from a video in which these 10 to 14 years old terrorists slitting and beheading the throat of the soldier and later jumping on the dead body in celebration, they also played with the head of the Martyred Soldier. This group of TTP belongs to Mullah Fazal Ullah who had given orders to shoot Malalah Yousafzai. Mullah Fazal Ullah is in Kunar Province of Afghanistan living with full protocol provided by the Afghanistan Government enjoying the status of a refugee, he has also opened many terrorists training centers to prepare such kind of terrorists between the ages 10 to 20 for slaughtering and suicide bombings. Mullah Fazalullah has a full support of Indian Military with the help of Indian Intelligence Agency i.e RAW for providing training in the camps. (Video not posted due to highly graphical contents)
“Whoever rebels against my Ummah and fights the righteous and unrighteous of them, does not avoid its believers and does not fulfill his obligation to whom he has a contract, then they are not from me and I am not from them . [Muslim 1848]
Ibn Al-Qayyim said,
"The Prophet forbidden taking arms against the rulers and revolting against them even if they were unjust as long as long as they established prayers. He said this in order to prevent great corruption and evil that could emanate from taking arms against them.
The reality has shown that taking arms and revolting against them had brought harm and evil that that was much greater than their corruption."
While speaking about undesirability of forbidding vices if that could lead to a greater vice he said,
"Like revolting against kings and rulers, for this is the foundation of all evils and calamities. If one reflects over what happened to Islaam during minor and major crises one will realize that it caused by the negligence of this very principle."
‘Umar said,
“We do not defeat our enemy through our great numbers and or sophisticated ammunitions, we defeat them through our obedience to Allaah and our enemies’ disobedience to Him. But when we disobey Allaah, we become like them in sins and they will then defeat us.
Lately, social media is abuzz with chatter about either the former president Pervez Musharraf or Zaid Hamid, both unsavoury characters. However, what is even more depressing is to see some television channels also engage in discussion with or about Zaid Hamid, a person who, at best, can be described as an anarchist. He may not claim links with an organisation like Hizbut Tahrir (HuT) but his ideology seems to be in line with it, since both support some amount of violence and chaos to bring about a change in Pakistan and implement a system of caliphate. Just about a couple of months ago, the Oxford University Pakistani Students Union had organised a conference on Pakistan which reportedly was managed by the HuT, in which the organisation, not yet banned in the UK, had discussed its vision of seeing Pakistan as the next caliphate.
But referring to Zaid Hamid’s publicity, a television programme got highly controversial and then taken off air because it involved the use of abusive language about the sitting army chief by Zaid Hamid’s former assistant Emaad Khalid. He was talking about the way Hamid tries to instigate young officers against the top army leadership even suggesting use of violence to remove those at the top. Given that the HuT had successfully managed to provoke an officer into assassinating Anwar Sadaat, this almost looks like their signature move. The same evening there was yet another programme that interviewed him.
Not that either of the anchors or producers of those programmes were interested in propagating his agenda; they were probably anxious to know more facts about the report circulated by Hamid’s former assistant about him getting money from various quarters, it got him more publicity than what he could have imagined. Watching and hearing about the man, one also wondered about the capacity of both the army and the ISI to make expensive mistakes. As if it was not enough that their own creation, Masood Azhar of Jaishe Muhammad was involved in an assassination attempt on a former army chief Pervez Musharraf in 2002, another character seems to have been built to either scare or attempt the killing of another army chief. The critical question is why are such vulnerabilities created?
Zaid Hamid, the man who now has an amount of traction amongst the youth and more, is a product of the establishment itself. Having done his engineering from NED, Karachi, he was attracted to jihad in Afghanistan where he went during the 1980s. He claims to have fought alongside Ahmed Shah Masood, which he presents as an argument that the jihad is above sectarian considerations. He seems to have dropped off the screen for a few years but then brought into ‘strategic circles’ under Musharraf’s government. Apparently, he was hired by the then Interior Minister General (retd) Moeenuddin Haider as an advisor in his ministry. He claims to have provided the ministry, as well as business groups, with intelligence. When I went to visit him a couple of years ago, his office was located at a stone’s throw from the main gate of Chaklala Cantonment. There were some cupboards in the office full of files that he claimed were security intelligence reports to assist commercial enterprises. It sounded like the US group Stratfor or Eurasia that claims to do the same.
The 1980s and 1990s context is self-explanatory as this was a period when people were recruited to fight the war in Afghanistan. Zaid Hamid’s case was of a young man motivated by religious zeal and anxious to contribute to jihad. But then, what do you do with such characters afterwards? Do you or do you not try to re-integrate them in society? But then, Hamid was one of the many characters who were treated as assets and kept hanging around for another critical job. His resurfacing towards the end of Musharraf’s years in power coincide with the urge of the military leadership to create another political alternative and narrative of an exciting middle class changing the face of the country. Here was a man extremely verbose and eloquent, addressing the youth and inciting them against the political society and political institutions.
The drive to promote Hamid didn’t end with Musharraf but it continued. There were many who would refer foreign visitors to Zaid Hamid as a security expert. This expertise and its propagation were used to detract people about Pakistan. Not that the political system does not require revamping but this was a case of the army staying a few steps ahead of the people and society and trying to bring change artificially. Having tested and tried partnership with traditional power centres, the military now probably wants to create a fresh breed of stakeholders, which it would then like to market as a ‘new Pakistan’. Those buying into this project completely forget that Pakistan has been through four distinct cycles of elite injection. The good or bad leadership that we see today is primarily a product of the 1980s and a lot of these people were middle class then. However, the middle class narrative, which is being used now, was missing during the 1980s.
The problem with this approach is twofold. First, until the structures remain the same or the manipulation of power from behind the scenes continues, the middle class narrative itself may not change Pakistan. There will certainly be new stakeholders or faces but not very different conditions. Second, the method is highly risky as it destabilises the country and its institutions and creates anarchy. Furthermore, it gives the impression that the army is no longer a professional whole but divided from inside. The army chief may be the most powerful man but there are other forces that can endanger his life or seriously challenge him through such non-state actors.
The main issue here is that if the army is so divided and manipulative then this is not a country that nuclear weapons could save.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 25th, 2013.
Many tribesmen give up their lifestyle in wake of changing socio-economic landscape. DESIGN: AMNA IQBAL
DERA ISMAIL KHAN:
The war in the region has snatched away the nomadic lifestyle, with socio-economic and political instability on the Pak-Afghan border restricting the nomad tribes in Waziristan to one part of the border.
A majority of these nomads, mostly belonging to the Dottani and Sulaiman Khel tribes, have Pakistani domiciles and CNICs and move towards warmer climates in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab during the winter.
But several families have given up the nomadic lifestyle, says Ali Muhammad, author of Ghur Se Dehli Tak, a book which explains the history and cultural practices of the Waziristan nomads. “Out of the total of 11,043 nomadic families, 3,000 have permanently settled down in Toi Khulla, Wana. The number of families giving up the nomadic lifestyle is increasing with the passage of time.”
This trend is emerging for a variety of reasons, including financial constraints, travelling problems, feud with the Gandapur tribe in Kulachi, DI Khan, and the volatile security situation along the Durand Line.
