Showing posts with label ISAF forces. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ISAF forces. Show all posts
Afghanistan has enough evidence to try only 16 of 88 prisoners that the United States considers a threat to security and plans to free the remaining detainees, the president’s spokesman said on Thursday.
The move will further strain relations between the two countries that are already near breaking point over President Hamid Karzai’s refusal to sign a security deal to shape the U.S. military presence after most foreign troops leave this year.
Without a deal, Washington could pull most of its troops out after 2014.
The United States is strongly opposed to their release because it says the prisoners, being held in Afghanistan, have been involved in the wounding or killing of U.S. and coalition troops.
State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said on Thursday the United States considers 72 of those detainees dangerous.
“These 72 detainees are dangerous criminals against whom there is strong evidence linking them to terror-related crimes, including the use of improvised explosive devices, the largest killer of Afghan civilians,” Psaki said at a news briefing.
She said “time will tell” whether the release of the detainees will affect the signing of the agreement. Psaki said it was in the interest of the Afghan people and its government to sign it.
The Afghan government says, however, there is no evidence against 45 of the 88 prisoners, while the evidence against a further 27 detainees is not sufficient to put them on trial.
“We cannot allow innocent Afghan citizens to be kept in detention for months and years without a trial for no reason at all,” Karzai’s spokesman, Aimal Faizi, told Reuters.
“We know that unfortunately this has been happening at Bagram, but it is illegal and a violation of Afghan sovereignty and we cannot allow this anymore.”
The president’s decision came after the head of Afghanistan’s spy agency presented the cases against the prisoners at meeting on Thursday morning.
U.S. senators visiting Afghanistan last week said releasing the prisoners would irreparably damage ties with the United States, but stopped short of saying it would prompt a full military withdrawal.
On Thursday, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham said they had made clear to Karzai in Kabul last week their objections to the release, and said there could be some action in response.
“We are in contact with our military and civilian leaders in Afghanistan and will determine what course of action is appropriate once we have received additional information,” the two Republicans said in a statement.
Karzai has called the so-called “zero option” an empty threat and suggested any security deal can wait until after the presidential elections in April. The United States says it needs time to prepare a post-2014 mission.
In an age of satellite technology and the Internet, insurgent media operations have reached a level of technical maturity that often outpaces their adversaries.
Instant outreach: Twitter user and Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid tweeted this news of a suicide bombing on November 17. (Photo: Twitter screenshot) Main photo: Videos of attacks on ISAF forces are posted daily on the Taliban’s website. (Photo: Durrani)
Barely do insurgent attacks occur and the national and international media are alerted to the destruction and loss of life, video footage and photographs supplied, and statements and press releases issued via the internet.
These are not the fast manoeuvrings of governments or NATO forces to broadcast their version of events and their position. They are rather the media outreach of the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have proved themselves highly adept at communicating in the digital age.
“As the mujahedin of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan get steadily stronger they also try to equip themselves with new technologies,” said Afghan Taliban spokesman for the eastern region, Zabihullah Mujahid.
“During our operations we have a cameraman who shoots videos and takes pictures from the battlefield. Our mujahedin then use Facebook and YouTube to get our message out to the entire world,” added the spokesman, commenting by telephone from an undisclosed location.
Getting with the times
War of numbers: US troops under attack by the Pakistani border. Citing Haqqani Network spokesmen, Pakistani media reported the next day that five soldiers died and eight were injured. In reality, one Afghan soldier was wounded. US claims of high insurgent casualties have also often created doubt. (Photo: Nick Allen)
Ironically, the Taliban have had to adopt technologies they banned during their 1996-2001 rule of Afghanistan: computers, televisions, films and the Internet. But they also like to point out that they are not stuck in the ancient past and can also move with the times.
“The Taliban are educated and use modern technology in a good manner,” said Ehsanullah Ehsan, who until June was the spokesman of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the movement’s independently evolved Pakistani incarnation.
Militant websites spring up and get quickly disabled, but the Taliban have maintained a steady flow of information on their primary website. News is published daily in five different languages: Pashtu, Dari, Arabic, English and Urdu. And they bring the news to the media, rather than wait for the media to find it.
“In emergency situations and circumstances, we inform reporters via text messages,” said Qari Yousuf, Taliban spokesperson for the southern provinces. “On a daily basis, if it is not emergency circumstances, we communicate with reporters through email.”
“If an incident happens somewhere in the country, the Taliban inform us about it via text message,” confirms Wahid, a Kandahar-based newspaper reporter. “Sometimes we get the information from Taliban quicker than we get it from the Afghan government.”
“Like the US forces and the Afghan government, the Taliban and al-Qaeda also use propaganda,” says Esmatullah, a radio reporter in Kandahar. “Taliban insurgents use the internet, email, Facebook and Twitter.”