Additionally, Kulachi and Gomal Pass, the two important routes these nomads have been following for centuries, are becoming increasingly difficult to traverse.
Mounting difficulties
With the Gandapur tribe increasing in population, the previously unobstructed land along the Kulachi route has disappeared under constructs including houses and cultivation fields. This makes it difficult for the nomads to cross this area with cattle.
The nomads and the Gandapur tribe are also at war with each other. Around 20 years ago, a Gandapur tribesman killed a nomad after a goat entered his (tribesmen’s) field and sparked a conflict that has claimed the lives of over 50 people to date.
Despite the feud, nomads of the Dottani and Sulaiman Khel tribes have no option but to take the Kulachi route. Not wishing to stay long for fear of violence, they cross over to Gomal Pass in South Waziristan where they set up tents and rest briefly before setting off again.
The Waziristan nomads face no problems in the Gomal Pass area, but are still confronted with several problems. Mainly, the war on terror makes security a concern. The reconstruction of the Gomal Zam Road and the corresponding traffic this has invited has made passing this area with cattle extremely difficult.
“It is difficult for us to go through Gomal Pass because our livestock is afraid of the traffic,” said Masthan Khan of the Sulaiman Khel tribe. “We are also limited in terms of the routes we can take due to the traffic.”
Masthan added the government had set up various security check posts on Gomal Zam road, which cause severe delays. “For this reason, many of us take the Ghur Larai route, which is long, winding and difficult to cross.”
Infrastructural developments, although welcomed by other tribes of Waziristan, makes the nomads uneasy as it obstructs their lifestyle. Many have been forced to alter their travel methods by adopting the use of tractors. But in addition to changing their modes of transportation, the nomads are also gradually changing their customs with some selling their livestock entirely.
“I sold 39 goats and two camels at a low price in Bakkar, Punjab,” said Ashraf Khan, 51, of the Dottani tribe. “Now I have only three camels and 13 goats. I was mentally prepared to sell my entire stock but my wife forbade me from doing so.”
Ashraf maintained he would sell his remaining camels and keep only three goats for milk. He aims to start a small business in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province. Other nomads like Gulab Khan, 41, also from the Dottani tribe, have permanently settled in Toi Khulla, Wana. Gulab said he owned land in Kot Kai, Toi Khulla, and would try and cultivate it for his livelihood. “I also have to care for my children. My daughter needs the polio vaccine and my son has to go to school. We do not have these facilities otherwise.”
Fighting for survival
The Waziristan nomads are warrior people, often carrying weapons. Their reaction to the Taliban and other militants entering their area after 9/11 was strong and clear.
According to 65-year-old Lal Daad Khan, a nomadic tribesman, the nomads convened a Grand Jirga to discuss the issue of militants in their areas. “They decided not to allow their areas to come under the influence of the Taliban,” explained Lal. “There were no restrictions on individuals wishing to ally themselves with the militants, but these people were warned not to carry weapons and display their loyalties to the Taliban in Toi Khulla. Unfortunately, the situation changed as Mullah Nazir’s group extended its influence,” added Lal.
Despite the changing environment, however, author Ali Muhammad claims the Dottani and Sulaiman tribes are still following ancient Pukhtun culture. “They speak pure Pashto and only bury their dead on Pukhtun soil. Their women even give birth while travelling in the absence of doctors or midwives. New trends are permeating their day-to-day lives with many nomads carrying cell phones and receiving mainstream education, but they still retain their unique way of life.”
Muhammad added it was unfortunate that neither the Pakistani nor Afghan governments were making efforts to preserve their traditions.
A jirga convened by the nomads in January 2013 warned the Pakistani government the tribes would permanently migrate to Afghanistan if their problems were not resolved by the government. They demanded a share in the Nikat System along with the Ahmadzai Wazir and Mehsud tribes in order to secure better education, health and other basic facilities.
The Dottani and Sulaimen Khel tribes have also initiated a movement named Tehreek-e-Pehchan (the movement for the recognition of identity), which aims to convince the Government of Pakistan to recognise tribe members as equal citizens.
“We are arrested and humiliated on the pretext that we are Afghans, even though we hold CNICs,” said Malik Nawab Dottani, a member of the Tehreek-e-Pehchan. “We are faithful citizens of Pakistan even though our culture resembles that of Afghanistan. People who do not believe this should study our history.”
Published in The Express Tribune, July 13th, 2013.
When former DG ISI Ahmed Shuja Pasha appeared before the Abbottabad Commission, he opened indiscriminate fire on all.
The former spy chief blasted Pervez Musharraf for caving in before Americans, the political leadership for ignorance, indifference and its lack of a reading culture, all security and intelligence agencies for not performing diligently and journalists as being ‘heavily bribed with money, women and alcohol’ for launching campaigns against the ISI.
Pasha admitted before the commission that the ISI had brutalised many, even ‘decent people’ but explained there are now ‘changes to its (ISI) mindset, culture and methodology’. This followed a warning note as he said that there were still people who continue criticising the ISI and they ‘should fear the ISI’ as they were working against the national interests.
He told the commission that former PM Yusuf Raza Gilani’s statement about a ‘state within state’ and asking who had given a visa to Osama bin Laden angered the army beyond imagination. He said, however, the PM only once asked him for a briefing during his entire stint.
The Defence Ministry, he continued, never sent a request for information sharing. No one, including the defence minister, he said, read policy documents on defence and there is no culture of reading among the political leadership. A thinking process does not exist, hence there is no formulation of any policy.
The former spy chief also made a rare admission of enforced disappearances notwithstanding the fact ‘it (the ISI) had nolegal authority’ and sought detention powers for the agency. He further disclosed that the US had pressurised Pakistan through Saudi Arabia for the release of Dr Shakil Afridi but failed in such attempts.
Pasha admitted links with Haqqani network that, he said, was a brain child of ISI and CIA created after the Soviet invasion. Besides Pakistan, other countries like UK and Italy are also in touch with them, he disclosed.
The former spy chief also disclosed that the CIA had infiltrated many foreign NGOs including Save the Children that has ‘a history of involvement with the CIA’ and concluded there were very few NGOs that could be termed totally ‘clean’. He said the CIA director had personally requested him not to expose Save the Children’s role in its activities in Pakistan.
Below are the highlights of his statement about different sections of society, foreign organisations and its role other than the embarrassing intelligence failure on fateful May 2, 2011 that has already been highlighted in the media.
Pasha’s views about political leadership: Calling into question the role of former military ruler, Gen Pervez Musharraf, he said Musharraf had caved in so promptly and so completely to the US demands that Shamsi airbase was given to them for drone strikes against people in Pakistan. Someone should have told the Americans that ‘enough was enough’ but in vain and both the ‘political and military elite were responsible for this lapse’.
He said the Abbottabad incident was a result of lack of capacity, inadequate knowledge and wrong attitude. For example, he explained, no one, including the defence minister, had read the basic documents concerning defence policy. There was simply no culture of reading among the political leadership. Besides, ‘the thinking process was also non-existent’. Accordingly, it was unable to formulate any policy.
He rejected the idea of putting ISI under civilian control, saying an earlier attempt to bring under the Interior Ministry was disastrous. The ISI reports to the president and the prime minister, he said, saying information is shared on a demand basis but has never received a demand from the Defence Ministry.
The PM has once asked for an update on the security situation, he disclosed, and the DG ISI was only once summoned to brief him. Explaining the indifference of provinces on intelligence sharing, Pasha blasted Sindh and Punjab. He said that ISI knew foreign miscreants lived in Karachi’s no-go area but police dare not venture there. The situation was increasingly becoming true of Lahore and other cities of Punjab, he said. The police protected in Lahore those who attacked the Qadianis in 2010 and even directed them to the hospital where the wounded were being treated. No guards were assigned to the hospital for security despite the information passed on by ISI as ‘venal political influence intervened everywhere’.
About Prime Minister Gilani’s statement in the National Assembly asking who had given a six-year visa to Osama bin Laden and his reference to ‘a state within a state’, Pasha said his criticism was very unfair. ‘The anger in the military over such unfair statements could not be described’.
Harassment by ISI, media’s suspicious activities and missing persons: Pasha accepted that agency’s record was not without blemish, saying many ‘decent people’ had been harmed by some of its errors. But the ISI learned from experiences, he said, and reformed itself through ‘change to its mindset, culture and methodology’. But he also warned that those who still criticise and fear from the ISI are people ‘who should fear the ISI’ as they more often than not were working against the national interest.
About the role of Pakistani media, Pasha said, journalists were also found involved in the vilification campaign against the ISI launched by the US and many journalists were ‘heavily bribed with money, women and alcohol.’ He said the media was ‘practically bought up’ and nearly ‘every one of our elite was purchasable.’
He also admitted that the ISI had arrested people without any legal authority but justified this malpractice by throwing blame on the police that, he said, leaked the information provided to it. Accordingly, the ISI preferred to act alone and there is a need to grant detention power to the agency, he explained.
Criticised all agencies: Pasha said all the intelligence agencies must be held to account for their failure including Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, Intelligence Bureau, Criminal Investigation Department and the Special Branch. None of the said agencies re-aligned their task in the aftermath of 9/11. Very little coordination exists for terrorism-related information sharing with military intelligence services, he disclosed. The police should have a comparative advantage with respect to internal security since it has tentacle down to the district level. The CID, Special Branch and the police have advantage over the ISI because of their spread, area coverage and local knowledge but nothing was done by them, he said.
Most of the officers posted in the IB are from police and do not know the basics of intelligence, said Pasha who did not have any intelligence experience either when appointed DG. He also failed to mention that same is being practiced in the ISI that is run by the armed forces notwithstanding the fact it is a civilian agency.
Self-assuming role of ISI as counter-terrorism agency: Admitting the fact that the government never tasked the ISI to deal with counter-terrorism, Pasha said the agency had assumed this responsibility ‘in response to the dysfunctionality of the prevailing system and the ineffectiveness of other state organs’. Another reason was the fact that the president so often happens to be serving army chief, he said with reference to repeated military intervention and realising the fact that Musharraf was COAS-president by that time.
Contacts with Haqqani network: Pasha said it was jointly created by the CIA and ISI against the Soviet occupation. The fighting core of this network had been placed under UN sanctions, he explained, but its non-combatant members were not. The ISI is in ‘contact with these non-sanctioned members’ who are responsible for administrative and other matters, he said and justified this by explaining that the UK, Italy and some other countries are also in touch with them.
Foreign NGOs as CIA’s agents: Pasha said CIA had a history of using NGOs and there were 1300 foreign NGOs working in Pakistan. There is clear evidence that CIA, he explained, uses them including Save the Children that, he said, has a ‘history of involvement with the CIA’. The CIA was extremely worried that its nexus with NGOs might be publicly exposed, he said. In fact, Pasha continued, the CIA director had personally requested him not to expose Save the Children’s role in its activities in Pakistan. He said there were very few ‘clean’ foreign NGOs working in Pakistan. Pasha said it was not possible for the ISI to track activities of all these NGOs and only the police could undertake their monitoring and surveillance.
The News
by Dr Harjinder Singh Dilgeer
Why did Indira Gandhi attack Darbar Sahib ?
The Background
Although Indira Gandhi had re-captured power from the Janta Party Alliance and had become P.M. again on the 14th of January 1980, but she knew that she had won those elections due to negative votes cast by voters against the Janta Party’s infighting; and, now, she had no new agenda for the next elections and about half of the term of Lok Sabha had passed, so she began thinking over several fronts; first she deliberated upon using the Tamil issue (in Sri Lanka) but it would not have yielded her much gains because it would have affected only Tamil or at the most Dravid votes, most of which were already with her, especially when the B.J.P. was her main opposition the South would support her because of its (South’s) clash with north on the issue of language and culture. Hence, to capture a high chunk of north Indian votes she (Indira Gandhi) needed to show something startling; hence she decided to use the Sikh card; and, for this purpose, she had to outstrip the B.J.P. and other fundamentalist and fanatic Hindu organisations to ensure the Hindus that ‘only the Congress can safeguard the interests of the Hindus’; this she could have achieved only by first establishing the Sikhs as ‘enemies of the Hindus as well as India’ and then by crushing them with all might.
With all this in her mind, Indira Gandhi decided to use the Indian Army, the R.A.W. (the Indian intelligence network), the I.B. (Intelligence Bureau) and all the media for an all out attack on the Sikhs.
Under this move Indira Gandhi decided to attack on the very heart of Sikhism i.e. Darbar Sahib Amritsar; she wanted to teach the Sikhs such a lesson that, what to talk of demanding their rights, they should never be able to raise their heads as honourable people; it included mass killings, desecration of their shrines, destruction of their archives, libraries and museums, their history and heritage; to create a permanent physical, social and psychological awe in their minds to make them realise that they had no pride, no civic, religious or human rights; and they were slaves and third rate beings (not humans).
Preparing Ground for invasion
To execute this agenda, Indira Gandhi decided to first create hatred in the mind of the Hindus in order to get their full-fledged support for herself and for her actions as well as disdain for the Sikhs; hence she had to present the Sikhs as criminals, killers of the Hindus, fanatics, fundamentalists and ferocious persons; and, on the other hand, to present the Hindus, especially of the Punjab as innocent people and peaceful citizens and victims of terrorism. To achieve this agenda she had to unite all the Hindu fanatics under one umbrella and one slogan: ‘hate the Sikhs, they are traitors, they are enemies of the Hindus, they are danger to the sovereignty of the country.’
Indira’s next move was to use all the media, Indian as well as foreign, by provoking or/and by bribing them, through national and international political manoeuvring and even through commercial publicity agencies; and it was a part of her strategy that the Sikhs should not be able to get international support or sympathy and they should rather be presented as ‘Sikh terrorists’ and not militants or Khalistanis or freedom fighters, or victims of state terrorism. She sent missions, she financed journalists and news agencies, she held dinner
parties to the media folk and sent precious gifts to writers, journalists and press correspondents; and, through her own official and national media she launched an all out war against the Sikhs.
The next move was to create differences and dissension, conflict and rebellion among the Sikh organisations so that they should point out their guns towards each other; this could have been doubly useful: firstly, a civil war among the Sikhs leading to destruction or at least major losses and a state of standstill in their struggle; and, secondly it would become an excuse to pounce upon them in many a way.