Skeptical reception
This recent Taliban website posting urges Afghans to reject the signing of the Afghan-US Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). (Photo: Durrani)
But since claims have been inflated by all sides, reports must generally be cross-referenced to construct a more accurate version of events. This is also a propaganda war, after all.
As the fighting in Afghanistan intensified from 2006, western reporters especially began to question claims of battlefield success.
For example, US media operations based out of Bagram Airfield ran daily bulletins about scores of insurgents killed in single engagements, with no supporting photographic evidence. Reporters stopped reporting the numbers and Bagram stopped issuing them, although this was also thought to be because the practice ran against counter-insurgency tactics.
Conversely, insurgent media operations have often posted far-fetched claims of numerous enemy soldiers and “tanks” being destroyed in single skirmishes.
No ordinary job
But there is no salary scale or pension plan doing insurgent PR: “Our press and media colleagues are not paid for their work,” said the spokesman Mujahid. “Like other mujahedin, they volunteer and perform their duties as jihad.”
As for the apparent contradiction of underground organizations being so PR active, they take their own security precautions. Thought to be based in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal belt or Baluchistan, Afghan Taliban spokesmen communicate with media from undisclosed locations. There is also speculation that the main names cited are aliases used by several people.
Similar security methods are employed by the Pakistani Taliban, which was only formally founded in 2007. But a larger population, higher literacy rate and depth of internet penetration in Pakistan also increases the range of its propaganda tsars.
“The social media has made our work easier, we can easily share our message with the people,” said Ehsan, also speaking from an undisclosed location.
“The social media has made our work easier, we can easily share our message with the people.” Ehsanullah Ehsan, former Pakistani Taliban spokesman
The TTP also contact prominent journalists with latest news events and claims of responsibility, just as they do with denials and disclaimers after incidents, he said:
“Sometimes blasts or other incidents are caused by other people, but people blame the Taliban. We then share our message through Facebook and Twitter and inform people that we had no connection with the incident.”
Radio outreach was also a key medium for militants in Pakistan in recent years, especially in the tribal belt and the Swat district, which emerged as an insurgent stronghold until it was cleared by the Pakistani military in 2009. Almost five dozen FM stations were set up in these areas to propagate the militant message.
“Our current [TTP] chief Mullah Fazlullah used to use FM radio to make people aware of the Taliban’s activities and preach Islamic law and Islamic rule,” says Ehsan, referring to the radical cleric from Swat who was in October named as the Pakistani Taliban’s new leader, and is now thought to be based in Afghanistan’s Kunar Province.
Revival of war chants
In Afghanistan, the public outreach work takes two distinct forms, said interviewees. One group of workers is responsible for direct media communications. The other promotes the Taliban’s agenda by defaming the Afghan government as a puppet entity that violates Islamic values.
As well as embracing social networks, insurgent groups have combined old methods with technology, notably the use of taranas, rhythmic chants without music, to stir a chord with youths especially.
Poetic and patriotic, the taranas are circulated via mobile phones, often with graphic video clips of attacks on foreign or government forces. New ones may emulate popular songs, so the association is instant and the original is used to promote a militant message.
This YouTube video showing Taliban fighters to the accompaniment of tarana chants was watched by 7,500 users.
“The Taliban’s taranas can easily be spread,” said Mohammad Khan, a resident of Kandahar city. “Many people now have smart phones equipped with cameras and memory cards, and can easily access these chants and share them with their friends via Bluetooth.”
Nasim, a 50-year old farmer from Kandahar’s Arghistan District, says local youths who went to Quetta to pursue religious studies recently returned to his village with Taliban recordings on their phones.
“They use the village mosque as a platform to promote and share their taranas and videos with other youths, who listen and watch very enthusiastically,” Nasim said. “Many such youths have joined the insurgents and now fight the Afghan government. I know four people who have taken up weapons and joined the Taliban.”
The taranas and videos can also be found in computer, mobile phone and DVD stores in Kandahar City, despite attempts to stop the sale of recordings “that promote violence and intimidate people,” said Dawa Khan Minapal, the head of Kandahar’s Information and Culture Directorate.
“By using these propaganda tools the Taliban have been able to recruit youths in the fight against the Afghan government and its international allies,” he conceded.
Watch your step
But while insurgent groups are quick to provide material, their broad access to the media is a worry to many journalists. Monitoring the main TV and radio stations, websites and newspapers, retribution can meted for reporting found to be unfavourable.
One presenter of a private TV channel in Peshawar recalled a discussion on air about the insurgency with a prominent Pakistani news anchor.