With this colossal plan, she entrusted job to the RAW and she began seeking help from the Russian K.G.B., the Israeli MOSSAD, the American C.I.A. and the British intelligence; none of them, perhaps, knew that she was in touch with the others and/or she was using all of them.
At home front Indira Gandhi did not fully trust the R.A.W and/or the I.B., hence she created a new agency under the code name Third Agency; she herself was the in charge of this ‘Agency’; her son Rajiv Gandhi and Arun Nehru were her main advisors;1 all the plan regarding the Punjab had been chalked out and executed by this Third Agency;2it had three main objectives: (1) to clinch the Hindu votes in the rest of the country by giving the Sikh community a punch on the nose; (2) to take the wind out of the Opposition’s sail by doing exactly what they had been saying the Government should do: ‘attack Darbar Sahib’; (3) to test the efficiency of a Third Intelligence Agency camouflaged by a blundering R.A.W. and inefficient I.B.3 According to Surya, three things prove the total involvement of the Government and its intelligence network in the Punjab operation: (1) all the senior intelligence officers serving in the Punjab, Rajasthan, J & K sector during the Akali agitation have either been promoted, recommended for a police medal or sent abroad; (2) most of the arms that were found in the Darbar Sahib, in 1984, had been smuggled into the country through Rajasthan under the actual supervision and/or connivance of a RAW officer; (3) S.K. Tripathi, in charge of RAW at Amritsar, from mid 1982 to the 3rd of May 1984, had sent a coded telegram to Delhi with details of an impending attack on more than 40 railway stations in the Punjab – and the Government chose nothing to do about it. Surya asserts that the ‘Third Agency’ was formed only to aid the Congress Party (Indira Gandhi) in its election campaign4 (to use the Sikh card).
“The Third Agency had its office at Bikaner House, Shahjahan Road, New Delhi; to camouflage it a Board bearing the nomenclature ‘Cabinet Secretariat (Security) was hung at the gate of its office. This ‘Agency’ was masterminded by R.N. Kao (Chief Security Advisor to Indira Gandhi); other important organisers included: N.F. Santook (former chief of the RAW), G.C. Saxena (later chief of RAW), and R. Shankaran Nair (Director P.M.’s Secretariat) etc.”5 H. S. Kriplani (a RAW man) who was expert in planning secret murders, was made in charge of the Punjab and was given charge of clandestine assassinations in the Punjab; he was also assigned the job of ‘gun smuggling operations’; Rabinder Ohri (Assistant Director RAW) operated from Rajasthan and coordinated with H.S. Kriplani (in smuggling of weapons); later, W.N.B. Rao (another Assistant Director RAW) took over from Ohri; after this R.N. Gupta (Assistant Director RAW) replaced Rao and supervised operations in Rajasthan; he remained on this ‘job’ till December 1983. Similarly, A.I. Vasuvada (another RAW officer) remained the in charge of Amritsar till summer of 1982; it was he who master-minded the action at Chowk Mehta on the 20th of September 1981 (it was carried through Awtar Singh Atwal, D.I.G. Punjab Police, which led to killing of several Sikhs); in 1982 he was replaced by S.K. Tripathi who planned murders of the Hindus as well as burning of 47 railway stations; after accomplishing his ‘job’ he returned to Delhi on the 3rd of May 1984.6 Another remarkable feature of these operations was that she frequently transferred the ‘Third Agency’ officers in the Punjab so that none should have complete picture of her plan; even
the Governors of the Punjab were transferred with short intervals; Jai Sukh Lal Hathi remained Governor till August 1981; his successor Amin-ud-Din was replaced in April 1982; he was succeeded by Chenna Reddy and then A.P. Sharma, the last to be replaced by her most confident man B.D. Pandey (in August 1983) who remained in office up to the 28th of June 1984. The chiefs of the Punjab Police too were replaced with the extra-ordinary speed: Birbal Nath was succeeded by C.K. Sahni who was replaced by Indira Gandhi’s favourite man Pritam Singh Bhinder who remained in office up to the attack on Darbar Sahib (later he was replaced by K.S. Dhillon).7
Now, Indira Gandhi began preparations for attack on Darbar Sahib; but before this invasion she began another era of violence. Her ‘Third Agency’ created atmosphere for multi-way violence: (1) Killings by the Police and the C.R.P.F., (2) Killings of the Sikhs in Haryana (under patronage of Bhajan Lal, the then chief minister of Haryana); (3) Terrorist actions by fanatic Hindus terrorist groups (4) Clandestine murders; and on the other side (1) provoke and promote demonstrations and disturbances in the name of the Akalis; (2) create situation to make Sikh leaders issue aggressive and provocative statements; (3) manoeuvre promotion of disdain and enmity among various Sikh groups, both political and militants; (4) clandestine killings of the militants to be attributed to the Akalis or rival militant groups: i.e. the state of ushering civil war among the Sikhs; hence chaos in the Sikh world.
The Indian Army assigned job of attack on Darbar Sahib
In the summer of 1983, Indira Gandhi asked Lt General S. K. Sinha, then vice-chief of the Indian Army to prepare a position paper for an assault on Darbar Sahib; but, when he strongly advised her against taking such a step;8 as a result he was transferred to Army Headquarters; later, he chose to seek pre-mature retirement. Now Arun Shridhar Vaidya was appointed the Chief of Army with Lt. General Krishna Swamy Sunderji (General Officer Commander in chief of the Western Command) as vice Chief. In September 1983, Indira Gandhi asked Vaidya and Sunderji to prepare a position paper for an attack on Darbar sahib and he agreed immediately; it (position paper) was ready by the end of December 1983; Indira Gandhi studied it for two weeks and, on the Indian Army Day, on the 15th of January 1984, she gave final instructions to General Sunderji to make preparations for attack.9
In the third week of January 1984, a commando force of 600 soldiers was selected from different units of the Indian Army; they were sent to make rehearsals for an assault on Darbar Sahib Complex, and, for this purpose a life size replica of the Darbar Sahib complex was built in the hills of Chakrata (near Dehradun), about 240 kilometres from Delhi. In January 1984, after accomplishment of the mission of practice of mock attack on Darbar Sahib Complex, Indira Gandhi was briefed about the completion of the preparations for attack; between February and May 1984 Indira Gandhi alerted the Army three times but each time she vetoed the invasion; ‘a case of nerves’ as per a senior aide.10
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Third Agency had escalated violence in the Punjab in order to justify an attack on Darbar Sahib; in 1981 there occurred just 28 incidents of violence in the Punjab, in 1982 the number was just 33; in 1983 when the Third Agency began its action for final round the number of incidents of violence rose to 138 but after this when the Commandos had completed their mock battle in Chakrata hill, number of incidents of violence began rising, and, just in five month (from the 27th of January to the 2nd of June 1984) 364 incidents of violence took place; of these 22 occurred in the first two days of June although the army had already taken positions in the Punjab on the 31st of May; even out of the incidents 90% were of frivolous nature hence of no significance; after Indira Gandhi gave the first order (which was postponed) to attack Darbar Sahib, incidents of violence increased with high speed so that attack on Darbar Sahib may be fully justified. Thus the activities of
the Third Agency and political manoeuvring of Indira Gandhi outwitted not only hazy minded Akalis but also the Hindus and the other political Parties. Indira Gandhi never disclosed her hidden aims, all this time. Indira Gandhi Government kept on repeating that Armed Forces will not enter Golden Temple Complex.11
Though Indira Gandhi had made all preparations for attack on Darbar Sahib but as a drama she continued having dialogue with the Akalis; she had performed this ‘drama’ several times earlier too; during Tri-Party Talks ‘three times in six months an agreement was reached and three times she backed out’; she again backed out when Swaran Singh tried to mediate; she uses dilly-dallying tactics when the ‘Punjabi Group’12 came up with a ‘formula’ in April 1984; in fact ‘Mrs Gandhi had other intentions’;13 even Ravinder Singh Ravi, a professor of Punjabi University, tried to mediate; his efforts too met with almost similar treatment; none of them knew that Indira Gandhi was just playing drama of negotiations, she had already planned to attack Darbar Sahib and cash the Sikh Card to capture a big junk of Hindu votes.14
The last drama of show of negotiations with the Akalis was played from March to May 1984; the Akali leaders met the Government delegations on the 27th, 28th and 29th of March, on the 21st of April and on the 26th of May,15 the last meeting took place on the 27th of May 1984;16 in the final meeting an agreement was reached with the Akalis and they were told that the same will be ‘announced after getting approval from Madam’; in fact this was just a drama because on that day (the 27th of May) orders had already been issued to the Indian Army to proceed towards Amritsar (an advance party of the Indian Army had taken positions around Darbar Sahib on the 30th of May).
On one hand Indira Gandhi had dispatched orders on the other hand a message was sent to the Akalis that ‘Madam’ had not approved the agreement; at this the Akalis announced that if their demand were not accepted by the 2nd of June 1984, they will launch a Non-cooperation Movement from the 3rd of June; however, the Intelligence Bureau, the Government, almost everyone knew that the Akalis won’t launch any such Movement, they will just continue holding demonstrations and rallies and court arrests.
Before finally attacking Darbar Sahib, Indira Gandhi had prepared ground; a mutual distrust had already been created between the Sikhs and the Hindus; the Sikhs were been projected as anti Hindu, killers of Hindus, as well as separatist, Khalistanis, anti-nationalists, ‘agents of Pakistan’, traitors, extremists (attvaadi/ dahishatgarad), fundamentalist, fanatics etc. The Government media, the A.I.R., T.V. were presenting the militants as the ‘Sikh terrorists’; and this hate-propaganda was so aggressive that not only the B.J.P.17 but even the other non-communal Opposition Parties, including both Communist Parties, vied each other in condemning and denigrating Sikhs and demanding a military action against Bhindranwala particularly and Darbar Sahib generally; Atal Bihari Vajpayee, L.K. Advani, Chowdhry Charan Sinh,18 Shiv Sena, Hindu Suraksha Samiti, Shiv Sena, Bajrang Brigade, Vishav Hindu Prishad, Arya Samaj all spoke in the same language; they were so ignorant that they could not read the mind of the notorious and mischievous woman; it is surprising that Harkishan Surjeet (of the C.P.M.), too sailed in the same boat in spite of the fact that he himself had been a part and parcel of negotiating team and he knew that it was Indira Gandhi who was the real culprit as she did not want a political solution and she had ‘other intentions.’
Execution of attack on Darbar Sahib
Army takes over the reins of the Punjab
Indira Gandhi issued orders for attack on Darbar Sahib under the code name of ‘Operation Blue Star’; on the 27th of May 1984 the troops left for Amritsar by rail, road and even by air; five Corps of Army (the 1st, the 2nd, the 10th, the 11th, and the 15th) had reached the Punjab on the 30th of May and the Army was still on the move. On the 31st of May, a meeting of the operating generals was held at Chandimandir (near Chandigarh) at the headquarters of ‘Core 2’ unit of the Indian Army; it was attended by officers of the Army, Air Force and Navy which included Lt. General K. Sunderji, K.S. Brar, R.S. Dyal and others; Sunderji had been Commander of a regiment in the Indo-Pak War of 1965, R.S. Dyal had been a Major of a Parachute Regiment in the same War. This meeting discussed and planned to attack and occupy Darbar Sahib in just 24 hours; the whole ‘action’ was broadly divided into two parts: attack on Darbar Sahib (under code ‘Operation Blue Star’) and sealing of border between India and Pakistan (‘Operation Wood Rose’); operation of the sealing of the border was assigned to 11 Core Unit, Lt. General K. Gauri Shankar was the chief of this ‘Operation’.
The advanced unit of commandos had already taken positions around Darbar Sahib, right in the evening of the 30th of May. Although secret agents and the intelligence network of the Government had already given almost complete picture of the inside of the Darbar Sahib Complex but still, on the 1st of June, Major General K. S. Brar, Captain Jasbir Raina, Lt. Colonel K. S. Randhawa, Brigadier D. V. Rao and Colonel Fernandes (who had reached Amritsar early in the morning of the 1st of June) went into the Darbar Sahib in plain clothes and had a round of the whole of the Complex to assess fortification.
On the 1st of June 1984, the C.R.P.F. and the B.S.F. which had taken positions on all the tall buildings around Darbar Sahib since long,19 suddenly began firing at Darbar Sahib without giving any warning; it was, in fact, an attempt to provoke the militants to retaliate, which would have given a chance to the Indian Army to assess which weapons did they have, what was the standard of their strength, where were their posts from which they could have attacked the Army. On the other hand, General Subeg Singh, commander of all the operations of the miltants, understood the strategy of the Indian Army; hence he gave orders not to give any reaction. This firing continued for more than five hours (12.40 noon to 7 p.m.), killing 8 Sikh devotees including a woman and a child) and wounding more than 25;20 the central building of Darbar Sahib itself had been hit by bullets where there were at least 34 bullet marks.21When the firing was going on, Harchand Singh Longowal, President of Akali Dal, tried to contact Zail Singh, the President of India, but in spite of making several telephone calls, Zail Singh could not be reached; all the time Zail’s Secretary kept on saying that he was not available; in fact Zail was avoiding22 because he knew all about the plan of the attack on Darbar Sahib and the firing of the 1st of June was a part of that. Meanwhile, Longowal succeeded in contacting B.D. Pandey, the Governor of the Punjab, who confessed that he won’t be able to do anything because ‘the orders were coming straight from New Delhi’.23This action was repeated on the 2nd of June 1984 when 32 bullets hit the building of Akal Takht from its backside; here too, the army wanted to test the reactions of the Sikh militants in order to know their positions from where they would be firing in situation of an attack by the Army.