“During the break we received a threatening phone call from the Taliban,” he said. “When I denied certain allegations [made during the call], they even played back a recording of the programme.”
“To write anything against [the Taliban] is asking for trouble and you can lose your life,” said another journalist originally from North Waziristan, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Thirty-nine Pakistani journalists have been killed in the course of their work in the past decade, some of them after they were told explicitly by insurgents that they would be targetted if they continued reporting.
However, topping it all come a recent letter from outlawed Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threatening media houses and media personnel to stop showing insurgents in bad light.
The threatening letter which the TTP termed as fatwa or religious edict termed the journalists as hypocrites and suggested punishments like exile and murder as punishment for their propaganda against insurgents.
In December 2013, the TTP issued a statement they termed a fatwa, or religious edict, saying journalists who persistently cast the insurgent cause in a bad light would be liable for exile or capital punishment. The statement followed a small arms and explosives attack on the Karachi offices of Pakistan’s Express Media Group. The TTP later claimed responsibility and indicated there would be further attacks on media houses.
By Nang Durrani and L. Yousafzai
AFGHANISTAN TODAY
AFGHANISTAN TODAY
Azm-e-Nau refined
Pakistan continued to refine a military response to perceived Indian attack, with the Azm-e-Nau-4 exercise that took place in November. The Pakistani military claims that its forces can now be effectively deployed faster than their Indian counter-parts, and hold on against Indian advances for longer.
Tactically speaking, Pakistan is better suited for a defensive posture at the moment. Firstly because Pakistan does not, now or for the last decade, have the political traction required to stand against the international outcry of a pre-emptive strike, which India can easily present as an aggressive first move by Pakistan. The resulting damage to Pakistan’s reputation will not allow it to draw out favourable ceasefire conditions in the United Nations (as the plan envisions).
Secondly, Pakistan’s air force is outclassed by Indian inventory, especially as India moves to acquire modern aircraft like the Dassault Rafale and possibly the American F-35 which has a higher service ceiling than Pakistan’s latest JF-17 Thunder’s, and possibly the latest from the American technology (America is desperate for customers for its F-35 Joint Strike Fighter). In such an event, Pakistan will not be able to guarantee air superiority inside Indian Territory. However, using itsadvanced missile technology available, Pakistan will be able to create a shallow defensive umbrella (like Egypt in the Yom-Kippur War) where its armour and artillery can manoeuvre without the fear of attacks by enemy airforce. This will allow Pakistani forces to either blunt Indian advances or carry out their own limited thrusts into Indian Territory.
Having said that, in the current scenario, chances of drawing down India while Pakistan gathers international support for a ceasefire are sketchy because of (as previously mentioned) Pakistan’s lack of international support vis-à-vis India. This is especially damning given China’s relative lack of interest in Pakistan’s problems. As of late, Pakistan’s ‘all weather friend’ has (for good reason) refused to reciprocate the overly joyous warm words that Pakistan offers it. Without strong support from China, even military mobilisation like it did in 1965, India will feel no need to step back.
Afghanistan and NATO drawdown: Opportunities and threats
With the deadline for the Nato withdrawal getting closer, and Karzai’s rebuke of further US assistance until his demands are met, Afghanistan is placed at a precarious cross-roads that presents an opportunity for Pakistan.
Pakistan has so far failed to create strong institutional level relationships with its Afghan counterparts. But with the Nato drawdown, there one very acute shortage that the Pakistani military can help their Afghanistan in.
Currently the attrition rate for Afghan recruits in the Afghan National Army (ANA) is upto 50%. Almost half of this is due injuries sustained in the battlefield. Before the reduction in ISAF forces, the ANA had access to Blackhawk helicopters that could quickly airlift injured soldiers to hospitals. With the sustained drawdown, the ANA has seen a shortage of such facilities, even basic field hospitals, which has resulted in such a high attrition rate and great loss of life for the Afghan people.
The Pakistani military can fill this gap by offering to provide and train army doctors. The dividends of such a move, in Afghan goodwill and trust, will be enormous. So far Pakistan has concentrated too much on individuals when dealing with the Afghan government, instead of institutions like the Afghan military, intelligentsia, and diplomatic core; a fact that India has used to its advantage. This is an excellent opportunity for expanding the foundation of the relationship with Afghanistan to sustain regime change even as Indian presence shrinks along with Nato.
Without concrete overtures by Pakistan, the threat of a two-front war will become all the more real. Pakistan cannot afford to maintain troops in its northern province indefinitely, nor can it assume to control proxies in Afghanistan without spillover into Pakistan. The recent case of the Afghan intelligence wing trying to cultivate similar proxies against Pakistan should be a wakeup call for the Pakistani security agency: we do not have the resources to outlive an Indian-funded proxy war; our populations, national identity and federal unity will crack under the pressure.