Preparations by the defenders of Darbar Sahib
The conspiracy to attack Darbar Sahib had been chalked out in the summer of 1983 and this planning had been leaked out to General Subeg Singh; he discussed the same with Baba Jarnail Singh; at first the latter resolved to leave Darbar Sahib and offer his arrest (as he had done in Chowk Mehta on the 20th of September 1981) in order to Save Darbar Sahib from military attack but then General Subeg Singh told him that the conspiracy to attack was not simply due to him and rather it was with an intention to ‘teach a lesson to the Sikhs’; at this Baba Jarnail Singh decided that the Indian Army should also ‘be taught a lesson as per Sikh traditions’ and the Indian Army should be given a fight like that of the 1st of December 1764 when 30 Sikhs fought against 30000 Durrani and Baloch soldiers at the same site. After this, General Subeg Singh had begun making preparations for combating the invading Indian forces. General Subeg Singh was an expert of guerrilla war; he had achieved great success in 1971 when the Indian Army fought a guerrilla war against the Pakistani Army in the battle of Bangla Desh; hence he knew how to stop advances of the enemy forces; thus he planned to give such a fight to the Indian Army that would be known as the greatest battle of resistance in the history of the world. But, Bhindranwala had just a few Sikh youth, most of them had never touched even a gun; but all of them were ready to sacrifice their lives for preserving the honour of Darbar Sahib and the Sikh Panth (and they proved what General Subeg Singh said; the battle of Darbar Sahib will be ‘the greatest battle of resistance in the history of the world’).
Truth is that General Subeg Singh was ‘real hero of the war of Bangla Desh’ though the credit went to General Arora because the latter was chief of the Army at that time; and, General Subeg Singh was the real hero of the battle of June 1984 too.
Indira Gandhi’s broadcast from the A.I.R.:
Though Indira Gandhi had ordered attack on Darbar Sahib but she was scared; right from the 27th of May 1984, when she had signed final orders, she had been nervous, her behaviour had turned queer, her voice choked all these days; during this period she had called a closed-door meeting of Congress activists from all over India, and, on the 2nd of June 1984, “when she walked up to the platform she appeared to be limping; her shoulders were hunched; she looked dishevelled; her face was drawn; she choked as she spoke; it looked like if someone in her family had died”.24
A few hours later, in the late hours of the evening of the 2nd of June, Indira Gandhi made an unscheduled broadcast from the A.I.R.; in her broadcast she blamed the Akalis for not having reached agreement (which was a lie as it was she who backed out at least three times); she stated that she had accepted all the demands of the Akalis i.e. sale of tobacco, liquor and meat had been banned in demarcated area in the walled city of Amritsar (this too was lie), consultations were being made for an All India Gurdwara Act (this was just a gossip), a Tribunal headed by a Supreme Court Judge was being constituted to decide distribution of water dispute (the Akalis had demanded that the case should be decided by the Supreme Court and not a Tribunal, but, she did not trust the Supreme Court), a Commission was being appointed to decide the issue of Chandigarh, Abohar, Fazilka and other Punjabi or Hindi speaking areas (this was a blatant lie), Sarkaria Commission has been appointed to submit its report on Centre-State relations (only this part was true; but Sarkaria Commission had been appointed on the 24th of March 1983 i.e. more than 14 months earlier). She said that the Government had accepted their demands but they were raising fresh demands all the time (this too was a lie), and, they have announced launching of a non cooperation Movement from the 3rd of June. In the end she played another drama by saying: ‘Even at this late hour, I appeal to the Akali leaders to call off their threatened agitation and accept the framework of peaceful settlement which we have offered. She ended her speech with the words “Don’t shed blood, shed hatred”;25 it was like devil giving sermons because when she was speaking from the A.I.R. the Indian Army had already taken positions around Darbar Sahib three days earlier to that and had also surrounded more than 70 Gurdwaras and had been firing at Darbar Sahib for the past two days; and it (Indian Army) was ready to play with ‘blood’ and dissipate and practice ‘hatred’. Commenting upon this Kuldip Nayyar observed: ‘How could she first order military operation and then suggest negotiations? And even if the Akalis were ready to talk, how could they contact her, all the telephones had been cut off.’26
Events Relating to Attack on Darbar Sahib
On the 2nd of June 1984, the Indian Army sealed all the international border, from Ganganagar in Rajasthan to Jammu; several army tanks, a large number of army trucks and Armed Personnel Carriers (A.P.C.) as well as other Army vehicles with a large quantity of weapons were seen everywhere in the Punjab and on the international border.
The same day, formalities of takeover by the Army were performed; the Army set up Command Headquarter in the Police Kotwali (about 300 metres from Darbar Sahib), the ‘Armed Group’ of the 350 Infantry Brigade, which was to guide ‘Operation’ (it was to act under the command of K.S. Brar), was stationed here, at the top floor of this building; and this office was direct on line with the Central Government’s Control Room at Delhi which was under the overall command of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi assisted by Arun Nehru, Arun Sinh, and K. P. Sinh Deo (Deputy Defence Minister).27 The same day, R. S. Dayal28 (Chief of Staff Western Command) took over as the Advisor Security29 to the Governor of the Punjab; and, with this all the telecommunication, postal services and rail and bus transport was taken over or suspended by the Army; the Punjab Police had now virtually no role as they were just to obey orders of the Army; by the evening the Army had been posted on all the key positions: the railway stations, bus stands and all the transport, telecommunication towers and their offices, bridges and roads, canals and rivers, administration and public services; now all the infra structure in the Punjab was under the command of the Indian Army; all the foreign citizens were ordered to leave the Punjab.
Gurdev Singh refuses to sign orders to attack
Before formally launching the attack the Army needed formal signatures from the D.C. of Amritsar; at that time Gurdev Singh was the D.C. and he refused to sign permission/orders to attack Darbar Sahib; as a result he was replaced by Ramesh Inder Singh (when Parkash Singh Badal became C.M. in 1997, he appointed as the Chief Secretary in his Government); Gurdev Singh was sent on leave (but even during this ‘holidays period’ he was to remain under strict surveillance of the Army); Ramesh Inder Singh immediately signed orders to attack.
As per planning the attack was to begin early in the morning of the 4th of June 1984; frontal attack on Akal Takht was to be made by specially trained commandos of the Parachute Regiment from 1st battalion, wearing black denims with bullet-proof vests; they were to be followed by the 10 Guards and the 12 Bihar Corps; they were to be assisted by 26 Madras and 9 Kumaon. The 12 Bihar Corps had already taken positions around Darbar Sahib, right in the morning of the 3rd of June. As per planning the whole ‘Operation’ was to be completed in thirty-six hours; hence, on the 3rd of June, at 9 p.m., a thirty-six hour curfew (later extended for another thirty-six hours) was imposed in the whole of the Punjab; and, in and around Darbar Sahib, electricity and water services were disconnected.
On the other hand, when the electricity was disconnected General Subeg Singh understood that the attack would begin within hours so he assigned duties to the defending Sikh volunteers whose number was between 100 and 125; they took positions in the basement of Akal Takht, in and around the Parikarma (periphery), at the Ghanta Ghar (clock tower) gate of Darbar Sahib; the Babar Khalsa group took positions at the top of Ramgarhia Bunga (two eighteen century towers on the corner of Darbar Sahib) and on the water tank (in side Guru Ram Dass Saran) and the tower of Baba Atal Gurdwara.
Dr Harjinder Singh Dilgeer
National Professor of Sikh History
Birmingham, England.
(hsdilgeer@yahoo.com)
1 A. R. Darshi, The Gallant Defender (Amritsar 2005), p. 97 (of 2007 edition). 2 Surya monthly, September 1984. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Darshi, A.R. The Gallant Defender (Amritsar 2005), p. 97 (of 2007 edition). 6 Ibid, pp. 98-99. 7 Ibid, p. 101. 8 ‘Operation Blue Star’ has been reckoned as one of the 10 Political Disgraces of India: 1. Internal Emergency (June 1975- January 77). 2. Operation Blue Star (June 1984). 3. Bofors Scandal (1987-96). 4. Demolition of Babri Mosque (December 1992). 5. JMM Bribery Case (July 1997). 6. Fodder Scam (January 1996). 7. Hijacking of an Indian Airliner to Kandhar (December 1999). 8. Arms Bribery Case involving Bangaru Laxman BJP chief etc (March 2001). 9. Gujrat Riots (February-March 2002). 10. Surviving No Confidence Motion (July 2008); for details see article, of the same name, by Gunjeet K. Sra in India Today, dated 29.12.2008. 9 Malhotra, Inder, Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography, (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1989) has also refereed to this. 10 Nayyar, Kuldip and Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of Punjab, p. 56. 11 A. R. Darshi, op. cit, p. 100. 12 The ‘Punjabi Group’ comprised of Kuldip Nayyar, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, Lt General Jagjit Singh Arora, I.K. Gujral, Pran Chopra, Gurcharan Singh etc. 13 Samiuddin Adiba, The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response (Delhi 1985), pp. 644-45. 14 Ibid, p. 682. 15 These meetings had been attended, from Akali side, by Badal, Tohra, Ravi Inder Singh, Balwant Singh, Surjeet Barnala, Balwant Ramuwalia etc. 16 Earlier too, on the 16th and the 17th of November 1982, then on the 17th and 24th of January 1983 too, meetings had been held between the Akalis and the Government delegations. 17 L.K. Advani, in his book, published in 2008, has openly confessed that that his Party, along with Chowdhry Charan Sinh’s Party, held two major demonstrations at Delhi, on the 3rd and the 4th of May 1984, to press attack on Darbar Sahib; again, he raised this issue in the Parliament too (Advani, My Counry My Life, p. 430). When this book was published, all the Sikhs condemned Advani, but Manjit Singh G.K. (president of the Delhi Akali Dal, Badal group) went to the residence of Advani on the 13th of April 2008, and presented him with a robe of honour (for instigating Indira Gandhi to attack Darbar Sahib). 18 He was a fanatic Hindu; it was he who had occupied the land of the Gurdwara Gian Godari built at Hardwar in the memory of the visit of Guru Nanak Sahib. In 1984 he joined Advani and demanded attack on Darbar Sahib; on the 3rd of May 1984, he led a demonstration against the Akalis. 19 According to Harminder Kaur and Mark Tully, the order for this fire had been given by K.S. Brar (Harminder Kaur, op. cit., p. 7, Tully, Mark, op. cit., p. 145), also see the ‘official account’ (which is full of lies) by K.S. Brar, Operation Blue Star. 20 Citizens for Democracy, Oppression in Punjab (Delhi 1984), p. 57. 21 Oppression in Punjab, p. 58, Tully, Mark, op. cit., p. 145. Later, these marks were shown by the international media including the Pakistani TV (In Khabarnama of the 3rd of June 1984.). Later these signs were removed by the S.G.P.C. when Gurcharan Singh Tohra was President and Manjit Singh Calcutta was the Secretary. 22 Harminder Kaur, op. cit., p. 8. 23 Ibid. 24 Tully, Mark, op. cit, p. 142. On the other hand, a fanatic Hindu journalist Prem Bhatia (editor The Tribune Chandigarh) playing as cheap sycophant, wrote that when he saw her in the first week of July 1984 ‘she looked five years younger’ (The Tribune, dated 8.7.1984); such was the mentality of sycophants of Indira Gandhi and the fanatic Hindus; the same Bhatia, in the issue dated 7.6.1984, described attack on Darbar Sahib as ‘a neat operation’ in spite of the fact that nothing was yet known as to what had happened there at Darbar Sahib or in 72 other Gurdwaras in the rest of the Punjab. 25 For Indira Gandhi’s full speech, see Appendix IV on pages 684-687 of The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response, a book edited by Adiba Samiuddin. 26 Nayyar, op. cit., P. 91 27 Darshi, op. cit, pp. 109-110. 28 It is alleged that he was a senior member of the Nirankari cult, which had killed 13 Sikhs in 1978. 29 According to A.R. Darshi, General Gauri Shankar was appointed as the Security Advisor to the Governor and R. S. Dyal was ‘immediate subordinate’ to Lt. General Sunderji (The Gallant Fighter, p. 109). 30 Such heavy artillery, which is used only in open field battles, was arrayed against the defenders of Darbar Sahib, on a Complex where thousands of pilgrims were staying for the night; no warning was given; no one was asked to surrender. 31 Later, on the 7th of June, the Army collected their dead bodies and their weapons from the tank. 32 Chellaney, Brahma, An Eye Account, an article in Abida Samiuddin’s book, The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response (Delhi, 1985), p. 181. 33 The Indian Army had already brought several tanks and at least 13 tanks were used in this ‘Operation’. 34 Later, Harjinder Singh Jinda and Sukhdev Singh Sukha punished General Vaidya in his own city Pune, on the 10th of August 1986; both were, later, arrested and sentenced to death; they were hanged on the 9th of October 1992. 35 According to a hearsay account, a Sikh boy of 16 years of age, who had tied explosives to his body, jumped before the tank and destroyed it; and, due to this the tank got bogged down near the Baba Deep Singh Memorial; it was removed much later and that even with much difficulty. 36 The Indian Army brought at least 13 tanks for attack on Darbar Sahib, three of these were taken to the parikarma of Darbar Sahib and the rest were on standby between Darbar Sahib and the Town Hall; to quote Subhash Kirpekar: “I saw two tanks positioned a little distance away from the kotwali, another outside Jallianwala Bagh and three more outside Ghantaghar entrance to Golden Temple complex.” [Amritsar Diary by Subhash Kirpekar, in Abida Samiuddin’s The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response, p, 171]. 37 Oppression in Punjab, p. 61. 38 Chellaney, Brahma, op. cit., p. 181. 39 Amritsar Diary by Subhash Kirpekar, in Abida Samiuddin’s The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response, p. 168. 40 Sunday Times, dated 17.6.1984. 41 For the Sikhs it was not the first unequal battle; they had already fought battles at Chamkaur (7-8.12.1705), Muktsar (29.12.17065), Lohgarh (29-30.11.1710), Gurdas Nangal (April to December 1715), Akal Takht Amritsar (1.12.1764), Saragarhi etc where a few of them fought against hundreds and thousands of invaders. 42 Tully, op, cit, 175. 43 Chellaney, Brahma, op. cit., p. 182. 44 Ibid. 45 Darshi, A.R., op. cit., p. 112. 46 Later, these signs were removed by the S.G.P.C. when Tohra was the President and Manjit Singh Calcutta was the Secretary. 47 This volume of Guru Granth Sahib too had been hit by a bullet; this was a handwritten volume from 1830. 