The next election is likely to see a Karzai-backed candidate come to power again. Even if Karzai’s ambitions are not filled, Pakistan still has to overcome widespread distrust among the Afghan populations. Eitherway, it’s an uphill battle. But if Paksitan is able to create relations, and eventually treaties with in-built mechanisms that can accommodate political changes (much like the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan which has survived four wars), it can hope to create a list of goods and services it can offer the Afghan people which will eventually become an ‘off the table’ list in any future negotiation.
Economy, the ability to sustain total war, and the nuclear option
On December 6th, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves fell to an all-time low of $2.9 billion (enough for only one month of imports). In the next week however, Pakistan received an inflow $500 million from various multilateral organisations, bringing reserves up to $3.4 billion. After this rise, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar confidently advised citizens to ‘sell their dollars’ as he claimed the rupee would bounce back.
Realistically speaking, this is not possible. The minister’s positive sentiment and temporary cash inflows has managed to strengthen the rupee for the time being, but it is a temporary solution.
Basic economics- to strengthen reserves a country must increase exports (inflow of money) and decrease imports (outflow of money). The current government is putting its money on the GSP-Plus status with Europe and various Free-Trade-Agreements with smaller trade partners to increase exports. This might work, especially the GSP-Plus status which is expected to increase textile trade alone by atleast $1 billion. However, keep in mind that a) Pakistan has to invest heavily in power projects, which will results in large import of machinery and construction material, b) even though Pakistan is switching from oil-fired power plants to coal-fired, which will result in a significant reduction in the import bill, it will still have to import coal for a while before its hydel-generation projects and nuclear power plants are online, c) and most importantly, Pakistan still has to payback previous IMF loans.
As a result, the current appreciation in the Pakistani is temporary and artificial, no more than a political stunt by the ruling party.
With such weak reserves, Pakistan will be unable to survive even up to a month during a war, as supplies run out and fuel is spent. Any offensive operations are out of the question, and the resulting sense of insecurity will lead to an increased reliance on the country’s nuclear arsenal to ward of threats (both Indian and others). In such a scenario, it is imperative that the nuclear option is in no way allowed to seen as a permanent solution.
Keep in mind that this solution was adopted out of a sense of insecurity. The basic premise of this option is that ‘only mutually assured destruction will guarantee our survival’. This does nothing for the sense of insecurity. Such an option must have very clear and clearly outlined parameters in policy and discourse. The Pakistani generals must know, up to the closest inch, the lines in the sand that have to be crossed before the nuclear option is warranted.
The sectarian schism
Azm-e-Nau notwithstanding, Pakistan’s ‘threat from within’ remains stronger. 2013 began with attacks on the Hazaara community in Balochistan. The attacks continued throughout the year and the army was called in several times to provide security to Shiite processions and pilgrims in senstive locations. The focal centre of sectarian violence was seen to shift from Balochistan to the Punjab. The government bent over backwards trying to appease both sides to no avail. Despite the government’s ‘foolproof security plan’ for Ashura, the Rawalpindi Ashura massacre gave the nation a rude awakening call.
More than 7,000 army officials have been deployed in Rawalpindi to maintain peace today for the chehlum procession of Hazrat Imam Hussain.
The army, stretched between two borders and an internal security situation, has more challenges today than ever before. Hopefully, the government’s plan to create an Anti-Terrorism Force and absorb the Elite Force and Special Police Branch within the Home Department, will remove some of the burden for the army.
The creation of new institutions must of course be carried out so as to define clear parametres and boundaries so that there are no overlapping areas of duty.. That leads to confusion and conflict of interest within institutions.
The battle continues
2013 was a year of violence and political theatrics as far as the security situation is concerned. From talks with Taliban, to the aftermath of Mehsud’s death, lack of political consensus on counterinsurgencies, the drone strike dilemma and NATO supply blockades, the national security strategy has been on a turbulent roller coaster throughout the year.
The army saw a change of command this year and a new minister of defence. What with the government’s committment to the National Security Plan, restructuring of the police department and the constitution of the Anti-Terrorism Force, Pakistan is in a better place to combat security threats in the coming year than it was last year.
The challenges of this year have helped shape, streamline and focus the direction of peace keeping strategies.
One can only hope that the security challenges of the next year are well met by the government and the army. This can only happen if the well intentioned plans devised in collaboration with all peace keeping stakeholders are put into practice honestly and deftly. 2014 – The year of the end game- might as well be the year our security challenges end as well.
By: Taimour Khan and Sarah Eleazar
SPEARHEAD RESEARCH ANALYSIS
SPEARHEAD RESEARCH ANALYSIS
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