48 Surya, August 1984; Nayyar, op cit, p. 102. 49 Daily Observer, dated 9.6.1984. 50 It is not true that the buildings had been destroyed in crossfire; the militants had not fired a single shot on the buildings adjacent to Darbar Sahib or around it; the militants aimed only at the soldiers trying to proceed towards Akal Takht; hence the houses were destroyed only by the Army’s shelling. 51 Daily Guardian, dated 26.6.1984. 52 Daily Telegraph, dated 15.6.1984. 53 In September 1984 Rajiv Gandhi had admitted this figure as 700. (Nayyar, op. cit., P. 108); later, the Army too admitted that ‘troops had to pay high price and suffered heavy casualties’ (Harminder Kaur, op. cit., p 47). 54 White Paper, p. 169. 55 Nayyar, op. cit, p. 109. 56 Brar, K.S., Operation Blue Star (Delhi 1992). 57 Sarna, Jasbir Singh, History o f Sikh Students Federation, (unpublished). 58 This is confirmed by Brahma Challeney, of the Associated Press, who was the only foreign correspondent in Amritsar: “the Sikhs killed during the attack were shot at point-blank range, with their hands tied at the back with their turbans.” The Times, London, dated 14.6.1984. 59 Kumar, Ram Narayan and George Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle (Delhi 1991), p. 265. 60 Mary Anne Weaver, in The Sunday Times, dated 10.6.1984. 61 Darshi, A.R., op. cit., p. 116. 62 Chellany, op. cit., pp 184-85 63 After 66 hours of imposition (from 3.6.1984 at 9.p.m. to 6.6.84 at 3 p.m.) the curfew was relaxed for two hours on 6 June from 3 to 5 p.m; on 7 June it was announced that curfew will be relaxed from 3 to 5 p.m. but it was cancelled on suggestion of Ramesh Inder Singh, the new D.C.; on 9 June the curfew was relaxed from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m.; on 10 June it was relaxed from 12 noon to 5 p.m. (however, in the walled city it was from 3 to 5 p.m. only); on 11 June it was relaxed from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and the following days from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. There was no bus service from 3 June to 10 June, on 11 June too there were a couple of busses and that even for taking passengers to Patti and Tarn Taran; on 12 June three busses carried passengers from Amritsar to Jalandhar. [Amritsar Diary by Subhash Kirpekar, in Abida Samiuddin’s The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response, pp, 171 and 173]. 64 Chellany, op. Cit, p. 182 65 Bhanwar, Harbir Singh, in his book Diary de Panne has given details of such acts; also see ‘Oppression in Punjab’ by C.F.D. 66 Though most of the Sikhs present in the Darbar Sahib Complex had been killed by the Army in cold blood, still some of the 350 of those who had been arrested from the headquarters of the S.G.P.C. were taken to the Army cantonment (some of them died there for want of water as they had been kept in a small confined place where they were not allowed even water; it being the hottest day many of them died); those who survived were, later, lodged in Jodhpur Jail (in Rajasthan); they were not tried by any court and were not released for many years; many of them had already become insane before they were released. 67 Thukral, Gobind, Atrocities on Sikh Children, a report published in India Today, dated 30.9.1984, Kumar, Ram Narayan, op. cit., p. 291. 68 Oppression in Punjab, pp. 76-77. 69 There were about 20000 books, about 500 handwritten volumes of Guru Granth Sahib and several relics. (The Tribune, dated 4.7.1984). 70 Oppression in the Punjab, pp. 66-67. 71 Ibid, p. 31 (statement of Kirpal Singh). 72Operation Bluestar: An Eyewitness Account by Subash Kirepaker, in The Punjab Story, edited by Kuldip Nayyar and Khushwant Singh, op. cit, p. 83. 73 All this was carried under the supervision of Ramesh Inder Singh, the newly appointed D.C. of Amritsar. 74 Chellany, op. cit., p. 182. 75 Ibid. 76 Monthly Probe India, August 1984. 77 Statement of Bhan Singh in Harbir Singh Bhanwar’s Diary de Panne. 78 Indian Express, dated 12.6.1984 79 While speaking on the Indian Government’s ‘White Paper on Punjab Situation’, on the 25th of July 1984, in the Lok Sabha, Vajpayee said: “First of all I want to congratulate those officers who freed Harmandir Sahib, sacred to all the Indians, from terrorists by sacrificing their lives and putting their precious lives in danger…The army had been given a delicate responsibility and the army should be felicitated for accomplishing their duty efficiently and bravely…” (Proceedings of the Lok Sabha, dated 25.7.1984). 80 Hindustan Times dated 10.6.1984. The B.J.P. leaders went to the extent of calling her ‘Durga’ a fictitious Hindu goddess which was shown defeating the demons in fiction works. 81 He called it ‘swift, yet restrained, operation in flushing out terrorists from Golden Temple Complex’ (Hindustan Times, dated 10.6.1984). 82 Indian Express, dated 8.6.1984. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Hindustan Times, dated 8.6.1984. 87 Later, Chander Sheikhar sent a fact finding team to the Punjab to know the truth. However, in 1991, when Chander Sheikhar became the Prime Minister of India, in collaboration with and under the blessing of Rajiv Gandhi, he exhibited an altogether different attitude; rather he behaved as a fanatic Hindu and even went to the extent of threatening another massacre of the Sikhs. Earlier he had been demanding an apology for this invasion but when he captured power he himself did not apologise as P.M. (even other Prime Ministers e.g. I. K. Gujral, V.P. Sinh, H.D. Devegauda, Vajpayee, and even puppet prime minister Manmohan Singh, never apologised for attack on Darbar Sahib and atrocities committed on the Sikhs, in spite of the fact that they had known the truth behind the attack; they simply called it ‘sad’, ‘unfortunate’ and ‘it should not happen again’ the Congress Party used Manmohan Singh to apologize for ‘Black November 1984’ pogrom of the Sikhs; and that even after 25 years). 88 Monthly Surya, July 1984. 89 Ibid. 90 The Sunday Times, dated 10.6.1984, Nayyar, Kuldip, op. cit., p. 56. 91 Indian Express, dated 15.6.1984. 92 Chellany, Brahma, op. cit., p. 182. 93 Tully, Mark, op. cit., pp. 194-95, Harminder Kaur, op. cit., p. 49. 94 Ibid. 95 Details personally narrated, on the 10th of June 2011, to this author by Lal Singh, one of the rebel soldiers. 96 Indian Express, dated 13.6.1986. 97 Punjab Times, London, dated 15 and 22.6.1984. 98 Indian Express, dated 9.6.1984. 99 Ibid, dated 12.6.1984. 100 Ibid, dated 17.6.1984. 101 Ibid, dated 23.6.1984. 102 At that time, the Indian Government had lied that only 493 Sikhs had been killed (in fact the number was about five thousand). 103 The Sunday Times, dated 15.6.1984. 104 It is remarkable to note that the Sikhs’ rage against the Indian government’s invasion of Darbar Sahib was not just a temporary reaction; in June 2009, even after 25 years of the attack (and again in June 2011), between 25 and 50 thousand Sikhs joined protest procession at London, to commemorate the anniversary of the attack; like protest are observed in every part of the world every year
To be continued….



















